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ABSTRACT 
This study attempts to assess longitudinally the increase in the quality of performance 
information resulting from the Managing for Outcome (MfO) initiative, embarked on by 
the New Zealand Government in December 2001, and to identify the internal and 
external factors influencing the increase in quality. To measure the quality of 
performance information, a disclosure index was developed.  The index assesses the 
comprehensiveness of information in compliance with available guidance, and reflects  
the approaches used by Marston and Shrives (1991), and Guthrie et. al. (2004). The 
disclosure analysis was applied to publicly available planning documents - the 
Statement of Intent and Annual Report of 27 New Zealand Government departments 
over the period 2003-2007.  
Agency theory, focusing on the role of information in the accountability relationship 
between principals and their agents, and public choice theory, focusing on the 
mechanisms to mitigate public choice problems, are used to explain the improvement in 
the quality of performance information and the external and internal factors influencing 
the improvement in quality. The roles performed and the activities initiated and 
implemented by ministers and other government agencies in the MfO initiative are 
identified and analysed. The data for the study was obtained from the reports of selected 
New Zealand central government departments and from semi-structured interviews.  
The findings support the Auditor General‟s assertion of disappointing quality in 
performance information. Weak incentives for reporting outcomes, the lack of 
authoritative reporting standards, and constraints on measuring performance have been 
the key factors in explaining the lack of meaningful progress in New Zealand 
performance reporting practice implemented under the MfO initiative. The initiatives do 
not include proper accountability arrangements, where the ministers responsible for 
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outcomes also report; instead the current arrangement is that chief executives report but 
are not themselves accountable. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Performance reporting has been one of the most important developments in 
public sector accounting under the umbrella of the New Public Management movement. 
In the case of New Zealand public sector reform, the performance management and 
accountability framework is one of the building blocks of the new public sector 
management system. The focus of the framework in the New Zealand public sector 
setting was initially on the performance of output delivery. This focus has been 
broadened to include the presentation of outcome information. Even though this 
practice has been going on for more than ten years, there is limited evidence on whether 
the new reporting regime has improved the quality of performance information 
disclosed by agencies in the public sector. Furthermore, recent research on performance 
reporting in central government agencies is very limited. This thesis aims to fill this 
void. 
A. Research Problem 
The New Zealand model of public sector reform has generated considerable 
interest from the academic community since it was introduced in the late 1980s. The 
model is quite attractive to researchers, due to the pervasiveness of the reform and its 
strong adherence to underlying economic theories such as agency theory, public choice 
theory and transaction cost theory. The strong influence of these economic theories has 
resulted in the adoption of output-focused accountability and contracting in the New 
Zealand public sector. The New Zealand model was constantly discussed in the public 
sector literature during the 1990s. However, interest has diminished in the past decade 
even though the model has evolved from its original version. The basic accountability 
framework based on output delivery is still in place but it has been complemented by an 
accountability in the form of management for outcomes.  
Public sector performance reporting in New Zealand has formally shifted its 
focus from solely output-based reporting to a combination of output and outcome 
reporting following the introduction of the Managing for Outcomes (MfO) initiative in 
December 2001. This development is seen as an answer to a series of comments on the 
deficiencies of output reporting (see, for example, Gregory, 2003; Neale & Anderson, 
2000; Schick, 1996) and several high-profile failures in the public sector (such as the 
Cave Creek tragedy and health care sector issues). The aim of this new scheme of 
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reporting is to enable agencies to provide better performance information to strengthen 
decision making, to improve communication and interactions with stakeholders and to 
provide better accountability (Steering Group for the Managing for Outcomes Roll-out 
2004/05, 2003). The underlying idea is that better performance information would be 
provided if output information were supplemented by outcome information. 
There is a concern that public sector agencies in New Zealand have too much 
discretion in reporting performance information under the current reporting regime. 
Even though the reporting of non-financial performance is mandatory, as regulated in 
the Public Finance Act 1989, there is virtually no (authoritative) standard to be followed 
in reporting such information. Therefore, there is a concern that information is presented 
fairly. There is no direct pressure for public sector institutions to provide information 
that is useful, except for a set of information that is expected to be reported as 
prescribed in some guidance documents. There is a concern that the disclosure of 
performance information is directed more to public relations purposes rather than for 
accountability purposes. This concern has been confirmed in the recent Beckett and 
Gilmore report on the outcome of the Treasury‟s Review of Accountability Documents 
project (Beckett & Gilmore, 2007). 
The state of reporting regulation for non-financial performance information is 
not as advanced as that governing the reporting of financial information. There are 
sources of guidance (such as the TPA-9, the Controller and Auditor General‟s 
framework of public sector performance reporting and the Treasury‟s guidance) but 
none is authoritative. The audit function performed by the Office of Auditor General 
(also known as the Controller and Auditor General), as reported in its yearly 
Parliamentary Paper, is directed towards assessment of the information system and 
control environment for service performance management rather than actual reporting. 
Furthermore, the audit only provides an assurance on the quality of the performance 
information reported in the Statement of Service Performance. No review is undertaken 
of performance information disclosed in other corporate documents, such as the 
performance planning documents (the Department Forecast Report, later replaced by the 
Statement of Intent). 
The initial emphasis of the MfO initiative was to improve the quality of 
performance information found in the planning and reporting documents issued by 
public sector agencies in New Zealand. There was an expectation that this initiative 
would create an environment in which agencies would be able to provide high quality 
information in their formal reporting documents. The improvement in the quality of 
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performance information was seen as a sign of progress from this initiative. However, it 
is questionable that the desired improvement in the information quality can be realised 
when agencies can exercise wide discretion in reporting the information and no other 
governance mechanism has been put in place to ensure that departments provide better 
information. 
B. Need and Importance of the Study 
The only thing that does not change is change itself (Leif Ericsson Leo Veness) 
 
 Reform is about change. Even though reform does not necessarily change the 
fundamentals of the system, it certainly modifies the existing system. However, it seems 
that reform has been interpreted as continuous change. The New Zealand public sector 
system has been continuously changing since the late 1980s when the first „big bang‟ of 
change was initiated. The public sector system has not reached a steady state even after 
two decades since reforms originally started. Adjustments have continuously been made 
to the system to mitigate aspects deemed to be undesirable. The only certain thing in the 
reform process has been change itself. It has kept happening. 
 It has been a continuing challenge in New Zealand public sector reform on how 
to properly incorporate a focus on outcomes into the system. While the output focus is 
well established, the public sector system is dysfunctional while it lacks a proper focus 
on outcomes. Ministers have not been able to formulate adequate outcomes for agencies 
within their ministries. Governments tried unsuccessfully, using a strategic management 
framework, to develop some outcome measures. And lastly, government agencies have 
been forced to provide outcome information, even though they are not responsible for 
achieving outcomes. This situation seems to have gradually disappeared from public 
attention. There may be change in the future that will result in proper attention being 
given to outcomes. 
 While the initial changes were rigorously investigated by many researchers, 
subsequent changes have received limited attention. The MfO, which was the last 
attempt to provide a means by which outcome information in the New Zealand public 
sector could be provided, has scarcely been reviewed, and then mostly by practitioners. 
There has been limited attention from academics on this initiative. Most of the reviews 
have been focused on practical matters with theoretical perspectives being largely 
absent from the reviews. Furthermore, none have tried to analyse the public sector 
reforms using the theoretical foundation that underlies the reform. If there are issues 
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with the reform, before the blame can be directed at incompatibility with the theory 
applied, it is necessary to first investigate whether the reforms have faithfully followed 
what is proposed by the underlying theory. This kind of study has rarely carried out in 
the public sector setting. 
  One of the central issues to be addressed in public sector reform is the 
availability of better information to support public decision making. To be able to 
investigate this issue, there is a need to develop a measurement technique to assess the 
quality of information. While there are many proxies for disclosure quality, only simple 
proxies, such as indicator counts and categories, are used in the current literature 
investigating the quality of non-financial performance reporting. A more sophisticated 
technique called a „disclosure index‟, commonly used in studies investigating 
accounting narrative, is adopted only in public sector research that focuses on annual 
report. There is a need for a specific disclosure index that can be used in any study 
investigating non-financial performance information disclosed in the accountability 
reports of public sector agencies. 
 There is also a need to get more comprehensive inputs from various actors in the 
public sector regarding issues concerning public sector reporting. While some reviews 
offer explanations on the performance reporting issue, there is a concern that these 
reviews may provide a partial view since all of them were carried out by or on behalf of 
certain government institutions. There is a limited voice from the preparers of the 
information in these reviews. There is no review where the various parties involved can 
give their opinions so that arguments from all important sides are gathered and analysed 
together. This study attempts to become such a vehicle. 
C. Research Question 
This study focuses on the issues in the disclosure of non-financial performance 
reporting by addressing three concerns. The first concern is the level of quality of output 
and outcome information produced by New Zealand central government agencies. The 
second concern is whether the latest attempt to improve the quality of performance 
information, the MfO initiative, has been successfully implemented to produce better 
quality of information. The third concern is the need to identify the incentives and 
obstacles faced by public sector agencies in their efforts to produce better output and 
outcome information for accountability purposes and for public decision making.  
The series of research issues and questions addressed in this thesis are: 
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 whether the current assertions of the disappointing quality of performance 
information reported by public sector entities in New Zealand are justified; 
 how to measure the quality of performance information reported in the corporate 
documents of public sector agencies; 
 since one of the objectives of new initiatives is to improve the public sector 
system is to address the problem of information quality, a question to consider is 
the impact of the MfO initiative on the reporting practice of public sector 
agencies; 
 whether there has been progress in the reporting of outcome information by NZ 
central government agencies over time as a result of the MfO initiative; 
 the extent to which the disclosure of performance information by NZ central 
government agencies has followed the available guidance or benchmark over 
time; how much effort is required by agencies to meet the reporting benchmark;  
 what external and internal factors have driven improvements in the quality of 
information produced; 
 how various actors interact in performance reporting practice. 
D. Scope and Limitation of the Study 
 The scope of study has been limited by a number of factors, including: 
Events 
 There were many events that led to the changes in the performance reporting 
regime. Not long after the original reform in the late 1980s, the government initiated a 
modification of the public management system by incorporating a strategic management 
framework. This event led to the introduction of some measures of outcome information 
in the management and reporting system. There were also several individual initiatives 
by some public sector agencies to develop outcome focused management, such as 
initiatives by the Department of Corrections in its pioneering efforts to come up with 
some outcome measures for its operations. There were also two pilot projects, the 
Capability, Accountability and Performance (CAP) project and the Pathfinder project, 
which established the foundation for the implementation of the MfO initiative. 
 This study focuses only on the impact of the MfO initiative for two reasons. 
First, there are data availability issues with the other events. Investigating older events 
forces reliance mainly on document study since it is quite difficult to complement that 
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with interview or other methods of obtaining oral information. Most of the people who 
were involved in the processes related to the older events are no longer available for 
contact. In addition, there is also a problem of getting detailed information of the distant 
past based on people‟s memories. Second, some agencies were affected by the other 
events in particular localities only, therefore the general picture of reporting practice in 
the government agencies may not have been affected. This study focuses only on events 
and practice in central government agencies. 
Documents 
 New Zealand government agencies produce many documents that contain 
performance information. Estimates that are produced yearly contain performance 
information at output class level and some outcome information. An Output Plan, which 
is a yearly contract between a minister and the department/ministry, contains detailed 
performance information of output to be delivered. The Statement of Intent (formerly 
known as the Departmental Forecast Report) contains a shorter version of information 
in the Output Plan and some outcome information, in addition to projected financial 
results. The annual report contains performance information of delivered outputs, some 
outcome information, and the financial results of the ministry/departments. Some 
agencies may produce a Strategic Plan document that may contain some performance 
information. And lastly, there is a three or five yearly report issued by some government 
agencies that contains outcome information on certain issues, such as Social Report, 
Environmental Report, or Defence Long Term Development Plan.  
 This study is limited to investigating performance information in the Statement 
of Intent (SOI) and the annual report, for two reasons. First, these two documents serve 
as a pair to fulfil the public accountability requirements of government agencies. The 
SOI provides the targeted performance information. The annual report discloses the 
actual results of performance. Meaningful performance information should contain both 
the targeted and actual indicators. Since the information in the SOI can be paired with 
the relevant information in the annual report, both provide meaningful performance 
information. Other documents mostly provide targeted measures, without any indicators 
showing the results, such as Estimates, Output Plans and Strategic Plan documents. 
Other documents provide only actual indicators of performance such as a Social Report 
or Environmental Report. Second, only the Statement of Intent and the annual report are 
affected by the MfO initiative. Since this study is focused on this initiative, logically the 
documents targeted for analysis should also be the ones affected by this initiative. 
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Entities 
 There are many entities in the New Zealand public sector, such as departments, 
ministries, Crown entities, local government, schools, boards, etc. This study limits the 
analysis of performance reporting practice to that of New Zealand central government 
agencies. This limitation is necessary due to resource and time constraints. In addition, 
there is a concern that targeting different types of institutions may make the 
investigation too complex since such a study would have to incorporate differences in 
the characteristics of the institutions and in their accountability arrangements. 
Therefore, the validity of the findings of this study is confined to New Zealand 
government ministries/departments only. 
Sample 
 Due to data availability issue, this study could not target all agencies. It focused 
on agencies in which all sets of the SOI and annual report during the period of 
2003/2004 to 2007/2008 were available. Furthermore, for the purpose of testing the 
reliability of its research instrument, tests were conducted on a sampling basis only, due 
to cost concerns. Thus, the validity of the findings may be restricted. Later, in case 
studies, a sample of nine ministries/departments was selected in order to analyse their 
reporting practices. However, this does not mean that the findings cannot be used in 
developing hypotheses or in carrying out further studies. 
E. Preview of the Study 
 This thesis is organised into six chapters. The description of each chapter is as 
follows: 
 
Chapter 1 introduces the study by stating the problems and underlining the need to 
investigate the problem. There is also a list of the research questions explored and the 
scope and limitations of the study are outlined. 
 
Chapter 2 describes the background to the study for the purpose of establishing the 
context in which the problems were investigated. It describes how the New Public 
Management movement has changed reporting requirements in the public sector. It is 
followed by a discussion of the theoretical framework and principles of the public sector 
reform in New Zealand. The discussion continues with a historical review of 
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performance reporting practice during three regimes of performance reporting: the 
original model, the first modification with the strategic management framework 
initiative, and the second modification resulting from the implementation of the MfO 
initiative. Between consideration of these three regimes, reviews of the evaluation of the 
original model and the strategic management framework are presented. This chapter 
concludes with a discussion on current performance reporting practice in New Zealand. 
 
Chapter 3 presents a comprehensive review of the literature relating to the theoretical 
framework used, the prior research on the topic, and the methodology used. The two 
theories that used in the analysis are presented in this chapter: public choice theory and 
agency theory. Public choice theory focuses on public sector problems and provides a 
rich template for analysing the behaviours of actors in the public sector setting. Agency 
theory is discussed with special consideration of its application to analysis of issues in 
the public sector. Later, these two theories are combined in the analysis of public sector 
reform in general.  
 
Chapter 4 outlines the research methodology for this study. It provides details of 
development of the disclosure index, reliability and validity testing, and scoring the 
documents. It also describes the development and the implementation of case studies, 
including the interview technique used and the analysis of interview results. 
 
Chapter 5 presents the findings. The findings are presented in two parts: the findings 
from disclosure analysis and the findings from interview. The findings are described in 
six parts, starting with general discussion and leading into discussion of more specific 
areas later. The first two parts provide a foundation for the analysis in the last four parts. 
These two parts consist of a discussion of problems in areas of public choice in the 
Westminster system, (the political system in New Zealand), and a map of principal-
agent relationships in the New Zealand central government setting. The third part 
provides an evaluation of the MfO initiative. The last two parts present an analysis of 
the reporting environment of the New Zealand central government, and discuss the 
factors that may promote or inhibit reporting practice. 
 
Chapter 6 provides the conclusions. It outlines the nature and purpose of the study. It 
also summarises the research results and the discussion of the findings. 
Recommendations are put forward for policy makers while suggestions are made for 
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further research in the area of performance reporting in the context of central 
government agencies. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
 The New Public Management (NPM) movement during the 1980s led to the 
adoption of non-financial performance reporting as one of the core and visible 
components of the public management system. More performance information was 
required, as contracting processes were increasingly used in the management of public 
sector agencies. The application of explicit standards and measures of performance was 
necessary for the functioning of the contract system in which one party has to perform 
activities or deliver results to the other party according to some agreed standards of 
performance. Consequently, performance information was required to be available at 
the end of and/or during the contract duration to enable the other party to assess whether 
performance or delivery was in accordance with the contract. The framework for 
reporting performance information has also been a focus of public sector reform in New 
Zealand. In order to provide an appropriate perspective for this research, it is important 
in this part of the study to provide background information on performance reporting 
practice in relation to NPM and the evolution of performance reporting practice in the 
New Zealand setting. Changes in the reporting framework are highlighted and several 
potential issues related to the research situation are identified and discussed. 
A. New Public Management and Performance Reporting in the 
Public Sector 
Researchers coined the term New Public Management to describe the adoption 
of private sector management practice in public sector reforms during the last three 
decades. Glynn and Perkins (1997) argue that NPM philosophy has three principal 
tenets: the adoption of private sector management concepts and styles, the introduction 
of quasi-markets and contracting processes, and the application of explicit standards and 
measures of performance. There was a strong conviction that the private sector is more 
efficient and effective, and therefore it seemed necessary to adopt the good practices 
used in private sector management to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of public 
sector management. The presence of the market facilitated the formation of price, which 
in combination with contracts was seen as a powerful mechanism for resource 
allocation. In addition, when explicit standards and measures of performance were more 
directed towards output rather than input, they were regarded as giving more flexibility 
to public sector managers to deliver effective and efficient services. 
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Dunleavy et al. (2006) argue that NPM combines the three approaches of 
disaggregation, competition and incentivisation to improve management of the public 
sector. As results and efficiency are rigorously pursued, government institutions are 
split into smaller and more fragmented units that only deliver products/services with 
similar characteristics. Agencies deal with each other on a user-pays basis. Competition 
is fostered between different public agencies and between public agencies and private 
institutions using quasi-markets. Public managers are rewarded on the basis of their 
performance in delivering the products/services and managing the agencies. 
Consequently, the management style in NPM philosophy emphasises output targets, 
limited term contracts, monetary incentives and freedom to manage (Bevir, Rhodes, & 
Weller, 2003). 
The definition, measurement and reporting of performance is an important 
element of the NPM. The specification of performance, in terms of output and/or 
outcome, for the accountability process is the building block of public sector reform 
around the world. These performance indicators, which are oriented to accountability in 
terms of results, are seen as a part of the NPM (Hood, 1995). As Behn (1995) identified, 
the performance management issue is one of the three big questions in contemporary 
public management.  
The form that accountability and performance management takes is defined by 
how the term performance is further specified. Two foci are commonly referred to in the 
performance specification: outputs and outcomes. Output refers to the goods and 
services delivered by government agencies. Outcomes are impacts on the communities 
caused by the delivery of outputs. Reformers of public sector management would focus 
accountability on outputs, outcomes, or a combination of both. This focus is not always 
fixed all the time. As in the case of the New Zealand model, there has been a strong 
pressure to shift the focus of performance reporting from an output orientation toward a 
combination of output and outcome information in the last two decades. 
The use of performance information in public sector management depended on 
the concept of accountability adopted in the reform. Any reform that views 
accountability as control will use contract-based performance reporting (Mayston, 
1993). First, the performance aspects that should be accounted for by public sector 
managers are specified. Once the performance aspects are defined, performance 
indicators are selected for each aspect of performance. Targeted indicators are then 
presented in the planning documents of government agencies. At the end of the period, 
agencies report on the achievement of the performance targets. In this way, the planning 
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documents serve as a contract of performance, fulfilment of which is reported on in the 
annual report. The audit function is carried out to ensure that performance information 
is fairly reported. 
Another view of accountability is as a means of dialogue (Roberts, 2002). In this 
setting, the performance information that is reported allows for a dialogue to take place 
between the agency and its stakeholders and this can follow disclosure-based 
performance reporting. For example, outcome information in New Zealand government 
reporting would be presented as additional disclosure, to accompany the financial 
statements and the statement of service performance. There is limited audit work on this 
information, the main aim being to ensure there is which is mainly to assess its 
consistency with the financial information. 
 An orientation toward performance indicators is not without criticism. Smith 
(1995) lists three unintended effects of this situation: ossification, tunnel vision, and 
suboptimisation. Too much focus on performance indicators can inhibit innovation, 
especially if accountability of performance is the main focus in performance reporting. 
A lack of innovation can lead to the problem of ossification. An organisation is then 
incapable of producing actions beyond its perimeter. The problem of tunnel vision 
occurs when managers focus on an area that is quantified in the performance 
management scheme at the expense of qualitative aspects of performance. Similarly, a 
suboptimisation problem will occur when managers focus on the achievement of their 
narrow local objectives at the expense of the objectives of the organisation as a whole. 
B. Theoretical Framework and Principles Underpinning Public 
Sector Reform in New Zealand 
 The New Zealand model of public sector reform is strongly influenced by three 
economic theories: agency theory, public choice theory and transaction cost theory. 
Officials from central agencies
1
 initiated the reform in New Zealand after issuing a 
series of policy papers that discussed a strategy to rectify the perceived deficiencies of 
New Zealand public sector management. When the concepts and principles of the NPM 
were adopted in designing the New Zealand model of reform, these theories served as 
the theoretical framework for the model. Boston (1992) argues that the influence of 
                                                 
1
 The term “central agencies” refers to three agencies in the New Zealand state sector that provide 
leadership within the state sector.  They consist of the Treasury, the Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet and the State Services Commission. They have a state sector system-wide perspective, and 
engagements and connection with every other organisation in three important areas: government strategy, 
budget, and performance. 
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these economic theories features in the three most important features of the New 
Zealand model. First, the principal-agent relationship in the New Zealand public sector 
is clarified so that agents will not face situations in which they have to serve multiple 
(and possibly conflicting) principals. Second, the way the incentive structure is designed 
is based on this clarified relationship and is intended to induce the agents to act in 
accordance with the interests of their principals, which will mitigate the public choice 
problems of the bureaucrats or the agency problems from the perspective of agency 
theory. Third, changes are made to ensure that the transaction cost is minimised in 
institutional arrangements by examining the relative costs and benefits of employing 
and supervising agents versus the option to purchase externally.  
 In public policy and management, two broad classes of problems have emerged 
from the transaction cost perspective: public choice problems and agency problems. The 
public choice problems stem from the capture of policy and resources by organised and 
better-informed special interests as well as public institutions. There are two aspects of 
public choice problems: the first is related to political decisions and the other deals with 
bureaucratic decisions. In political decisions, politicians may decide to fund 
programmes or projects directed to benefit their local and/or specific constituents 
instead of ones that benefit the majority of voters. In bureaucratic decisions, concerns 
are raised that public sector bureaucrats may not act in the best interests of their political 
principals. This is essentially an agency problem, which is caused by employing people 
in public delivery systems whose incentives need to be aligned with the legislature‟s or 
governing bodies‟ established policy objectives. This alignment results in a class of 
transaction costs known as agency costs. These costs include the costs of establishing, 
monitoring and enforcing contracts for service delivery and deadweight losses due to 
contract imperfections.  
 The aim of the New Zealand model, as stated in the Steering Group‟s review of 
the reform in 1991, shows the influence of these three economic theories.  The reform is 
aimed at establishing a policy framework based on „Clear, prior specification of 
intended performance, appropriate delegation of decision-making authority, subsequent 
monitoring of achievement and the careful application of incentives and sanctions‟ 
(Steering Group, 1991, p. 60). From the public choice perspective, essentially this is to 
control the bureaucrats so that their capture of government policies is minimised. From 
the agency theory perspective, similar controls over bureaucrats are needed to minimise 
agency costs.  
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 Bale & Dale (1998) argue that there are five characteristics embodied in the 
New Zealand model that clearly show that the model is strongly based on ideas 
borrowed from public choice theory (especially in mitigating the public choice 
problems which stem from bureaucratic decisions) and agency theory. The 
characteristics are: 
 Clear lines of accountability are established between government ministers as 
the principal and their departments as the agent.  
 Department performance is defined in an unambiguous and measurable way. 
The non-financial performance, for example, is measured and assessed at the 
output level of the departments.  
 Authority is delegated to chief executives, especially in relation to the 
management of inputs allocated to produce the targeted performance.  
 Incentive systems are designed to reward or punish chief executives in relation 
to achievement of the targeted performance.  
 Structures for reporting and monitoring performance of chief executives are put 
in place. 
 The Treasury, in its official briefing document to the incoming government in 
1987, as quoted by Cook (2004), formulated five cascading principles underpinning the 
New Zealand public management system: clarity of objectives, freedom to manage, 
accountability, effective assessment of performance, and adequate information flow. 
These principles show the strong influence of public choice theory and agency theory in 
the New Zealand public sector reform, in which performance assessment, incentives and 
information play an important role in the relationship between principals and agents. 
The starting point of a well functioning public management system begins with the 
specification of objectives. The objectives that chief executives are responsible for 
achieving should be specified as clearly as possible. If possible, the objectives should be 
identified individually and multiple and conflicting objectives should be avoided. The 
next step is the delegation of authority and power to make resource allocation decisions 
in order to achieve the objectives efficiently and effectively. This condition requires the 
ability of chief executives to freely manage inputs. Good public sector management 
should complement this freedom to manage principals with a proper incentive system 
and accountability mechanism.  A system that provides incentives and sanctions to 
modify the behaviour of chief executives should be in place, so that they pursue the 
established objectives instead of their own goals. Chief executives must be accountable 
for their performance and their principals must be able to ask for accountability and to 
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reward accordingly. The performance should be assessed effectively, and the 
assessment must be able to differentiate between the controllable and uncontrollable 
aspects of objective achievement. Lastly, performance assessment needs sufficient 
quantity and quality of information concerning the chief executive‟s performance. 
C. The Original New Zealand Model: Output-Focused Performance 
Reporting 
 The State Sector Act 1988 (SSA 1988) and the Public Finance Act 1989 (PFA 
1989) reflect public sector management from the perspective of agency theory, in which 
the principals, agents and the relationship between them are modelled, defined and 
structured following a set of principles (Boston, Martin, Pallot, & Walsh, 1996). The 
principal for the executive agents is defined very specifically as ministers, replacing the 
previous arrangement of multiple and ambiguous stakeholders. Chief executives are 
employed to serve ministers.  
 There are two critical aspects of the new arrangement. First, the critical link in 
the accountability chain focuses on the relationship between the ministers and 
departmental chief executives. The New Zealand model goes one step further by 
concentrating only on one relationship, while in public sector reforms in other 
jurisdictions, multiple accountability relationships are still preserved. Second, the tasks 
of each party in the relationship are set so that the accountability and responsibility of 
each party are clear (Scott, 2001).  
 The relationship between the ministers and their agencies is set to have two 
dimensions: ownership interest and purchasing interest. The ownership interest follows 
the relationship that exists in the private sector where the principal (government or the 
Crown via a minister) is viewed as the owner of departments (government agencies). 
The interest of the owner is similar to the interest of investors in general. They desire 
the best return possible from the resources allocated to the departments. Public 
production lowers the wealth of society if the rate of return earned from this investment 
is lower than the return on comparable investment in private ownership (Scott, Bushnell 
& Sallee, 1990). As an owner, the principal demands accountability for financial 
performance from the agent for managing his/her ownership. Financial reporting 
standards for discharging this accountability are borrowed from the established 
framework used in the private sector. 
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The purchase interest, which was developed specifically for the public sector 
setting, recognises that the same principal has a purchase interest in his/her departments. 
Principals have the option of acquiring goods and services (outputs) from departments 
or sourcing them from more competitively priced suppliers in the private sector. To 
meet the policy objectives of the government of the day, ministers act as a member of 
the Cabinet to plan and negotiate the services required from their departments. In 
making their decisions, ministers may ask for advice from the department providing the 
services and may also employ independent advisors (Scott et al., 1990). The ministers‟ 
concern in a purchase decision is to get value for money, as if their department is 
buying from an independent supplier. The accountability on purchase interest is 
contractual. At the beginning of the fiscal period, there is a contract that specifies the 
outputs to be delivered by the departments. This contract is documented in detail in the 
Purchase/Output Agreement and reported in summary in the Statement of Intent 
(Department Forecast Report). At the end of the fiscal year, the achievement of the 
agencies in providing the planned outputs is presented in the Statement of Service 
Performance (SSP) and is then assessed. 
Boston (1992) further elaborates the task of ministers and chief executives in the 
purchase interest form of the relationship. As principals, ministers are responsible for 
choosing the outputs to be purchased and for the outcomes associated with these 
choices. They have the task of setting policy agenda, determining departmental 
priorities, specifying their desired outcomes, deciding on the outputs necessary to 
achieve these outcomes, and monitoring the chief executive‟s performance in delivering 
the outputs. As agents, chief executives are responsible for delivering the outputs 
selected. They have the task of ensuring that the minister‟s requirements are satisfied 
and of taking responsibility if they cannot deliver the outputs as specified in the 
contract. The accountability is structured in a staggered scheme, in which executives of 
the agencies are formally accountable for outputs via contractual arrangements, and the 
ministers are supposedly held accountable for the outcomes to parliament (the public) 
via the political arrangement. In addition, executives of the agencies have other forms of 
accountability to the State Services Commissions and other Scrutiny Agencies (see 
Figure 1 below). 
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Figure 1 Accountability Arrangements in the New Zealand Public Sector (Adapted from Anderson 
& Dovey, 2003). 
 
The sole focus of chief executives‟ accountability to ministers is one notable 
characteristic of the New Zealand model that differentiates it from public sector reform 
models in other jurisdictions. In contrast, the models in other jurisdictions incorporate 
the accountability of heads of government agencies directly to the public who use the 
public service, in addition to the accountability to ministers. The accountability of chief 
executives of New Zealand agencies to the users of services is exerted indirectly via 
ministers and Parliament. Public agencies are accountable to ministers and to 
Parliament which, in turn, is accountable to the voters who elected the representatives. 
This accountability arrangement is in line with one of the underlying principles of the 
reform, which is the clarity of objectives. If managers face uncluttered lines of 
accountability, they may have a better chance of managing efficiently and effectively. 
On the other hand, if public managers face twin direct accountability to ministers and 
members of the public, there is a possibility of accountability conflicts, especially 
among the front-line staff. They may face a dilemma in their loyalties, of whether to 
focus more on serving the members of the public or to serve their management objective 
of serving the minister. 
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The specification of public services contained in the annual contracts for service 
provision between ministers and chief executives are based on the upward 
accountability to ministers and Parliament in terms of the suitability of agreed outputs 
for the preferred outcomes. The contractual obligation is between ministers and chief 
executives. The contract specifies members of the public as beneficiaries of service 
provision, but they are not formal parties to the contract. Therefore, they cannot directly 
hold chief executives accountable. As Mulgan (2008) argued, this accountability 
arrangement reflects the purer form of the Westminster system in which the central 
mechanism of government accountability is the chain of ministerial and parliamentary 
accountability. Officials answer to their superiors, the chief executives, who then 
answer to ministers. Subsequently, ministers answer to Parliament and lastly Parliament 
answers to the people. 
In addition to clear specification of objectives, responsibility and performance, it 
is necessary to devise the right incentive system and establish proper authority. The new 
arrangements incorporate a new type of incentive by applying labour-market 
mechanisms. Permanent tenure for departmental heads is abolished and replaced by 
term appointments. They are called chief executives. The State Services Commission 
(SSC) manages the appointment process. Each appointment is made on contract for up 
to five years, with the possibility of reappointment. The contracts also contain terms of 
employment, which are negotiated by the SSC. The Governor-General in council makes 
the appointment decision, based on recommendations submitted by the SSC. The Prime 
Minister and Minister of State Services approve the term of employment. This 
mechanism, as Scott et al. (2001) argue, ensures that ministers have little ability to 
influence the identity of chief executives, other than at initial employment, or any of 
their conditions of employment. This is essential in the Westminster system to ensure 
that bureaucratic appointees remain politically neutral and only serve the government of 
the day.  
 Scott (2001) argues that if properly implemented, the new public management 
framework promotes a degree of detachment from the past legacy of input-based public 
sector management in which ministers and central agencies had to argue for the added 
value of a certain service from a position of less information than the department had. 
With the identification of ministers‟ objectives and requirements, there is always a need 
to question the existing services and their costs, whether they are appropriate for these 
objectives and requirements. The chief executives cannot assume that the past service 
will still be required. There are incentives in place for departments to produce outputs 
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arising from an analysis of current and future objectives and requirements. Chief 
executives have to demonstrate the value added aspect of their existing and proposed 
services. 
As mentioned by Scott et. al. (1997), the most controversial element of the New 
Zealand reforms was the selection of outputs, rather than outcomes, as the measures of 
non-financial performance for accountability purposes. Reformers claimed that 
enforcing accountability to chief executives in terms of outcomes would not be 
workable as there are problems of measurability, causality, control and time frames. The 
focus on output accountability in the New Zealand model is in line with the principle of 
performance measurement which requires such measurement to be carried out in an 
unambiguous and measurable way, so that the accountability relationships between 
ministers and executives are clearer and stronger.  As ministers are still responsible for 
outcomes, there is no intention to reduce the attention on outcome achievement. There 
is an expectation that while government agencies are tightening the management 
process by understanding the value of the concept of controllable outputs, they are also 
identifying and pursuing better outcomes (Scott, 2001).  
The selection of outputs as the focus of accountability has been based on some 
perceived problems in the New Zealand public management system. Scott (2001) 
identifies three problems that were intended to be addressed by output-focused 
accountability. First, ministers did not always have enough understanding of and/or give 
enough attention to the range of activities being carried out by departments. They may 
have given attention to some areas of their interests but they were frequently poorly 
informed on other areas of departmental services. Ministers also may have had a 
perception that many of the services in the areas outside their concern were not highly 
valued, either by themselves or by the recipients of the services. Second, the 
responsiveness of bureaucracy to changes in policy was still not on a level that ministers 
considered satisfactory. Government agencies were not fast enough to respond to 
changes in politicians‟ policy preferences. Even though ministers had an array of 
administrative controls at their disposal, they felt that they did not have the degree of 
control necessary to ensure that their policy preferences were being implemented. Third, 
there was a perception on behalf of ministers that the accountability mechanisms for 
departmental heads were very weak. There were no appropriate incentives, as the tenure 
of departmental heads was permanent. In addition, there was no prior specification of 
service delivery in a given period so that it was difficult to extract information 
subsequently in order to provide effective accountability. 
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D. Evaluation of the Model 
 After a decade of implementation, the new accountability arrangement has 
generated mixed results. Researchers have claimed that the reforms have improved 
accountability in the New Zealand public sector setting. The reforms also brought 
enormous efficiency gains in the NZ public sector (see for example, Newberry & Pallot, 
2004; Schick, 1996; Scott et al., 1997). The flexibility introduced by the accountability 
arrangements has enabled public managers to do more with fewer resources.  
 On the other hand, researchers are also quick to raise their concerns about the 
New Zealand model in several respects. First, a system that focuses on output is not 
compatible with ownership interest. Second, the accountability for outcomes has not 
been formalised in the system. Third, coordination among public sector agencies for 
pursuing shared outcomes is greatly undermined in this model. Fourth, as outcomes are 
not explicitly stated, there is a concern that the decisions on outputs may not take into 
account the consideration of outcomes. Lastly, there is an ongoing issue with output 
specification or output definition making it an uninformative guide to what the public 
would expect from public agencies.  
 Some researchers have raised concerns that the focus on outputs and the 
purchase interest of the principal will undermine the ownership interest of the same 
principal. Newberry & Pallot (2004) quote the concern raised by the State Services 
Commission that these arrangements will erode the long-term capability of agencies and 
thus the ownership interests of government in the agencies, the same concern as 
previously raised by Schick (1996). This ongoing resource erosion could eventually 
make departments lose the capability to perform even their core functions (Audit Office, 
1999). As Campbell (2001) has put it, there is a serious distortion in the relationship 
between ministers and public managers as a result of an overemphasis on outputs.  
Some other researchers argue that the accountability arrangements of the New 
Zealand model do not operate properly in practice, especially in relation to the 
accountability of the ministers. The principals (ministers) are accountable for the 
outcomes of their agencies under the political accountability arrangements. The Public 
Finance Act 1989 (PFA 1989) requires ministers to identify the link between the outputs 
and their (Government‟s) outcomes in the Estimates submitted to the parliament. 
However, ministers, for the most part, do no more than assert in the Estimates that 
certain outputs contribute to certain outcomes. In addition, there is no requirement for 
ministers to devise measures of performance to demonstrate progress towards 
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achievement of outcomes (Ussher & Kibblewhite, 2005). When the PFA 1989 was 
being discussed and considered, the Controller and Auditor-General raised concerns 
about the lack of requirements in the bill for ministerial reporting on outcomes (Neale & 
Anderson, 2000). The lack of a reporting requirement on outcome information, and the 
separation of output and outcome accountability, are key factors in the unsatisfactory 
linkages between agencies‟ outputs and the ministers‟ intended impacts on spending 
programmes (Webber, 2004). As quoted by Scott et al. (1990), the comment of the 
Controller and Auditor General in his submission to the Finance and Expenditure Select 
Committee of Parliament on the Public Finance Bill gives a good summary of this issue. 
The New Zealand model falls short of being a well-structured set of accountability and 
reporting provisions because it has a significant omission in the provision for ministerial 
reporting on outcomes (Finance and Expenditure Committee, 1989, p. 18). 
The case of the Cave Creek disaster, and the subsequent enquiry, shows how the 
accountability arrangements in the New Zealand model were tested as to whether proper 
accountability would rule when problems arose in the public sector. On 28 April 1995, a 
scenic viewing platform in Paparoa National Park collapsed, resulting in the death of 14 
people. A commission headed by Judge Graeme Noble conducted an enquiry into this 
disaster and concluded that nobody individually or collectively was responsible for the 
tragedy. Instead, the system and the culture within the Department of Conservation 
were to blame. Consequently, there was no immediate resignation from senior officials 
because of this disaster. The Minister of Conservation asserted that accountability in 
this case was provided by his public accountability and his determination to ensure that 
corrective actions were implemented. The minister insisted that he could claim that he 
fulfilled his duty of obligation as a minister under the doctrine of ministerial 
responsibility, if he was prepared to answer fully for the events and could address the 
flawed system and culture that contributed to the tragedy (Gregory, 1998).  Eventually, 
the minister resigned after the media and public pressured him intensively. A new 
minister was appointed and the State Services Commission conducted a full review of 
the Department of Conservation.  
In analysing this case, Gregory (1998) argues that in a Westminster regime, the 
accountability flows from the requirement that ministers are answerable to Parliament 
and the electorate for their own and their department‟s actions and/or inactions, not 
from the ability to make them or their chief executives resign from their positions. This 
doctrine is seen as inadequate, since ministers have actively tried to avoid resignation 
on several occasions by distancing themselves from political responsibility when their 
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department‟s administration has gone wrong. The New Zealand model was designed to 
ensure that rigorous assessment of the responsibility of ministers and chief executives 
could be applied so that rewards or sanctions could be given accordingly. Yet, in the 
case of the Cave Creek disaster, this assessment could not be properly implemented.  
The argument for ministerial and managerial responsibility still revolved around the 
ministerial answerability for the problem and the promise of ensuring that shortcomings 
were corrected. 
Gregory (1998) further argues that in this tragedy it was not easy to differentiate 
something as an output or as an outcome, even though the responsibilities of ministers 
and chief executives were clear in this regard. It could be argued that a safe viewing 
platform was the desirable outcome. Therefore, the outputs that were to be purchased 
were all necessary components to ensure that the platform was safe, including certain 
types of bolts that should have been purchased and used to install the doomed platform. 
The Purchase Agreement should show the detailed performance of the output. On the 
other hand, another argument could be raised that the output purchased by the minister 
was a safe platform, not just a platform. Therefore, the minister should apply the caveat 
emptor principle. He should be wary of buying a faulty platform. The main question is 
whether the separation of responsibility embodied in the public sector reform has led 
public agencies to be concerned more on measuring outputs rather than producing 
desirable results. Public managers might focus more on the short-term achievement of 
output delivery and thus undermine the agency‟s roles and functions to help ministers 
realise their desired outcomes. 
 Another criticism is that the New Zealand model placed too much focus on the 
horizontal relationship between chief executives and their ministers and too little on 
their relationship with the Cabinet as a whole (Boston, 1992). Many outcomes sought 
are shared outcomes that require a combination of outputs produced by several 
departments. Boston (1992) further argues that there is no mechanism that ensures a 
coordination of activities within the government agencies to pursue these shared 
outcomes. There is no involvement or oversight by the Prime Minister or Cabinet in the 
preparation of performance agreements. There is also no provision that requires a chief 
executive to consider the shared outcomes of the government and coordinate or 
cooperate with other departments in the development and implementation of policies 
across the public sector. Therefore, he concluded that there is an impression that the 
responsibility of the chief executive is to provide outputs for individual ministers rather 
than the outputs necessary to achieve the collective interests of the government. 
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 Boston & Pallot (1997) argue that the problems of horizontal coordination 
between government agencies were intensified in the New Zealand model. The reform 
has shifted public sector management into a more decentralised system. This system, 
combined with the accountability focus shared between chief executives, contributes to 
the problem of coordination. Chief executives argued, when interviewed by a review 
team on the state sector reforms in 1991, that leadership and strategy (for the 
government‟s collective interests) were the constitutional responsibilities of the cabinet 
and ministers, as quoted by Boston and Pallot (1997). Their expectation was that the 
government would provide or agree on a set of priorities in the form of policy goals or 
outcomes. Unfortunately, the Cabinet did not develop or articulate them, so individual 
ministers and their chief executives could not specify the intended outcomes that 
represent a collective interest of the government. Hence, horizontal coordination was 
not properly supported. 
 There is also concern that there was no systematic evaluation process to ensure 
that the outputs specified and produced were the best combination of outputs to achieve 
the Government‟s objectives or outcomes. Most reviews on the New Zealand state 
sector reforms, including reviews done by Schick (1996), Scott (1996), and the 
Controller and Auditor General (1999), have all pointed to issues of linkage between 
outputs and outcomes. Petrie and Webber argue that these issues have two different 
aspects. The first aspect is the difficulty in relating specific outputs to broad outcomes 
and the second aspect is the lack of a mechanism to monitor and evaluate outcomes. In 
the first aspect, the Controller and Auditor General (1999) asserted that government 
agencies have narrowly interpreted the term “link” used in the PFA 1989 for relating a 
class of outputs to outcomes. They simply assert that a class of outputs will contribute 
to an outcome without an elaborate explanation of how it is expected to do so. In the 
second aspect, the reporting of outcomes is not developed in the formal system, leading 
to the lack of a mechanism to monitor and evaluate outcomes.  
 Petrie and Webber (2006) argue that the main problem/weakness is that 
departments and agencies could not re-evaluate their activities as a part of an annual 
process of output specification to find out the best way to contribute to the 
Government‟s objectives or priorities. Therefore, no process was in place to seek 
continuous improvement in the alignment of outputs to outcomes. The problems in the 
New Zealand model are largely with the effectiveness of government interventions, 
which is the extent to which the desired outcomes are achieved through the delivery of 
outputs. The effectiveness appears more problematic in three areas in which the level of 
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difficulty is quite high, in relating outputs to outcomes: policy advice provision, social 
service delivery (such as outputs in the area of healthcare, education, housing, 
entitlements, Maori Development, etc.), and regulation activities.  
 The last issue with the New Zealand model, as Mulgan (2008) puts it, is the 
problem relating to the definition of outputs or output classes for which departments are 
accountable. This problem is quite apparent in the area of policy advice delivery. The 
decision to focus on outputs in the accountability relationship is based on the preference 
for results that are less ambiguous and more easily specified and measured. However, 
some outputs remain difficult to specify meaningfully, so that they cannot be used as 
informative guides of the public‟s expectations of public servants. If someone is 
dissatisfied with the performance of an agency, he or she can point to the specification 
to highlight his/her points of dissatisfaction. In practice, the purchase/output agreements 
and output statements are rarely used in public debate on government accountability. 
Mulgan (2008) argues that output information is bypassed in public debate because it is 
not specific enough to be helpful in nailing down the government agency‟s obligation, 
especially in the area of policy advice in which the output classes seem to be 
incomprehensible and the performance measures are tedious. 
E. The First Modification: Strategic Management Framework 
 During 1993-1994, not long after the implementation of public sector reform, 
the government (under the leadership of the National Party) initiated corrective action to 
the New Zealand model by adopting a longer-term Strategic Management Framework. 
The government introduced strategic measures under a new policy-making framework 
in the form of strategic result areas (SRAs). Ministers and officials were required to 
define the strategic nature of their business as related to these SRAs and thus confirm or 
revise the key result areas (KRAs) developed for each SRA related to them. Boston & 
Pallot (1997) state that this framework was developed to address three concerns: 
inadequate specification of government goals or objectives, the lack of governmental 
strategic vision in the policy and budgetary process, and the lack of proper coordination 
among agencies within the public sector. 
 Before the development of SRAs, there was no formal strategic management 
process in the New Zealand model. There was a requirement in the PFA that the 
Estimates should provide information on the link between each class of outputs and the 
Government‟s desired outcomes for each vote in the government budget. Therefore, 
ministers were required to be explicit about the outcomes that their departments were 
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trying to contribute or achieve. However, as previously mentioned, this requirement is 
narrowly interpreted by providing a simple assertion about the link, instead of 
elaborating on it, if outcomes were identified in the Estimates. These outcomes were 
only identified if the information was available formally through high-quality policy 
advice provision or informal information dissemination (Cook, 2004).  
 Boston and Pallot (1997) argue that the adoption of KRAs and later the related 
SRAs was a combination of two unrelated initiatives. The development of SRAs was a 
top-down process by the National-led government to develop long-term objectives of 
the government. On the other hand, the development of KRAs was undertaken by the 
SSC to try and correct some perceived deficiencies in the new public management 
system adopted in the late 1980s. This initiative was essentially a bottom-up approach. 
 They state that the top-down process was started when the SRAs framework was 
introduced following a failed project of improving the government‟s strategic 
management by developing a model that encompassed social and economic strategies. 
This model was perceived as an extensively complex framework with complicated 
interconnections and was further complicated by the tendency that every department 
wanted to be considered as strategically relevant. Developing such a complicated model 
proved to be an overwhelming task for the government. A simple alternative model was 
developed under the leadership of David Kirk, political advisor to the prime minister at 
that time, by preparing a policy statement setting out the National Party‟s long-term 
objectives for  government. This policy statement was published in a document entitled 
“Path to 2010” about four months before the general election of 1993. The document 
contained the major objectives of the government, but did not spell out a detailed 
programme to achieve these objectives. When the National Party won the 1993 election, 
they faced the problem of translating the broad vision in “Path to 2010” into more 
detailed policies and a clear set of priorities. 
 Boston and Pallot (1997) also state that the bottom-up process was started at the 
same time under the leadership of the SSC and the Department of Prime Minister and 
Cabinet (DPMC). During the early 1990s, it was becoming apparent that there were 
some deficiencies in the new public management system for performance specification, 
monitoring and assessment. The most unsatisfactory aspect was in assessing 
performance, as the quality of performance agreements varied from one agency to 
another and they also lacked specificity. The SSC then developed the idea of KRAs as 
the key measures for which chief executives were held accountable. KRAs were the 
most significant objectives set for chief executives to achieve during a financial year.  
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 This initiative was essentially an effort to align the interests of the SSC in 
assessing the performance of chief executives and the interests of chief executives for 
which their performance was assessed (Boston & Pallot, 1997). The SSC wanted to shift 
public management from quantitative and output-based management into something 
more qualitative and focused on outcomes, which was missing in the original model of 
New Zealand public sector reform. This focus was also longer term to provide equal 
attention to the ownership interests of government, which by nature tends to be longer 
term. Chief executives wanted to see the delivery of outputs placed in the context of 
government priorities. 
 The DPMC played an important role in the development and implementation of 
SRAs, since coordination was needed to ensure that SRAs for each individual agency 
could link to the government goals described in “Path to 2010” (Boston & Pallot, 1997). 
The term SRA came later in 1994 during an early exercise of the SSC and DPMC in 
reviewing the performance agreements of chief executives. The DPMC introduced the 
term SRA to serve as a bridge between the broad objectives of the government in “Path 
to 2010”. KRAs were introduced into the performance agreement of each agency. Under 
the DPMC directions, departmental chief executives decided on the SRAs appropriate 
for their departments in terms of three areas that they had to consider. First, they should 
find out what their ministers wanted to achieve in their portfolio area. Second, they 
should identify the two or three objectives that their department needed to meet to 
achieve the goals set out in “Path to 2010”. Third, they had to ensure that those 
identified objectives corresponded with the priorities of their ministers. With these 
directions, the DPMC had asked chief executives to consider the government‟s 
collective interests embodied in “Path to 2010” when framing their departmental 
outcomes. 
 The risk management process was also part of this strategic management 
exercise (Boston & Pallot, 1997). The DPMC required chief executives to identify some 
of the most serious risks or key issues that might jeopardise the department‟s efforts in 
achieving the government‟s collective interests and key policy goals. These identified 
key issues or risks were later confirmed with the respective ministers when senior 
DPMC officials met with them individually. 
 The result of the SRAs development process was a paper that outlined a new 
strategic management process that government agencies should follow and listed all 
identified specific SRAs (Boston & Pallot, 1997). The paper was discussed and later 
endorsed by the Cabinet in May 1994 after it was referred to the Cabinet Strategy 
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Committee for consideration. Even though the initial set of SRAs was considered as an 
internal management tool, it was later available for the public in February 1995, before 
the first budget policy statement under the new Fiscal Responsibility Act was produced.  
The SRAs document contains a description of each policy area identified, the objectives 
for each policy area in terms of outcomes and a list of activities to be carried out during 
the next three to five years to achieve each objective. The document serves as a 
reference for government agencies in selecting the appropriate SRAs. Since chief 
executives were involved in the development of SRAs, the objectives were directly 
applicable and relevant to them. With the SRAs, the strategic objectives of the 
government are integrated with the performance of departments.  
 The SRAs were expected to be the basis for yearly plans of government 
agencies. They served as the outcomes which chief executives had to consider in 
planning and offering the set of outputs to be purchased by their respective ministers. 
However, KRAs, instead of output information, were used as a basis for performance 
assessment since they were viewed as measures that were more specific and less varied. 
Each year, ministers and chief executives confirm, and revise when necessary, a series 
of KRAs based on the published SRAs. The KRAs were developed only for areas 
critical to a department‟s business. If the activities conducted by departments related to 
SRAs, chief executives had to specify the particular SRAs to which their departments 
would contribute. In these cases, KRAs would show an emphasis on the achievement of 
particular SRAs. If the activities were not related to SRAs, emphases in the KRAs 
reflected the minister‟s priorities and the strategic effectiveness of the organisation. 
 This new development translated into the practice of linking departmental 
outputs with the identified outcomes (defined as SRAs and measured using KRAs). In 
planning documents (Departmental Forecast Reports), executive agencies identified the 
SRAs related to their operations and stated the KRAs. In developing the annual 
planning documents, which contain output specifications, executive agencies discussed 
and re-evaluated with their respective ministers how their outputs might best contribute 
to achievement of the government‟s objectives (SRAs and the related KRAs). In the 
annual report, the longer-term outcome accountability is discharged by requiring 
executive agencies to report on progress towards achievement of the planned KRAs. 
This process is expected to enable executive agencies, together with their ministers, to 
seek continuous improvement in the alignment of outputs and outcomes. 
 With the introduction of KRAs into the New Zealand model, chief executives 
were induced to adopt a longer horizon in their planning. The SSC expected that the 
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KRAs did not vary greatly for the three-year period corresponding to the election cycle 
period in New Zealand, unless there was a major change in strategic direction agreed by 
ministers (Boston & Pallot, 1997). The basis for assessing the performance of chief 
executives and departments was observable and verifiable milestones were provided for 
each KRA. Therefore, SSC required chief executives to provide these milestones in 
detail (including the dates of delivery) so that the progress towards achievement could 
be measured. 
 One of the strong points of the introduction of the strategic management 
framework in the New Zealand model was the identification of shared outcomes and 
thus the facilitation of coordination among relevant agencies in developing strategies for 
achieving these outcomes. There were two mechanisms for promoting the identification 
of shared outcomes and the coordination of activities among agencies. First, in the 
performance agreement, there was now a requirement for chief executives to cooperate 
and consult with other departments where appropriate (Boston, 1992). Central agencies 
monitored the fulfilment of this requirement and included the results as a part of the 
annual performance assessment process. Second, the State Services Commissioner 
reviewed each draft of the KRAs with the assistance of the Secretary of Treasury and 
the head of the DPMC before chief executives and ministers could finalise and sign the 
performance. The review assessed how good the specification of KRAs was, whether 
they were internally consistent, whether they were congruent with the KRAs of other 
departments and how compatible the KRAs were in contributing to a shared SRA 
(Boston & Pallot, 1997). This review also ensured that all relevant parties had been 
consulted in the KRAs development. 
 However, this modification did not produce the intended result of mitigating the 
concerns held about the original New Zealand model. Various reviews have been 
conducted and so far, the reported results have been mixed. The benefits mentioned are 
better clarification of the Government‟s strategic objectives, improvement in the 
“conversation between ministers and chief executives” regarding strategic planning 
(State Services Commission, 1998a), and better specification of outputs (Petrie & 
Webber, 2006). The weaknesses identified related to the goals (SRAs), the measures 
(KRAs) and the assertions of links between outputs and goals. The goals are too broad 
to be useful as strategic directions (Ussher & Kibblewhite, 2005). On the other hand, the 
specification of KRAs has been seen as too narrow (Controller and Auditor General, 
1999; Petrie & Webber, 2006) and there have been a lack of targets or quantifiable 
measures of progress over time (Ussher & Kibblewhite, 2005). Many KRAs also 
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involved milestones which lacked challenge (Controller and Auditor General, 1999). In 
addition, the relationship between outputs and goals has been interpreted narrowly by 
simply asserting that a class of outputs will contribute to an outcome without describing 
how it might be expected to do so (Controller and Auditor General, 1999). The SSC 
(1998b) also concluded, as quoted by Petrie & Webber (2006), that the main area of 
concern is a weak connection between strategy and spending. They questioned the 
appropriateness of the application of private sector approaches to strategic management 
in public sector institutions. The strategic management approaches of the private sector 
are applied in an environment where there is a single coherent sense of purpose, 
whereas government institutions typically have multiple objectives that cannot be 
coherently combined. The strategic management approach cannot be adopted easily 
without making appropriate modifications. 
 Although the Strategic Management Framework had been successful in some 
respects in drawing the attention of executive agencies to the importance of the 
relationship between their activities and the expected or intended policy impacts 
(Webber, 2004), this initiative had been largely abandoned by the late 1990s. Webber 
(2004) argues that political and bureaucratic factors were behind the reasons for this 
abandonment. The political factor could be seen in the way in which the new Labour-
led coalition government was determined to roll back some of the policy reforms of the 
1980s after the coalition won the election in 1999. In relation to the bureaucratic factor, 
there was a growing perception that executive agencies did not give sufficient attention 
to the results of their activities in their accountability for outputs. The KRA initiative 
was unable to remedy this situation since it is not a formal correction of the perceived 
shortcomings in the government‟s outcome specification and the links between 
outcomes and outputs (Controller and Auditor General, 1999). The Auditor General 
(1999) also noted that there is a risk that this framework is unlawful, as it is not a part of 
any legislation. 
F. The Second Modification: Managing for Outcomes  
 The origin of Managing for Outcomes, the next adjustment to the New Zealand 
model of public management, can be traced back to the analysis and recommendation of 
the Review of Centre (RoC) published in 2001 (Webber, 2004). The RoC is a review 
conducted by a committee of officials from central agencies with input from a small 
number of external advisers. In the review process, they broadened their focus from just 
reviewing the roles and activities of the central agencies into assessing the broader 
 30 
public management issues, particularly analysing various shortcomings that had been 
identified in the original New Zealand model. The Advisory Group on the Review of 
the Centre (2001) argues that there are three main categories of perceived problems in 
the model. First, there is a lack of integration in the delivery of government services. 
Second, the activities of departments and agencies within and between sectors are 
fragmented because there is a lack of an alignment mechanism. Third, the building and 
sustaining of institutional capabilities and organisational culture is considered weak. 
The RoC‟s recommendations are focused on incorporating a much stronger outcomes 
focus into the budgeting and expenditure management process to complement the 
existing output-based model. 
 One thing that is similar between the strategic management framework 
modification and the MfO modification is that they are both an incremental approach to 
the existing system. Both modifications are intended to complement the existing output-
based system. The strategic management framework was aimed at combining the top-
down strategic management process with the bottom-up output-based planning. The 
RoC considered that the MfO is aimed at softening the output-based model rather than 
replacing it with a new or different approach. The focus of the MfO-based public 
management system is to incorporate the balanced perspectives of outputs and 
outcomes. While ministers are still responsible for outcomes, chief executives are now 
responsible for “managing for outcomes”, in addition to their existing responsibility of 
delivering the agreed outputs. The desire to keep the existing output-based system intact 
was supported by the government of the day when the Minister of Finance in 2003 
stated that the output-based model was viewed as sound, so there was no need to make a 
major amendment (Webber, 2004). 
 The difference between the two modifications is in the approach to outcome 
identification and reporting. The combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches in 
the strategic management framework led to the establishment of a flawed system in 
which the development of output and outcome measures was not integrated. The end 
result was an attempt to combine three incompatible mechanisms (the “Path to 2010”, 
the KRAs and the output-based management) into a single strategic planning system 
that seeks to align the internal strategic planning within government agencies with that 
of the government. The MfO can be considered as a bottom-up approach in which the 
departments play key roles in identifying, measuring and reporting outcomes, by 
consulting with their respective ministers. The internal strategic planning process should 
ensure that the strategies developed are aligned with the outcomes. Therefore, the RoC 
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recommended that there should be a requirement for the departments to develop 
procedures and documents in their annual planning activities to strengthen their internal 
strategic planning process, to ensure that outcomes are identified, measured and 
monitored.  
 At the same time the Review was conducted, the central agencies implemented 
two pilot projects to improve public management with two objectives: assessing the 
viability of outcome-based management being implemented in the New Zealand public 
sector and supporting the public sector agencies in implementing the MfO initiative. 
These pilots, which were known as the Capability, Accountability and Performance 
(CAP) Pilot and the Pathfinder Project, were used as a means to support some 
departments that were willing to participate in the development of a more results-based 
approach to their policy advice and service delivery operations. The most extensive 
pilot project is the Pathfinder Project, which was implemented in 2001/02. There were 
15 departments that took part in the Project, including some which had participated in 
the earlier CAP trials (Economics and Strategy Group, 2003). For other non-
participating departments, support was provided later in the form of an intensive series 
of workshops and guidance materials under the MfO initiative (Webber, 2004). 
 The official announcement of the MfO initiative was made in December 2001, 
which was close to the announcement of the results of the RoC. MfO was intended to 
require all public sector agencies to adopt a more strategic and outcome-focused 
approach to management and reporting (The Steering Group for the Managing for 
Outcomes Roll-out 2004/05, 2003). In this new initiative, departments were required to 
produce an annual Statement of Intent, to replace the Department Forecast Report as the 
performance planning document, that would emphasise a „strategic outcomes 
framework‟ (Webber, 2004). This document was supposed to function as a means for 
strategic discussions between agencies and their respective ministers and other 
stakeholders (Anderson & Dovey, 2003). The consequence of this focus was a gradual 
shift of reliance from the previous narrower output-based planning to a broader 
outcome-output-based planning (Webber, 2004), which would take into account the 
responsibility of executive agencies for the development of their long-term capability 
(Anderson & Dovey, 2003). This initiative essentially puts more burdens on chief 
executives to improve the quality of outcome information in public management 
processes. 
 With this new initiative, the public sector reform in New Zealand shifted from 
the question of „what does government do?‟ to „does government achieve anything?‟ 
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(Gray, 2005). Although chief executives were not accountable for achieving the 
outcomes (results), they were now accountable not only for delivering the outputs but 
also for their contribution to the achievement of outcomes. In their reporting documents, 
executive agencies were to show that their outputs were specified to achieve certain 
impacts (results), which were supposed to be agreed upon with their key stakeholders, 
and measures were described for achievement of these results. The SOIs and Annual 
Reports had to contain commentary and indicative measures on outcomes, strategies, 
risk and capabilities (Anderson & Dovey, 2003). 
 As this initiative was starting to be implemented, two issues with the existing 
output-based budgeting were also identified. First, the legislative requirement for 
departmental output based on „Output Classes‟ had created some problems when 
ministers attempted to relate the output classes to the intended outcomes. There was 
some evidence that the expenditure categories contributed to an increasing lack of 
understanding and interest of ministers in the detailed spending of their departments 
(Economics and Strategy Group, 2003). As stated by Webber (2004), although there 
was a shift towards more management-related output categorisation in recent years to 
enable ministers to relate the outputs to the outcomes, the criteria were not consistently 
applied. Furthermore, only some departments provided a meaningful indication of the 
purpose and the intended impact of expenditure to Parliament or the public. Second, 
several significant areas of departmental administration were difficult to define in a 
meaningful and measurable way in terms of outputs and output performance, such as 
policy advice or ministerial servicing (Webber, 2004). As outputs could not easily be 
specified, the related outcomes were also more difficult to specify. 
 To date, two reviews have been conducted on the MfO initiative: one by the 
Treasury and the other by the Controller and Auditor-General (Economics and Strategy 
Group, 2003). The first review was conducted by Roger Beckett and Simon Gilmore in 
2007, following a request from Finance Minister Michael Cullen. They conducted 
interviews with both parliamentary and non-parliamentary users on their perceptions of 
departments‟ accountability documents. They found that there was a concern among 
users that these documents were not as effective as they should be, in fulfilling their 
purpose of supporting decision-making in budgeting and assessing performance 
(Beckett & Gilmore, 2007). The second review assessed the quality of service 
performance information contained in the 2007/08 SOIs based on their developed 
criteria. Overall, the CAG was disappointed with the quality of information reported, 
especially in the presentation of logical links between the medium-term outcomes and 
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outputs planned and the specification and relevancy of performance measures and 
targets for the outputs and outcomes (Controller and Auditor General, 2008). 
G. An Overview of Managing for Outcomes  
 The MfO initiative gave more responsibility to chief executives. In addition to 
their responsibility to deliver outputs, chief executives were responsible for managing 
their department‟s activities toward achieving outcomes. Instead of waiting for the 
government (or ministers) to come up with the department‟s outcomes, chief executives 
were required to be pro-active in ensuring that the outcomes were set so that they were 
able to align policy advice and service delivery to pursue them. Chief executives had to 
show that the outcomes were established and measured and that they were altering their 
mix of outputs as circumstances dictated, to better pursue outcomes. 
 In the SSC‟s official documentation of MfO, the Economic and Strategy Group 
(2003) stated that the ability of chief executives to implement MfO initiatives was 
confirmed by the visibility of some key components. These key components of MfO 
were categorised in three aspects: planning, management and reporting. In the reporting 
aspects, changes in the requirements for issuing reporting documents (the Statement of 
Intent, Estimates, Output Plans and Annual Report) were minimal in the immediate 
future. There was no new document to be produced under this initiative. The only 
cosmetic change was the change in the name of a planning document title, from the 
Departmental Forecast Report to the Statement of Intent. However, over time, the 
content and quality of these documents were to reflect improvements from the adoption 
of the MfO initative in the area of planning, management and performance. The 
documents were expected to show that chief executives were managing the delivery of 
outputs toward some specified outcomes. 
 There were to be significant changes in the planning aspect of public sector 
organisations. Three components that were expected to be visible in this area, as 
discussed by the Economic and Strategy Group (2003), were:  
 Strategic planning. In strategic planning, the chief executive had to be able to 
relate the department to the sector(s) in which the department was operating by 
incorporating a well-defined set of government or sector outcomes. They had to 
be able to articulate what their department was trying to achieve in contributing 
to the broader objectives or outcomes. In their planning, they were essentially 
preparing an outcome framework with an effective intervention logic that linked 
their outputs to the government‟s outcomes. The most visible result from 
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improved strategic planning was to be in the form of the availability of a well-
structured department‟s outcome framework in the corporate documents. 
 Stakeholders’ consultation and coordination. Chief executives had to be able 
to show that the stakeholders were involved in the outcome-focused strategic 
planning. The planning had to involve at least two tiers of management within 
the department. The relevant outside stakeholders were to be consulted to a 
certain degree, especially the responsible minister(s). 
 Improvement by trial and experience. Since a learning process is necessary in 
the effort to find the most effective interventions to achieve certain outcomes, 
there was an expectation that over time, the quality of the outcome framework 
and the discussion around it would improve with trial and experience. 
 There were five visible key components in management by which the chief 
executives had to show that they were successfully implementing the MfO initiative. 
These components, as explained by the Economic and Strategy Group (2003), were: 
 Modified business plan and/or improved output plans. There was an 
expectation that the business plan included the output plans, when departments 
were making a detailed operational plan of their new strategic framework. The 
progress was reflected in the form of alignment of the department‟s existing 
outputs to specific outcomes and/or modification of outputs to achieve the best 
combination to achieve the stated outcomes. 
 Implementation of performance monitoring. Since outcomes were to be 
consistently monitored, there would be performance measures against outcomes, 
especially for the priority or vital ones. Departments had to develop a capability 
to monitor performance that would support the managerial decision-making over 
time. 
 Changes in the management system, organisational culture and/or long-
term capability requirements. The long-term reflection of managerial 
engagement around outcomes may be reflected in changes to these 
organisational features. 
 Improved coordination among government agencies and better 
communication with stakeholders. Outcome-oriented management required 
chief executives to continuously consult and collaborate with relevant 
stakeholders, central agencies and other government departments. The evidence 
that they were going in the right direction was initially seen in the development 
of shared outcomes and later in the possibility of shared funding, managerial, or 
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service delivery responsibilities. If chief executives understood what other 
agencies were contributing to the broader goals, it would also show that 
coordination and cooperation among agencies had improved. 
 Improved internal coordination. Internally there would be improvements in 
the coordination within a department. Staff would exhibit better understanding 
of their departmental objectives and their division‟s or business unit‟s 
contribution to the achievement of the departmental objectives. 
H. The Current State of Performance Reporting in New Zealand 
 In terms of information disclosure, two major changes have been implemented 
under the MfO initiative. First, executive agencies are required to provide outcome 
information in addition to information about their planned outputs in the SOI. Second, 
they are required to report the achievement in terms of output production and outcome 
achievement in the Annual Report. 
 The SOI is a planning document submitted by government agencies to 
Parliament that provides a description and explanation of the agencies‟ key operating 
intentions and performance expectations over the medium term of a 3-5 year period. 
The content requirements as stated in the PFA can be divided into two broad sets of 
information: a medium-term set of information for a minimum of three financial years 
and an annual set of information for the first financial year covered by the SOI. The 
medium-term set of information describes the agency‟s function, their targeted 
achievements (goals, impacts, outcomes and/or objectives), their strategy for achieving 
the targets, and their proposed metrics to measure the achievement. In terms of the 
strategy, agencies should describe the following information: the rationale (links) 
between their outputs and their selected and targeted outcomes, the risks (unintended 
outcomes) identified and managed, their past and future major evaluative activities to 
monitor their achievements, and any collaborative activities planned with other 
organisations (The Treasury and State Services Commission, 2007). 
 New unaudited information is also required to be recorded in the Annual Report 
relating to the achievement of the medium-term and yearly plans described in the 
related SOI. The PFA requires agencies to disclose their progress against the targets set 
out in the SOI. The reports should cover the achievement of agencies against their 
targeted milestones using the proposed metrics described in the SOI. The reports should 
also contain information about the execution of the strategy. Agencies will determine 
their own format for reporting this information since there is no particular format 
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prescribed. The Treasury cites the criteria used in the NZ Institute of Chartered 
Accountants Annual Report Awards as a reference for good reporting (The Treasury, 
2006). 
 The current reporting regime for performance reporting in NZ consists of two 
sets of information: audited output information and unaudited outcome information. 
While the Statement of Service Performance could be used to report the output and 
outcome information, most agencies only reported output information in the Statement 
of Service Performance. The Statement has to be audited by the Auditor General in 
terms of the accuracy of information. Some documents can be referred to for the 
presentation, as the Treasury points out (see for example, The Treasury, 2006; The 
Treasury and State Services Commission, 2007), such as the Technical Practice Aid No. 
9: Service Performance Reporting or the OECD‟s documentation entitled “Specifying 
Outputs in the Public Sector.” 
 The outcome information is usually reported in the unaudited part of the Annual 
Report. For the reason of avoiding the audit requirement, most agencies report the 
outcome information in this part of the Report. Therefore, the emphasis of this study is 
the whole Annual Report, not just the Statement of Service Performance, since the 
former provides more complete picture on the presentation of output and outcome 
information. The format of outcome information presentation is presented usually in the 
form of narrative information with some graphical and diagrammatical information. 
Similar to output information, there is no accepted standard for the presentation of this 
information. More documents are available for reference in the reporting of this 
information. Those documents are: 
 FRS-2: Presentation of Financial Reports, issued by New Zealand Institute of 
Chartered Accountants (NZICA)
2
 in 1994 and amended in 1996. This document 
sets out, among other things, the mandatory requirements for service 
performance reporting. Until the introduction of International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) in the public sector in 2007, this standard was 
legally binding on the entities to which it applies since it had been approved by 
the Accounting Standards Review Board (ASRB) for the purpose of the 
Financial Reporting Act 1993. The corresponding standard under IFRS is NZ 
IAS 1 Presentation of Financial Statement (last revised in 2007 and amended in 
                                                 
2
 This body was first known as NZ Society of Accountants, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in New 
Zealand and now as New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants 
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2009). This standard has also been approved by the ASRB and is thus also 
legally binding on affected entities. 
 TPA-9: Service Performance Reporting, issued by NZICA in 2002. This 
document contains comprehensive guidance for the specification, measurement 
and reporting of service performance. The guidance is developed based on best 
practice in service performance reporting. 
 Reporting Public Sector Performance, 2nd Edition, issued by the Controller and 
Auditor General in 2002. This document contains the Auditor General‟s view on 
the proper presentation of reporting public sector performance. 
 Managing for Outcomes: Guidance for Departments, issued by the Treasury in 
2003. This guidance is intended to help government departments in 
implementing the MfO initiative. It contains suggestions on how outcome 
information should be reported in the corporate documents. 
 Guidance and Requirements for Departments: Preparing the Statement of Intent, 
first issued by the Treasury in 2003, and amended yearly with the latest one 
being 2007. This document provides a detailed instruction on how to prepare the 
Statement of Intent, including the format of the presentation of outcome 
information. 
 Public Finance Act 1989, as amended in 2004. This act sets out the requirements 
for public sector reporting. The act also lists the required information to be 
disclosed in the service performance disclosure. The 2004 amendment sets out 
further performance information related to outcomes, cost effectiveness and 
organisational health and capability. 
 Preparing Annual Reports, first issued by the Treasury in 2005 and later 
amended in 2006. This document provides detailed guidance for departments to 
prepare their annual report, including the format of the presentation of 
performance information. 
 Performance Information Measures and Standards in the SOI and Annual 
Report, issued by the State Services Commission in 2006. This document is 
intended to provide further and elaborate guidance for government departments 
in developing and reporting performance information in the corporate 
documents. 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. Theoretical Framework 
Public choice theory and agency theory are the most important economic 
theories underlying public sector reform. This research focuses on the influence of these 
theories on the current situation in the New Zealand public sector. The aim is to point 
out which components of the reforms that do not consider these theoretical perspectives. 
Therefore, this research uses these perspectives as the lenses for collecting and 
analysing data to support the findings. Public choice theory is used to identify and 
explain the conformity of the changes in the public sector system to those proposed in 
the theory, especially in the area relating to information produced in the 
legislative/political environment. Agency theory is the lens for identifying and 
explaining factors that led to the adoption and improvement of performance information 
reported by the New Zealand central government agencies. The focus of analysis using 
this theory is on the relationship between government agencies and various stakeholders 
in relation to the production of information. This theory is used to identify the presence 
(or the lack) of mechanisms used and their effectiveness in promoting more 
performance disclosure by agencies.  
1. Public Sector Problems in the Perspective of Public Choice Theory 
Public choice theory is a positivist approach to studying and understanding the 
political and bureaucratic process in the public sector. It is an application of economics 
to the political environment. This theory explains the incentive mechanisms and 
processes of the appropriation and distribution of goods through political means, rather 
than through purely economic means. The political means of public good production is 
unique, since the benefits and the costs can be concentrated or diffused. This theory is 
different from the previously dominant normative public sector approaches because of 
the difference in the assumptions of the participants in the political and bureaucratic 
spheres. The conventional view holds that public officials are pursuing public interest, 
in which they faithfully carry out the “will of the people”. In modelling the behaviour of 
individuals in the public sector, public choice theorists assume that people are guided 
predominantly by their own self-interest. Their motivations are no different whether 
they participate in the political process or in the market. Voters will support candidates 
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or ballot propositions that they believe will make them personally better off. 
Bureaucrats will seek to advance their careers. Politicians want to be elected or re-
elected. In essence, public choice theory is the use of the rational actor model of 
economic theory to understand the realm of the public sector environment. 
Ostrom & Ostrom (1971) list four assumptions of public choice theory: 
 Individuals are self-interested, which means individuals have their own 
preferences that affect the decisions they make. These preferences may differ 
from one individual to another.  
 Individuals are rational. It means they are able to rank all known alternatives 
available in a transitive manner.  
 Individuals adopt maximising strategies, in which individuals make consistent 
choices from those alternatives that they think will give them the highest net 
benefit based on their preference.  
 There are levels of information possessed by the individuals: certainty, risk, and 
uncertainty. These levels are based on the individual‟s knowledge of strategies, 
outcome for each strategy and his/her preference for each outcome.  
Public choice theory focuses on explaining how decisions are made in the public 
sector and why the decisions taken may not be as optimal as those that are made in the 
market. The fundamental unit of analysis in this theory is the individual. Organisations 
or a group of people do not make choices, only individuals do. Therefore, the model of 
public sector decision-making should incorporate how the diverse and often conflicting 
preferences of these self-interested individuals are expressed and pulled together when 
making a collective decision. 
This theory also describes why public choice processes are different from those 
in the private sector. The differences are in the incentives and constraints that direct the 
self-interest pursuit of individuals in these two sectors. In a private choice process, such 
as buying cars, individuals choose among the available alternatives based on their 
personal circumstances. They capture the benefits and bear the costs of their own 
choices. The purchase decision is voluntary and a deal will happen if both buyer and 
seller are better off after the deal. On the other hand, for decisions in a public setting, 
such as politicians proposing a programme to fund the fixing of leaky homes for New 
Zealand citizens, the benefits and costs will be shared. There is no guarantee that 
everyone is better off with this decision. People who have leaky homes will support this 
programme because they are likely to get most of the benefits. They will show greater 
support if the funding comes from taxes that are assessed uniformly on the community 
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as a whole. However, people who do not own leaky homes will vote rationally against 
the proposal, since the costs for them exceed the benefits. If they are the minority in the 
community, they will be forced into paying for it. The collective decision-making 
process will make the majority impose their preference on the minority, unless those 
who are harmed can relocate easily to another political jurisdiction or individuals can 
veto a proposal that would harm them.  
Public choice theory depicts the behaviour of three actors in the political realm: 
voters, including interest groups; politicians; and bureaucrats. There are two hierarchies 
in which these actors interact with one another to determine the appropriation and 
distribution of goods. The first hierarchy is the political market in which voters, interest 
groups and politicians meet and are involved in an aggregate decision-making process 
to sort out government policies. Bureaucrats do not play an active role in this hierarchy. 
They may provide politicians (in the parliament) with information for the decision-
making process, but they do not actively seek to change the outcomes of the process to 
satisfy their preference. In fact, in most cases, they are not allowed to actively 
participate in the political process. The second hierarchy is in the government 
management process, in which policies are implemented by bureaucrats. In this 
hierarchy, the main actors are politicians (ministers in the government under the 
Westminster system) and bureaucrats. To a certain extent, interest groups can indirectly 
influence the process through policy networks in which bureaucrats are exposed to 
them. In these networks, bureaucrats in some cases maintain a working relationship at 
arm‟s length on behalf of the ministers (B. Ryan, 2006). Public choice issues exist in 
these interactions, both in the political and the bureaucratic processes.  
Public Choice Issues in the Political Process 
Government decision-making is affected by some internal and external factors. 
The internal factor is the self-interest of politicians and bureaucrats and the external 
factors are pressures from interest groups, lobbying and voting behaviour. Since 
politicians are usually elected to represent their geographical constituents or their 
special interest constituents, they have a tendency to pursue policies, such as supporting 
pork-barrel projects, that will benefit their constituents possibly at the expense of the 
general public. 
 Interest groups influence political decision-making if they can get 
disproportionately more benefits from the decision while the costs are shared 
proportionately or disproportionately more by other members of society. They have 
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much stronger incentives than taxpayers and other large groups do, because they are 
small in numbers but have access to a concentration of benefits. As Stigler (1971) 
argues, group power is grossly unbalanced in favour of small and concentrated interests. 
However, this is true only in cases where the benefits of regulation or political decisions 
are concentrated and the costs are diffused.  
 The behaviour of people in using government legislation and regulation to 
transfer wealth (rent) to themselves is called rent-seeking (Johnson, 1994), which is the 
public choice problem in the political market hierarchy. Special interest groups 
concentrate their efforts to get preferential legislation/policy at the expense of the public 
at large. Politicians produce and supply legislation/policies, which redistribute income 
and wealth. They allocate rents not earned in the market. The elected representatives 
will have a biased perspective, as they need to cater to the interest groups by pursuing 
policies that benefit this small number of people at the expense of the other, larger, 
group of people in society. In other words, government policy is captured by interest 
groups. If the policy involves the establishment of a new government institution, the 
result is captured bureaucracy, which is a bureau that is captured since its inception. The 
bureau is designed from the start to promote regulated interests.  Despite these rent-
seeking problems, the presence of interest groups does not produce entirely negative 
effects. They may benefit the political process by providing additional information that 
may improve the quality of the decision made and the equality between the parties to 
the decision (Johnson, 1994). 
 The rational behaviour of politicians, interest groups and voters has led to 
situations in which the results of political decision-making are outcomes that conflict 
with the preference of the general public. Many biased policies or pork-barrel projects 
are not the desire of the overall democracy. However, it is rational for politicians to 
support these projects or policies for several reasons. Their support for the demands of a 
specific interest group may give them certain benefits and (possibly) make them feel 
powerful and important. They may gain financial benefit in the future by becoming a 
lobbyist for these groups after they retire from politics. They may support the policies or 
projects because their local constituents will get the benefit, which in turn will increase 
the possibility of getting more votes or campaign contributions. Another key reason is 
that the politicians pay little or no cost to gain these benefits, because they spend public 
money. Interest groups also behave rationally in rent-seeking behaviour. The result of 
policies or projects in their favour is millions or billions of dollars of benefits to the 
interest group compared with relatively small investments made. For some business 
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interest groups, winning government favour means that they have a better chance 
against their competitors. Voters or the general public are also rational. They calculate 
that it costs them so much more if they have to defeat the government that produces 
biased policies, than to lose small benefits individually from these policies. Voters may 
not even be aware of what is happening because they choose not to become aware. This 
is called „irrational ignorance‟. Voters induce that the cost of becoming informed (with 
the potential of taking action) is greater than the benefits of being informed. This is one 
of the key differences between the political market and capital market. 
 Incorporating Williamson (1985)‟s approach of transaction cost economics, 
Frant (1996) develops an analytical model of the public choice problem in the political 
market and offers a solution to the problem. With the perspective of transaction cost 
economics, there is a choice between conducting a transaction in the market versus 
moving the transaction inside a firm or organisation. The incentives that are provided by 
the market transactions are called high-powered incentives since the “efficiency gains 
from the transaction flow directly to the parties transacting” (Frant, 1996, p. 367). 
Incentives in hierarchies are low-powered ones. Frant (1996) extends the definition of 
high-powered incentive so it can be used in the public sector analysis. He argues that 
since politicians desire re-election, this is similar to the market participant‟s desire for 
monetary gain. If high-powered monetary incentives promote productive efficiency 
through innovation and cost reduction, such high-powered political incentives promote 
“allocative” efficiency by increasing the likelihood that people will value the public 
sector‟s products. 
 Frant (1996) further argues that while a powerful incentive can make people 
more responsive, it may also result in greater unintended consequences in some 
situations. When people have opportunities to behave dishonestly, high-powered 
incentives may induce greater dishonesty, such as in the case of the manufacturer and 
supplier in the private market. In the political realm, politicians may engage in 
exploitative behaviour if political opportunism exists. It is a function of the knowledge 
of voters about politicians and the ability for them to monitor politicians (Frant, 1996). 
Politicians tend to act unscrupulously when both factors are weak, to ensure re-election. 
For example, they may spend public money in an area that would not be selected if 
voters were fully informed. 
 The solution to the opportunism problem is to move the decisions into a 
hierarchy in which incentives are low-powered. In other words, if political opportunism 
strongly exists, the decisions of the government have to be depoliticised as far as 
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possible. The activities are put out of reach of the normal political process, so that the 
previously impossible transaction that provides mutual benefits can now take place. 
Legislators cannot easily undo a law or annul a contract from one legislative session to 
another. When the activities are assigned to an independent public bureau, a structure 
should be in place so that voters and politicians can commit themselves in advance to 
avoid certain types of undesirable behaviour. 
Public Choice Problems or Agency Problems in Bureaucracy 
 One drawback of low-powered incentives in the public sector is that they 
eliminate the allocative efficiency that is possible in the environment of high-powered 
incentives. It is harder to ensure that decisions or transactions in a bureaucracy reflect 
citizens‟ preferences, as the incentives are not designed to promote sensitivity to 
society‟s preferences. The issue is now about how to control the problems of politicians 
with bureaucracy. Frant (1996) considers that allocation decisions in the hierarchies 
may be motivated by professionalism norms and the decision-makers‟/bureaucrats‟ 
perception of public interest. These motivations, coupled with an accountability 
mechanism that would make bureaucracy become responsive to the politicians‟ wishes, 
can be the right combination for promoting allocative efficiency of the government 
institutions‟ decisions. 
 Moe (1995) has a different perspective when explaining why the bureaucratic 
structure is not easily influenced by politicians, thus resulting in its unresponsiveness to 
the politicians‟ wishes. He starts his argument by considering that the right to exercise 
public authority is a sort of property right. Politicians use this right formally and interest 
groups use it informally by influencing politicians to make choices about government 
policy and structure. However, in a democratic society, no set of individuals can 
perpetually claim these rights. Some individuals may gain support today in order to be 
very powerful, but they are not sure that they can maintain their position of power in the 
future. There is uncertainty with political property rights. 
 This uncertainty has produced a profound effect on the behaviour of politicians 
and interest groups. They know what they gain today in terms of policies and structures 
can be overturned by actors with different interests tomorrow. Their hard-won 
achievements can be undermined or destroyed by others in the future. They have strong 
incentives to make sure that this situation will not easily happen. Ex ante, they will try 
to anticipate this by taking preventative actions. In the design of policies or structures, 
they will install a capacity for the policies or structures to survive and prosper in an 
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uncertain political future. The structures therefore involve the separation of politics 
from administration. In their desire to ensure that bureaucracy is unable to be influenced 
by their opponents, politicians have ensured their installed policies and structures are 
not easily controlled by them. In Moe (1995)‟s proposition, the political 
unresponsiveness of government agencies has been designed from the inception of the 
agencies, because the politicians do not want their policies or structures to be easily 
overturned.  
 Once politicians set up structures or bureaucracy to implement their choice of 
policies, public choice problems occur in the bureaucratic process. There are three types 
of public choice problems. The first type is essentially the same as the public choice 
problem in the political market, which stems from the rent-seeking behaviour of interest 
groups. In fact, this problem originates in the political market and is entrenched within 
the bureaucracy. Some politicians want to ensure that bureaucrats are not subject to 
capture by their clients, who have different interests to the general public and in 
particular to their interest as elected representatives of the public in the current 
government. These clients are the interest groups that worked with the politicians in the 
previous government to capture the policies currently implemented by the government 
agencies. The politicians in the current government will find it difficult to change these 
policies and introduce others in line with their preferences. The bureaucracy is not 
responsive enough to the policy preferences of the governing politicians. The second 
type is called bureaucratic capture, which is the rent-seeking behaviour of the 
bureaucrats. Officials in government agencies have a tendency to pursue their own 
interests, which may not be in line with the interests of their political principals. The 
third type is capture by agency employees, which is essentially the agency problem of 
chief executives in employing staff to deliver services. Public sector agencies may be 
unresponsive or deliver services in an inefficient manner because employees are 
maximising their interests rather than their principal interests. 
 Moe (1997), extending Niskanen (1971)‟s model of the relationship between 
politicians and bureaucrats, argues that the game played between the two focuses on 
asymmetric information and the legislature‟s authority to set the rules and assert control. 
In this game, bureaucrats try to maximise the budget slack allocated by the legislature 
using their superior information. In Niskanen‟s perspective, they have two pivotal 
advantages over politicians. Usually, they are the sole supplier of public services so they 
have a monopoly over information about the true cost of production. They also know 
the value of every level of output to the legislature. Politicians, on the other hand, 
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determine the rules of the game because bureaucrats are under their authority and 
politicians are the ones that set the structure of the bargaining process (Moe, 1995). 
 One course that politicians can take to reduce the bureaucrats‟ tendency to 
engage in rent-seeking behaviour is to develop and implement intensive monitoring. 
However, according to McCubbin & Schwartz (1984), they have little incentive to 
engage in this kind of monitoring. Instead, they prefer to use a “fire alarm” strategy to 
monitor bureaucrats. This is because it costs them more to engage in “police patrol” 
oversight without any meaningful additional benefits that they can gain. Their incentive 
is to be re-elected. They just need to satisfy their constituency groups to win their votes 
by simply responding to any fire alarms these groups “set off,” and identify what it is 
when something goes wrong. McCubbin & Schwartz (1984) further argue that 
responding to their voices makes sense for two reasons. First, it enables politicians to 
produce tight control by combining their response with their legislative weapons. These 
weapons are powerful enough to shape the bureaucracy. Because of this huge 
consequence, bureaucrats will tend to anticipate it and comply from the outset. Second, 
the constituent groups feel that politicians do address their concerns and therefore they 
are more likely to support the politicians in elections. These groups are most likely the 
customers of the bureaucracy. They cannot discipline the public sector agencies 
directly, since there is no exit strategy available if they are not satisfied with the services 
provided. The only mechanism they have is voicing their concerns to the politicians, 
asking them to act in disciplining the agencies in return for their votes. 
 The weakness of disciplining bureaucrats through the consumers‟ voice is that 
politicians filter demands through legislation. Public sector agencies may not be able to 
judge the consumers‟ wishes because of this filtering. They may try to open their own 
information channel to consumers, exposing them to capture or forcing them to seek 
capture. In addition, these agencies cannot be disciplined properly to meet the demands 
of the consumers, as they may over- or under-estimate the demands. Furthermore, when 
politicians try to resolve the voters‟ specific demands/complaints, it induces public 
sector agencies to do political micro-management. 
2. Agency Theory and the Public Sector Setting  
 Agency theory is a theory that discusses the ubiquitous relationship between two 
parties in which one party (the agent) performs work delegated by another (the 
principal). An agent is employed to undertake some activity on behalf of a principal. 
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Agency theory provides a theoretical basis and general framework for the behaviour of 
people with different goals in a principal-agent relationship. 
 Lambert (2001) describes the role of both parties in the relationship. The 
principal delegates tasks, provides capital, takes risks and develops incentives. The 
agent has to complete the tasks, make decisions on behalf of the principal and bear a 
secondary type of risk. The principal will seek to control and shape the behaviour of the 
agent so he/she will act in a manner consistent with the principal‟s preferences. One of 
the tools used to accomplish this goal is entering into a (compensation) contractual 
arrangement where the principal and the agent must agree on what the agent is paid, 
which includes how much compensation exists for the agent and what conditions apply 
to the compensation. 
 This standard agency theory has some important assumptions. Liu and Mills 
(2007) summarise these major assumptions as follows: 
 The parties involved are self-interested. Principals and agents will seek to 
maximise their returns. Their utility functions are mutually independent, so the 
interests of the principal and the agent are not always aligned. 
 There is goal conflict between the parties involved. The utility function of the 
agent has two major conflicts: income that provides utility and effort that 
provides disutility. Agents will always try to maximise income and minimise 
efforts. If an agent minimises his/her efforts, it creates disutility to his/her 
principal, who seeks to have the agent do his/her best effort. Thus, the agent may 
not act in the interest of the principal. 
 There is significant information asymmetry. Principals have perfect information 
on what actions should be done by agents but there is information asymmetry on 
the actual actions taken by agents. Only agents have the information of their 
actual actions, but some actions are observable to the principal.  
Eisenhardt (1989) adds some important assumptions on the nature of the parties 
involved and the contract. The actions of the principal and agent are endogenously 
derived and based on well-specified preferences and beliefs. They also have unlimited 
computational ability and they can anticipate and assess the probability of all possible 
future contingencies. It is assumed that the contract is complete. The contract specifies 
actions for each verifiable situation. The courts are perfect enforcers of the contract. 
 The environment and the characteristics of the principal-agent relationship 
depicted in the above assumptions lead to the basis of an agency problem. The inherent 
problem in this relationship is that the agent may not act in the best interest of the 
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principal, which stems from the self-interested nature of the parties involved and the 
presence of goal conflict. This problem intensifies under the conditions of information 
asymmetry and the low efficacy of the agent, which leads to two specific types of 
agency problems: moral hazard and adverse selection. Moral hazard is an agency 
problem on the part of the agent‟s actions, in which there is a lack of agent‟s effort. 
When the interests of the principal and the agent are not aligned, the self-interested 
agent may take advantage of the principal by pursuing his/her own interest at the 
expense of the principal. It arises because of the presence of an information asymmetry 
in which the agent‟s actions are either hidden from the principal or are costly to observe. 
On the other hand, adverse selection is a problem relating to the principal‟s action in 
appointing the agent. This problem also arises because of information asymmetry. As a 
result, the principal cannot assess the competency of the agent before entering into a 
contract. The agent may be tempted to misrepresent his/her competency or ability in 
order to get the contract with more favourable terms. Therefore, the principal may 
unwittingly enter into a contract that otherwise he/she would not do if he/she could get 
perfect information on the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989; Waterman & Meier, 1998). 
 The principal develops strategies to help mitigate agency problems. 
Consequently, the principal has to incur some costs, which are called agency costs, and 
can be classified into two types: monitoring costs and bonding costs. Monitoring costs 
relate to the efforts to reduce information asymmetry, such as mandatory audit, 
development of governance structure, installation of information systems and other 
oversight processes. The main monitoring method used is requiring the agent to report 
his/her performance or behaviour and verifying the information by employing an 
auditor.  Bonding costs relate to the initiatives to reduce goal conflict between the 
principal and the agent. The main method in these efforts is the use of an incentive 
scheme or reward structure in combination with performance assessment. The 
incentives may be explicit, such as receiving a bonus or getting more resources, or may 
be implicit, such as a consideration for employment (Eisenhardt, 1989; Waterman & 
Meier, 1998). 
 The agency problems become more severe in certain conditions which are more 
prominent in the public sector. Therefore, in analysing public sector cases through the 
lens of agency theory, the simple model of principal-agent relationship should be 
expanded to consider the presence of these conditions.  The conditions, which will be 
explained later, are: less verifiable or measurable outcome/performance, ex-ante causal 
ambiguity, the presence of multiple principals, severe bounded-rationality on the part of 
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principals, a high degree of risk-averse behaviour on the part of agents, and the level of 
goal conflict in the relationship.  
 The verifiability or measurability of outcome will influence the monitoring 
mechanisms used by the principal. If outcome dimensions are not measurable, 
information on performance by default is useless in a single-period agency relationship. 
Principals will tend to use behaviour-based monitoring assuming they know the types of 
agent behaviour that will result in better performance. In a multi-period relationship, 
principals and agents may learn to develop some verifiable but imperfect aggregate 
measures of outcome. This information will be used both for incentive purposes and for 
risk-sharing purposes (Banker, Datar, & Maindiratta, 1989). Implicit or relational 
contracts also play an important role in this situation if the value of the future 
relationship is large enough not to induce either party to renege (Baker, Gibbons & 
Murphy, 2002). In this kind of contract, subjective (unverifiable) measures of 
performance are used, together with available objective measures, to disentangle the 
effects of an agent‟s actions from those of luck and to eliminate distortions induced by 
objective measures of performance. On the other hand, when the dimensions of 
performance are ex-post verifiable then the monitoring system should be able to capture 
the performance information. More performance information will be demanded in a 
situation in which it is more verifiable. Therefore, the greater the measurability of 
outcome the more performance information will be used in a principal-agent 
relationship. 
The second condition is the existence of ex ante causal ambiguity, in which the 
principal does not know what specific agent actions add value to the relationship. 
Jacobides & Croson (2001) argue that the principal is in a difficult position, since he/she 
has to commit to a scheme to assess the usefulness of the agent‟s effort before learning 
about it. Since the principal does not know what the right effort is, the monitoring 
system is doomed to fail, as the information generated lacks relevance. In a multi-period 
relationship, the principal may ultimately gain adequate understanding of the 
relationship between outcome, efforts and chance factors. However, if the relationship is 
very complex, it will take a long time to have an adequate understanding that enables 
the principal to develop a management scheme for the agent‟s compensation. 
Enforcing monitoring in situations in which ex ante knowledge of critical 
success factors is very limited will impair the organisation‟s survival ability because the 
learning environment is not supported. Principals and agents need to learn these factors 
over time. If agents are forced to be accountable or compensated on the basis of specific 
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and contractable dimensions, they have less incentive to advance a beneficial but costly 
learning activity (Jacobides & Croson, 2001). Agents will never be induced to 
experiment with new ways of doing things that will be more effective in achieving 
outcomes. Principals will never gain an adequate understanding of outcomes, efforts 
and chance factors. The organisation is doomed to fail because it will never be able to 
fulfil its objectives. 
The next condition is the presence of multiple principals, which is a typical 
characteristic of the principal-agent relationship in the public sector. A public agency 
deals with two or more principals in a complicated way to produce public goods and 
services. It may have to deal with more than one minister, address the concerns of 
parliamentary members, serve the public and follow the directions of a coordinating 
agency. In dealing with the agent, some principals may focus on delegating tasks to 
achieve certain outcomes or to produce specific products or services. Other principals 
may have a bigger role in influencing resource allocation to the agency in the budgeting 
process, while others may be involved in specific activities such as the monitoring 
process and incentive contract management.  
The presence of multiple principals will likely lead to a situation where there are 
multiple and/or conflicting goals. As different principals may have different goals, 
multiple conflicting goals are inevitable. These conflicting goals make the principal-
agent relationship very complex. One or more principals will be dissatisfied with the 
relationship no matter how well principals design the monitoring systems and the 
incentive structure (Waterman & Meier, 1998). Some compromise may be developed, 
resulting in multiple and sometimes ambiguous goals or “noise”, as competing 
principals will rarely agree on the goals of the agency or on accounts of the agency‟s 
performance. The agent will have limited knowledge of the preferences of the principals 
since there is no precise knowledge of them and uncertainty about the attention of these 
(political) principals (Waterman & Meier, 1998). 
The design of incentive schemes is very complex in this situation. It is expected 
that there will be multiple sources of guidance, backed with different kinds of incentive 
mechanisms (Eisner, Worsham & Ringquist, 1996). These mechanisms compete with 
each other (Martimort, 1996). Dixit (1997), as quoted by Verbeeten (2008), argues that 
delivering the incentive scheme is very complex in this situation, as each principal will 
have positive coefficients only on the performance dimensions of his/her interest, and 
negative coefficients on other dimensions. Therefore, the incentives are weak, as the 
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aggregate marginal incentive coefficient for each outcome decreases with the increasing 
number of principals (Verbeeten, 2008). 
The best strategy for these principals in monitoring the agent is using what 
McCubbins & Schwartz (1984) term as “fire-alarm oversight”, instead of continuous 
monitoring. This oversight relies on the voices of their constituents or the public in 
informing them that the agent is not acting in the constituent‟s or public‟s best interest. 
The incentive structure faced by the (political) principal for monitoring activities is the 
cause for adopting this strategy, as explained before in the discussion on public choice 
theory. If the agent continues to shirk responsibilities when the level of monitoring is 
low, the principals individually are unlikely to directly bear any costs of the shirking. 
The bulk of the cost will be passed along to the public as the ultimate principal of these 
(political) principals. It will only cost them if their constituents or public ask them to act 
to reduce the shirking in exchange for the constituents‟ support or votes. Therefore, as 
long as the public is not aware (i.e. a scandal has not emerged), the political principals 
would not pay a direct cost for this lax oversight (Waterman & Meier, 1998). 
The fourth condition is the problem of bounded rationality. This problem exists 
when principals (and agents) have limited computational ability and they cannot 
anticipate and assess the probability of all possible future contingencies. One of a few 
situations in which a bounded rationality assumption exists is when principals can 
specify their objectives but they may not be able to communicate them perfectly to 
agents. As they resist the specification of objectives, informal dialogue using examples 
and generalisation is the preferable method of the principals‟ communication. They 
want their agents to be proactive in responding to complex or unforeseen circumstances. 
The agent‟s initiative and judgment should be executed in the principal‟s accepted way 
and in conformity with their values. Therefore, the agent‟s ability to meet the principal‟s 
objectives is a function of their honesty, competence and empathy with the principal 
(Hendry, 2002). 
 Another aspect of the principal‟s bounded rationality is restriction on 
communications. The restrictions will make the principals acquire only limited 
knowledge of agents‟ actions even though the information is fully reported by agents. 
One such restriction is technical expertise. Principals may not have the technical 
expertise necessary to understand the agents‟ information provided (Lambert, 2001), 
because they lack the necessary expertise in complex areas or because they have bias in 
the information flow due to the “fire alarm mechanism” (Eisner et al., 1996). In this 
situation, the principal and agent relationship operates under greater uncertainty than in 
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the “full information” case, in which the principal is able to know for certain whether 
the actual outcome is due to the agent‟s performance or due to factors beyond the 
agent‟s control. This communication restriction also limits the ability of agents to 
truthfully communicate their information (Lambert, 2001). Even though the agent may 
be able to comply with the requirement to report an extremely rich information set, the 
usefulness of the information is limited by the ability of the principal to understand it. 
 Several situations stem from the condition of bounded rationality. First, this 
condition will make principals resisting the specification of goals or objectives, so that 
agents are unable to have an adequate understanding of those goals and objectives. This 
condition is similar to the one in which outcomes are not easily measurable. When the 
principal‟s objectives are not easily understood, it is difficult to come up with aggregate 
measures of outcomes that show the achievement of the objectives. Less performance 
information is demanded in this environment. Even if there is no goal conflict, agents 
cannot be induced to reveal more, as they do not have the ability to understand all 
dimensions of the performance that show the fulfilment of the objectives. Second, since 
principals cannot understand the agent‟s information fully in order to capture the full 
dimensionality of efforts or outcomes, they will not rely on periodic formal reporting in 
communicating outcomes or monitoring an agent‟s effort. Instead, they prefer 
continuous informal dialogue and place more value on the agent‟s initiative and 
judgment in signalling his empathy with them.  
 The fifth aspect is the characteristic nature of risk-averse agents. While parties 
involved in the principal-agent relationship are assumed to be risk-averse in a typical 
agency model, the risk-averse characteristic is stronger in the case of agents employed 
in the public sector setting. The risk characteristics of the agent will be important in an 
agency relationship when there is a stochastic term attached to the agent‟s output. The 
agent faces risk in terms of uncertainty of outcomes, as outcomes are only partly a 
function of effort. Risk-averse agents will avoid any relationship where the incentives 
are based on outcome. Even if the agent‟s performance is to be measured by the results 
of his/her effort, the agent will prefer measures that are controllable by them, whether 
the controllability is related to his/her ability to achieve the benchmark or their ability to 
manipulate the measures. 
 Another consequence of an agency relationship with a risk-averse agent is in the 
agent‟s selection of his/her behaviour or efforts. Wright et al. (2001) argue that risk-
averse agents prefer risk-reducing strategies because they can lower the disutility 
associated with their work and also reduce the prospect of losing their jobs. As 
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outcome-based incentive strategies are not preferable, principals have to rely on 
monitoring strategies. Only if tasks are specified clearly in advance is the principal able 
to induce efforts by using these strategies. In multi-tasking situations, risk-averse agents 
will be more likely to reduce their efforts on some non-visible tasks if they already exert 
high efforts on other visible tasks, even though the former tasks will be likely to 
produce better outcomes for the principal. 
 The last situation is the level of goal conflict in the principal-agent relationship. 
In a typical principal-agent model, there is divergence between the principal‟s and the 
agent‟s interests. Many principal-agent relationships in the public sector exhibit goal-
conflict characteristics. Public sector agents have ever-changing relationships with 
different groups of principals, as politicians and political coalitions change. It is highly 
likely that they will have political principals who have divergent interests. Even if they 
deal with the same group of (political) principals who share convergent interests, in 
order to maximise their chances of getting re-elected, these politicians may seek to alter 
established policy in a new direction, which may result in the divergence of interests. 
 In other situations, the interests of both parties in the agency relationship may 
align with each other. This goal convergence or consensus might occur in the culture of 
collectivism that is prevalent in the public sector. In this culture, collectivist behaviours 
have higher utility than individualistic self-serving behaviours. Agents will be more 
likely to act in the interest of principals in this environment. Wright et al. (2001), using 
McClelland (1960)‟s theory of needs, argue that some agents may enjoy performing 
responsibly because of their need for love, respect and self-actualisation associated with 
their employment. In this environment, the assumption of goal conflict may not hold. 
Verbeeten (2008) claims that the fact that more risk-averse employees tend to work for 
public sector organisations may imply that there is a match between them and these 
organisations. They may be motivated to work in the public sector by some intrinsic 
motivation, such as the idealistic or ethical purpose served by the organisations. 
Therefore, agents in these organisations may get utility from some aspects of the task 
itself, resulting in a more supportive attitude towards their principals‟ interests. 
 Waterman & Meier (1998) argue that there are two consequences seen in the 
agency relationship as a result of goal consensus, depending on the possession of 
information. Agents will play a passive role if neither principals nor agents possess 
information. They will support the policy proposals of the principals and protect and 
implement them without questioning them during the policy adoptions. Both may put 
additional effort into providing more information if it will help them clarify the 
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principals‟ interests. If information asymmetry exists, agents will voluntarily provide 
more information to clarify the goals. Once the goals are clear, tasks are delegated to 
agencies and they are simply left alone, and the principals will monitor them using a 
“fire-alarm strategy”. Thus, in the situation of goal consensus, agents may be more 
easily induced to reveal more information. 
The Role of Reputation in the Agency Relationship 
Reputation has been argued as being one important solution to the agency 
problem in which the scope of contracts is limited due to the circumstances of the 
agency relationship. Reputation has a potential for disciplining the behaviour of both 
parties in a multi-period setting. For the sake of reputation, agents as well as principals 
may both uphold their contract agreement, and fulfil any promises made under the 
implicit contracts they have agreed on during the course of the relationship. Thus, 
understanding how reputation works in the multi-period agency relationship is 
important in order to analyse public sector issues using agency theory. The multi-period 
dimension and the difficulty of providing explicit incentives in the public sector setting 
have made the role of implicit incentives, such as reputation, become more prominent in 
addressing the agency problem. Consequently, the study of reputation in the agency 
relationship may provide an interesting basis for the analytical analysis of agency 
relationships in the public sector. 
 Some researchers argue that the agent‟s reputation can be seen as his/her asset 
(Charmichael, 1989; Parker, 2005). The cost of this asset for an agent is the amount of 
shirking forgone in the past and when current efforts are made at more than a minimal 
level. The agent‟s reputation will potentially produce benefits in the future in terms of 
continuing and/or increasing streams of future income. The stream of future income is 
expected because of job security (i.e. the agent is not fired as he/she continues to have a 
good reputation), re-employment (where the contract is renewed once the old term 
ends), or the possibility of better job offers or positions. This reputation will remain 
valuable as long as the present value of the future earnings stream is greater than the 
benefits obtained through one-time cheating. Thus, as Parker (2005) argues, there is a 
quasi-rent for honesty, which is a price premium for preventing cheating in the form of 
a higher future income stream. Reputation expands the career horizon of an agent and 
reduces the attractiveness of opportunistic behaviour. 
 Other researchers view reputation as a mechanism for controlling self-interested 
behaviour based on social pressures. Society pressures an individual to conform to 
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certain norms and individuals obtain utility from developing a reputation that is 
consistent with those norms. Dees (1992), quoted by Stevens (2002), observes that 
social norms such as honesty, trustworthiness, fairness, justice, a sense of public duty, 
respect for the autonomy of others and avoidance of gratuitous harm, are the behaviours 
expected from society (the market) of a reputable agent. Therefore, if the agent wants to 
gain a good reputation, he/she must conform to the types of behaviour dictated by 
society‟s norms and consequently may get the benefits from it, such as entering into a 
less costly contract with a principal or obtaining more preferential treatment from the 
principal in the case of contract renewal. 
 An important idea arising from this career concern model is that even in 
circumstances where explicit compensation based on performance is not offered, the 
agent still has an incentive to provide more effort because outside options, in the form 
of future job offers from other principals, matter. Agents will try to convince the labour 
market that they possess a high level of talent by raising the market‟s perception of their 
ability. They do this by delivering a higher level of performance. This translates into 
future job opportunities with the same principal or other potential principals for 
potentially higher future wages. The agent will exert more unobservable efforts to 
increase the outputs and influence the market‟s belief. Nonetheless, in equilibrium the 
market will anticipate these actions and therefore draw a correct inference regarding the 
agents‟ ability, based on the observed outputs (Gibbons & Murphy, 1992). 
Agency Relationship with Superior Private Information  
 Cases in which agents have superior private information are easily found in 
many principal-agent relationships. Successful managers are said to have a comparative 
advantage in information acquisition as one of their prime skills. In the business setting, 
for example, a manager may hold information on productivity level, production costs or 
the market. Similarly, in the public sector setting, the manager may hold superior 
information on the functioning of bureaucratic production, the productivity of the 
capital employed and the characteristic of the public segment that his/her agency is 
currently serving. This superior information is gained because of the proximity of the 
manager to the production process and the accumulation of their experience in 
delivering public services. A typical principal in the public sector does not have 
experience of working or expertise in the area of public service production. Therefore, 
principals in the public sector have to deal with this situation of severe information 
asymmetry. 
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 One of the consequences of the presence of an agent‟s private information is that 
if the information is obtained before the agent makes a decision, this additional 
information may improve economic welfare because of better selection of production 
choices by the agent that will benefit the principal, as shown in the hurdle model 
explained by Christensen & Feltham (2005). In this model, to have a higher probability 
of getting a good outcome, the agent has to overcome challenges (hurdles). If pre-
decision information about the challenges is not available to the agent, he or she must 
provide the same effort for all challenges. With pre-decision information, the agent can 
make better decisions. If the challenge is too high, he or she will provide no effort. On 
the other hand, if the challenge is achievable, the agent will provide just enough effort 
to overcome the challenge and achieve a good outcome. The key issue for the principal 
is how to induce the agent to communicate the challenges truthfully. 
 The principal may be able to induce the agent by employing strategies based on 
the Revelation Principle in which there is a pre-commitment on the part of the principal 
to “under-utilising” the information. This principle states that “for any optimal contract 
(consisting of compensation, action and message) based on communication by the 
agent, there is another equivalent contract that (weakly) induces full and truthful 
disclosure of the agent‟s private information” (Christensen & Feltham, 2005, p. 262). In 
other words, according to this principle, any proposed mechanism involving non-
truthful reporting by the agent can be duplicated or beaten in terms of expected utilities 
by an equilibrium mechanism that induces truthful reporting (Lambert, 2001). This 
principle does not say that truthful reporting is free. The “cost” of the principal‟s 
inducing the agent to tell the truth is that he/she has to use the information to a lesser 
extent than if the truthful reporting was not mandated or if there was a verifiable report 
with information. In some extreme cases, the principal has to ignore the agent‟s reported 
information in the compensation scheme. The revelation principle basically states that 
the cost of motivating a truthful reporting strategy is no greater than the cost of 
motivating a non-truthful one. 
 Lambert (2001) describes several types of models that incorporate conditions in 
which the revelation principle cannot hold, in his discussion on earnings management 
practices (non-truthful reporting). The first type is if the agent cannot report truthfully 
due to exogenous restrictions on the agent‟s ability to communicate his/her information. 
The second one is where the pre-commitment made on how to use the agent‟s report 
cannot hold. 
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 According to Lambert (2001), one form of communication restriction is when 
the agent observes a rich information set but he/she is unable to communicate it fully 
and/or the principal does not have the technical expertise to understand it. In this 
situation, it will be very difficult and costly for the agent to communicate the full 
dimensionality of his/her information. In addition, the principal will also find it difficult 
to understand many dimensions of the information set reported. Here, by definition, the 
revelation principle fails since truthful reporting is impossible to achieve. This situation 
is similar to the bounded-rationality problem previously discussed. Thus, principals 
cannot use strategies based on this principle to induce the agent to disclose more 
information. 
 In the second model, Lambert (2001) shows that the revelation principle does 
not hold if the pre-commitment assumption is relaxed. When this pre-commitment 
cannot be enforced, the agent will believe that the information reported will be used 
against him/her. Then, it may be impossible to motivate the agent to report truthfully. 
Lambert (2001) argues that the pre-commitment assumption can be relaxed in two 
ways. In the first setting, there is the presence of another party (other than the principal 
and the agent) who cannot pre-commit on the use of reported information. This third 
party can be an auditor hired by the principal, another employee of the organisation, a 
competitor, or the labour market.  In the second setting, the principal cannot pre-commit 
to the subsequent periods of a multi-period setting. 
3. Public Sector Reform in the Perspective of Public Choice Theory and 
Agency Theory 
In public choice theory, the self-interest of politicians and bureaucrats is 
emphasised. The public sector will grow as government officials try to expand their 
budgets to get more budget slack, when politicians use public money to the benefit of 
their interest groups at the expense of other groups, and when the regulations and 
subsidies developed reduce economic growth (Boston, Martin, Pallot, & Walsh, 1996). 
The production of public goods is excessive because of budget maximisation behaviour, 
since there is no automatic disciplining mechanism available, such as market forces 
(Niskanen, 1971). Since the reward system in the public sector does not promote 
effective performance (Chapman, 1979) and environmental uncertainty makes contracts 
incomplete, principals are unable to monitor agents‟ behaviour (Dixon, Kouzmin, & 
Korac-Kakabadse, 1998) and agents act as rent-seekers. They seek privileges in order to 
 57 
partake in the monopoly rent that they provide and reduce the efficiency of the 
economic system (Tullock & Eller, 1994).  
Public choice theory offers a superior way of organising the production of public 
goods. The system should be based on some wider view of welfare in which everybody, 
including the producers and consumers, gets equal treatment. The system is based on 
minimal government intervention and closer attention to how individuals interact with 
each other. The right policies, in the public choice perspective, are the ones that 
minimise the government‟s role, control the discretionary power of politicians, reduce 
public monopolies, limit the functions of government agencies and maximise liberty 
(Johnson, 1994). Limiting the politicians‟ authority, such as preventing them from 
running budget deficits or imposing taxes beyond a certain level, may mitigate public 
choice problems in the political market. In the bureaucracy, government agencies can be 
constrained from implementing bureaucratic capture by limiting their authority to 
certain functions only. The role of policy advice provision should be separated from the 
role of implementing policy so that the advice given will not be biased towards the 
government agencies that would result in their bureaucratic capture. Competition should 
be developed in the provision of policy advice and public service, in order to provide 
consumers with more power to discipline government agencies in the form of an exit 
strategy, in addition to the impact their voices might make. 
Public sector reform should also be directed at increasing the accountability of 
various actors in the public sector to their principals. The relationships between the 
public (via their representatives in the Parliament), ministers and executive agencies 
should be clearly defined. Executive agencies should be given clear objective functions, 
clear identified tasks and the right incentives to perform these tasks and to pursue these 
objectives. 
 The central assumption is that if executive agencies are given the right 
incentives, they can deliver socially desirable outputs or outcomes without the need for 
either direct political control or any administrative control. The public sector 
environment is then structured to improve incentive systems, contracting mechanisms 
and monitoring systems. Incentive systems should be improved by aligning them with 
proper performance measurement systems that capture the intended performance 
(behaviour) of agents. Contracting mechanisms are enhanced by providing ex-ante 
performance information on the expectations being sought from the agents. Monitoring 
mechanisms are advanced by providing more comprehensive ex-post information on 
agents‟ performance. 
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 The optimality of the political market, just as in other markets, is based on the 
degree of access to information. The political market will be optimal if everyone has 
equal access to information. From the perspective of public interest, the quality of 
decisions produced by the policy decision process in the public sector will improve if 
there is a greater supply of relevant information to the actors involved. When 
transaction costs vary for different groups in the public sector realm then it is likely that 
access to information is not equal. Public sector reform should be directed at ensuring 
that more information is available to all relevant parties and that access to such 
information is equal for everybody. 
 The role of performance information is, therefore, critical to the reforms, as 
these improvements are related to the prescription of a better performance management 
framework. The reforms should be able to produce proper performance measures over 
time, as principals and agents are able to formulate better measures given their 
experience. These measures should be comprehensive and well specified. The annual 
report should contain the necessary performance information for monitoring purposes. 
If a reform is to be seen as successful in its implementation, the reform should exhibit 
these improvements over time. The quality of the performance information increases as 
the information becomes more comprehensive and well specified. The message from 
public choice theory is that if the reforms can restructure the public sector environment 
so as to have clear relationships among parties, proper incentive systems, more 
comprehensive contracting and monitoring, then public choice problems would be 
minimised. 
 The need for information and the difficulties associated with asymmetric 
information is a central issue in agency theory. This problem is inherent in the public 
sector setting, stemming from the delegation of legislative authority to executive 
agencies. Opportunities and incentives are created for agents to deviate from their 
principal‟s preference, as they usually have expertise that their political principals lack. 
Laws and principal directives (contracts) are not sufficiently complete and therefore 
they are open to an agent‟s interpretation. To align the agent‟s interest to their 
principal‟s preference, various mechanisms may be used, focusing on regulating the 
production of information, the use of incentives and improvement in monitoring. Some 
examples of these mechanisms are output-based commissions, profit-sharing, 
performance measurement and bonding agreements. 
 Agency theory has influenced public sector reform in the way that principals, 
their agents and the relationship between them are defined, including the framework for 
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incentives and monitoring. In the New Zealand setting, ministers are seen as the 
principal for executive agencies and the relationships are divided into two types: 
ownership and purchase interest. Financial performance measures are used for the 
incentive framework in the ownership relationship. Non-financial performance 
measures are the tools for aligning the agent‟s interest in the purchase relationship. 
Contracts, in the form of planning documents, and the subsequent performance 
information in the annual reports, are used for better monitoring of the behaviour of the 
agents. 
 Contracts, as the main tool for formalising principal and agent relationships, 
have the purpose of allocating risks, responsibilities and rewards precisely between the 
parties. In a principal-agency relationship, a contract has some important roles: aligning 
the interest of agent and principal, inducing agents to reduce information asymmetry 
using incentives, and providing motivations for agents to perform the desired tasks. In 
neo-classical theory, there are some implications for contracts that should be noted. 
Parties to the contract are assumed to be able to hide information and to cheat if 
opportunities exist. Therefore, contracts should be complete enough to cover all 
eventualities. Parties should easily be able to invoke the sanctions or rewards outlined in 
the contract. And lastly, the impact of the sanctions or rewards should be effective 
(Greve, 2000). 
 The insights gained from the perspective of agency theory are similar to the 
results of the previous analysis under public choice theory. Reform is said to be 
progressing if mechanisms exist to enable principals and agents to develop better 
contracts and the related monitoring mechanisms. Better specification in the contracts 
will result in better quality of performance information provided in the reporting 
documents. This information in turn will make the next period contracts contain more 
comprehensive performance information. The typical benefits associated with this 
improvement would be enhanced control and accountability, and reduced uncertainty 
and information asymmetry. 
In terms of the reporting improvement, agency theory provides an insight into 
the pattern of performance improvement over time in the relationship between the 
agency and its principal. There is a problem of a ratchet effect in a multi-period contract 
setting. This effect would be exacerbated if there were no comparative performance 
measures. As the principal tends to consider the agent‟s past superior performance as a 
guide to evaluating his/her current performance, the agent is induced to lower his/her 
performance in earlier years to avoid being assessed against a higher standard in the 
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future (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992).  The reporting improvement is influenced by the 
agent‟s contract period. The improvement would be higher in the latter periods of the 
agent‟s contract. 
4. Performance, Performance Information and the Users of Performance 
Information 
It can be argued that the performance reporting is a necessary element in the 
delivery of superior performance within the public sector. Therefore, performance 
information is always addressed in the public sector reform, even though the focus of 
the reform is the increase in the performance of public sector agencies. To promote 
superior performance in the public sector, high-quality performance information is 
needed. This information plays two important roles in the process of promoting superior 
performance: to secure the control of public sector principals on public managers and to 
provide incentives for the managers to perform better. 
On the side of the principal, one of the arguments for the publication of high-
quality performance information is the desire to secure control of the public sector 
organizations (M. Smith & Taffler, 1995). Control can be achieved if the public sector 
principals (the ministers, members of parliament or taxpayers) can assess the 
performance of the public sector agencies. The logic is when public and their political 
agents learn that the performance of these agencies could be improved, they will exert 
pressure on management to deliver better performance (P. Smith, 1990). In order to 
assess the performance, the principals should be able to identify objectives pursued by 
the agencies and the achievement of these objectives by the agencies. Performance 
information disclosure facilitates this process by communicating relevant information to 
the principals (Lee, 2008). The disclosure of this high-quality performance information 
will help the public sector principals to discipline the public sector managers by 
requiring them to continuously improve their performance if they do not want to be 
replaced. Performance information is said to be high quality if it can show the 
achievement of the objectives of the public sector agencies.  
The publication of high-quality performance information also pressures public 
sector principals to manage their portfolio of public agencies more intensively. James & 
John (2006) argue that incumbent elected agents are often held responsible by voters for 
the performance of public sector agencies. When high-quality performance information 
is published, voters and service users may be able assess how well their public sector 
agents controlling the public agencies. The visibility of these agencies‟ performances 
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will result in the desire of the elected officials in charge of the government to exert 
pressures on the public sector managers to promote superior performance. 
On the side of the agent, the publication of high-quality performance 
information can also work as an incentive mechanism for the public managers to 
promote superior performance. This is essentially the role of reputation as incentive 
mechanism in the principal-agent relationship that is already discussed. As Mayston 
(1985) argues, when relevant performance expectations are set, the subsequent 
performance information publication may produce „embarrassment effect‟ on behalf of 
the public sector managers from failing to meet the performance target. This may then 
stimulate the managers to search and experiment for future improved performance. If 
the set of performance information published represents a complete set of information 
on the agency‟s performance, the publication of high-quality performance information 
may potentially promote superior performance within the public sector organizations.  
Performance information provision is an important mechanism in the process of 
mitigating the agency (as well as public choice) problems. The desire to increase the 
accountability of various actors in the public sector setting has led to a greater demand 
for performance information. The production of this information needs to be justified in 
a sense that its benefits should outweigh its costs, especially on mandated disclosure in 
which the users may not bear the production costs of the information. The performance 
information may be used as a part of control mechanism or incentive scheme to ensure 
that the executive agents deliver improved performance over time. However, the type of 
the users of performance information and their characteristics may influence the 
usefulness of performance information disclosure.  
There is an established literature that discusses the users of public sector 
reporting. Most of earlier works in this area, such as research done by Anthony (1978), 
Jones et al. (1985), and the Government Accounting Standards Board (1987), were 
directed to identify the possible users in the public sector financial reporting. The later 
works were built on these earlier works to provide the similar list of users for non-
financial performance reporting. 
Mayston (1985) provides a comprehensive list of users of performance 
information disclosures in a form of four groups of relevant decision-makers that use 
performance indicators. The first group includes voters, tax-payers and consumers of 
goods and services produced by public sector agencies. The second group consists of 
elected officials, such as MPs and select committees, who are the representatives of the 
first group. The oversight officials, such as Audit Office and Ombudsmen, could be 
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included in this group since they provide oversight services to the Parliament. The third 
group includes the elected officials in charge of the governments (the ministers) and 
their support people (advisers). And, the last group consists of internal users, which are 
managers of the public service agencies.  
There are several other users that are not identified in the list.  Media and 
educational and research institution may get the benefits from the performance 
information disclosure since they can act as the information analysts for the other users. 
Other public sector agencies (within a jurisdiction or in different jurisdictions) are also 
identified as a significant user of performance information disclosure (Mack & Ryan, 
2006). 
The users‟ interest in the performance information is not homogenous. In 
general, the more focus the interest, the more intensive the demand for performance 
information disclosure and hence the more useful is the disclosure. The focus of the 
interest relates to the levels in the chain of accountability.  
At the lowest level, in which the ministers in charge of the public sector 
agencies are the principal, information is expected to be used extensively as the 
ministers will need it to help managing their portfolio of public sector agencies and the 
consideration of funding support for programs in the portfolio (Pollitt, 2006). While the 
published performance information may be useful for the ministers‟ decision-making 
activities, they will be more likely to demand more information privately to the 
management of public sector agencies. While the production of the information may be 
useful to the ministers, the public disclosure of the information may not be useful to 
them. There may get sanctions from their peer (in the government and the Parliament) 
and the public for bad news in the performance information disclosure.  
Further up in chain, the principals‟ interests are more diffuse and diverse. Pollit 
(2006) contends that the interests of the Parliamentary members is less likely to be 
intensive. The interest is much more episodic and strongly focused on bad news 
disclosed in the performance report. However, they are the decision makers for funding 
allocation in the public sector. Therefore, the performance information disclosure will 
be useful to help them in evaluating the public agencies‟ funding and spending 
proposals in the budget process. 
At the top level of accountability chain, the interest in very diffuse and diverse. 
At the taxpayers‟ or citizens‟ level, the benefits of performance information disclosure 
are not easily identified. Taxpayers may use such information for their own local and 
particular purpose, such as getting health or education services (Pollitt, 2006). In this 
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small scope of purpose, the published performance information may benefit them. 
However, the benefit is very limited since the individual does not effective mechanism 
to provide immediate sanctions on publication of performance information. They either 
have to wait for the election time to vote out (discipline) their representatives, which is 
highly imperfect control mechanism, or to move to other jurisdictions, which may be 
infeasible to many taxpayers since it involves very large personal costs (P. Smith, 
1990). 
B. Review of Prior Research 
 This part of the thesis provides a review of the literature on the areas studied and 
the methodology used. Since the research focuses on performance reporting in the 
public sector, it is necessary to present first some published studies carried out by other 
researchers in this area. It is followed by an overview of the literature in the area of 
content analysis methodology and an outline of a disclosure index research instrument. 
This provides the basis for a discussion of the selected research instrument used later in 
this study.  
1. Research in Public Sector Performance Reporting 
 Studies focusing on performance reporting have tended to address on local 
government rather than central government. The entities studied are varied in terms of 
their geographical location and the types of entities (see Appendix 1 for a list of some 
studies analysed). US-based studies have used cities as the object of the research (see 
for example, Ho & Ni, 2005; Poister & Streib, 1999; Robbins & Austin, 1986), while 
studies in other countries (such as UK, Australia and New Zealand) use local authorities 
(e.g., Boyne & Law, 1991, 2005; Ryan, Stanley & Nelson, 2002; Smith & Coy, 2000), 
schools (e.g., Tooley & Guthrie, 2007), police agencies (e.g., Collier, 2006) and even 
art galleries (e.g., Thompson, 1995). There have also been some studies published on 
local government reporting in Mediterranean and Scandinavian countries.  
These studies, except for studies by Robbins and Austin (1986) and Ryan et al. 
(2002), which focus on the information quality of the annual report, provide some 
evidence on the status of performance reporting in the local government setting and the 
low quality of performance information. Performance information was viewed as 
generally poor and not improved over time (Boyne & Law, 1991) and to be the weakest 
section of the reports (Banks & Nelson, 1994). 
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 On the other hand, the few studies focusing on performance reporting in a 
central government setting have mostly looked at performance reporting of UK 
executive agencies (Carter, 1991; Hyndman & Anderson, 1995, 1998; Hyndman & 
Eden, 2001, 2002; Pendlebury, Jones & Karbhari, 1994; Rutherford, 1996). The studies 
report on the type and the number of performance indicators reported by executive 
agencies. The limited findings show the increased provision of performance information 
(Carter, 1991; Rutherford, 1996) but mainly in terms of output information (Hyndman 
& Anderson, 1995, 1998; Pendlebury et al., 1994), and which is therefore inadequate 
for the discharge of accountability (Pendlebury et al., 1994; Rutherford, 1996).  
 Several studies use survey methods to find out whether there has been any 
improvement in performance reporting (e.g., Lawton, McKevitt & Millar, 2000; 
Pollanen, 2005; Waweru, Porporato & Hoque, 2007). The findings support the notion 
that public officials prefer the use of effectiveness measures rather than efficiency 
measures, which is the opposite of the existing practice of disclosing more efficiency 
measures rather than effectiveness measures. The findings also show that they prefer 
measures that are internally developed (Lawton et al., 2000). 
 Other related studies investigate the degree of utilisation of performance 
information by the users as an indicator of information quality (e.g., Brusca Alijarde, 
1997; Coy, Fisher & Gordon, 2001; Steccolini, 2004; Taylor & Rosair, 2000). Their 
findings are also disappointing. These studies have found that the number of users is 
limited (Coy et al., 2001), as the audience for the reports tends to be „within-
government‟ groups (Brusca Alijarde, 1997; Steccolini, 2004; Taylor & Rosair, 2000). 
These reports are intended more to satisfy accountability obligations (Taylor & Rosair, 
2000) and less to communicate with external users (Steccolini, 2004). Performance 
information is not used by politicians and board members to control service delivery 
agents (Day & Klein, 1987). Even in Australia and New Zealand, where more extensive 
performance information is published, members of parliament make little use of it 
(Thomas, 1998). As Boyne and Law (1991) have noted, the findings reflect the poverty 
of performance information in annual reports.  
 Several other studies point out various important issues relating to the practice 
of performance information: obstacles in performance reporting, how the reporting 
dynamism develops over time, and the determinants of the quality of performance 
information. Studies that focus on the problems of developing and reporting 
performance information in the public sector have found several difficulties faced by 
agencies in the public sector. Stewart and Walsh (1994) found problems related to the 
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difficulty of determining a set of performance indicators suitable for services (which are 
the dominant outputs in the public sector) and the comparability of indicators across 
different agencies, activities and outputs. Rutherford (2000) found that public managers 
struggle to report the battery of performance indicators that provide a comprehensive 
picture of performance consistent with cost-benefit principles. Di Francesco (1999) 
found that public sector agencies were not doing well in the identification of direct links 
between outputs and outcomes (Di Francesco, 1999). 
 The presence of these problems means that development of performance 
information in a typical public sector institution over time has followed a distinct 
pattern (Mayston, 1985). Initially, information is produced in small batches of 
indicators from readily available data. This information has more curiosity value rather 
than functionality. Over time, the volume of indicator information increases, but there is 
no corresponding change in the organisation, design technology and functional 
intentions in the production of performance information.  Thus, the volume increases 
but the „quality‟ does not. 
 Two solutions are offered for these problems: regulation of information 
(Hyndman & Eden, 2002) and acquisition of skills and capability (Webber, 2004). 
Better systems can be developed more quickly if greater prescription and detailed 
guidance can be provided to regulate the performance information that needs to be 
reported. This situation calls for comprehensive and generally accepted standards for 
performance reporting. It also demands a well-specified performance measurement and 
performance reporting systems. The acquisition and development over time of the 
necessary skills and capabilities that enable organisations to effectively integrate the 
output and outcome concepts will lead to the eventual success of performance-based 
public sector reporting. 
 The research literature points to several factors that influence the type of 
performance indicators and the „quality‟ of their disclosures by institutions. Carter 
(1991) offers seven dimensions of organisations that might be relevant to the shaping of 
performance indicators: ownership (private or public sector), trading status, level of 
competition, heterogeneity of outputs, political pressure, degree of complexity in output 
delivery, uncertainty in the objectives and between the means and the ends for achieving 
the objectives. Size of the organisation has also been found to have a significant effect 
on the quality of disclosure (Ryan et al., 2002; Taylor & Rosair, 2000).  
 Studies in the public sector reporting literature that focus on central government 
practice can be grouped under two perspectives. The first group of research, which is 
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the majority, is based loosely on rational choice theory. Within this group, most studies 
utilise some form of accountability concept to explain the role of reporting, such as 
studies by Hyndman & Anderson (1995, 1998), Hyndman & Eden (2001, 2002), 
Catasus & Grondlund (2005), Brun & Siegel (2006), and Herawaty & Hoque (2007). 
Some studies, for example research by Rutherford (2000), Carlin (2004), Brun & Siegel 
(2006), and Mack & Ryan (2006), have focused on the role and characteristics of 
information in the relationship between the agencies and their stakeholders. The second 
group of research uses an institutional and contextual perspective. Theories being used 
as the lens for analysis are stakeholder theory, such as research by Hoque et al. (2004) 
and Rantanen et al. (2007),  and institutional theory, which has been used in research by 
Laegreid et al. (2006) and Hoque et al. (2004). The last group of studies combined these 
two perspectives as either a combination of theories, or a contrast of both theories, such 
as studies by Julnes & Holzer (2001), Laegreid et al. (2006), Sotirakou & Zeppou 
(2006), and Rantanen et al. (2007). 
Although some studies based on some variation of rational choice theory exist in 
the public sector reporting literature, very few use agency theory or public choice theory 
as the lens for the analysis. In fact, even if the research is based on some idea from 
agency theory, all of them are just superficially based on agency theory, such as Mack 
and Ryan (2006). It is a disappointing situation, considering the public sector reform 
movement has been built on a foundation that incorporates both economic theories.  A 
lack of research utilising these economic theories brings about a situation in which 
public sector practitioners are unable to assess whether the deficiencies of public sector 
reform under the umbrella of New Public Management are the result of inconsistent 
implementation of the economic theories or incompatibility of the theories with the 
public sector environment. Since agency theory and public choice theory are 
foundational for this reform, these theories should provide useful insights into the 
current situation, and therefore may be useful in revealing some of the limitations seen 
in reporting practice by comparing these with the theories. Agency theory may also be 
useful in identifying some of the limits in the current structure of contractual 
arrangements or the relationship between the principal and agent in the public sector 
environment. Public choice theory is useful for identifying whether the current structure 
is getting closer to implementing the “superior way” of producing public goods. These 
are the reasons why this thesis utilises agency theory and public choice theory as the 
framework for analysis.  
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2. Literature Review on Disclosure Measurement Methodology and Research 
 To address one of the questions in this thesis, which is measuring the quality of 
performance information disclosed by New Zealand central government agencies, a 
measurement method/technique will be applied. There are a number of proxies used in 
the literature for measuring disclosure. Disclosure analysis in this thesis uses a variant 
of content analysis methodology, which is called the disclosure index. To provide a 
perspective on the methodology used, it is necessary to present a literature review of 
this methodology. The discussion will start with a summary of proxies used in 
disclosure research based on the work done by Hassan and Marston (2010). The 
summary will be followed by a description of the basic methodology in content 
analysis. The discussion will be concluded by a review of accounting disclosure 
research using a disclosure index. 
Proxies for Disclosure in Accounting Research 
 Hassan and Marston (2010) categorise proxies used in measuring the disclosure 
in accounting research into two groups. The first group consists of proxies that are not 
derived from a disclosure vehicle. The second group consists of proxies derived from a 
disclosure vehicle. 
 Proxies for disclosure in the first group are proxies that are generated externally 
from the disclosure vehicle. According to Hassan and Marston (2010), proxies in this 
group are either the indicator variable, which is a variable that indicates the level of 
disclosure, or the causal variable, which is a variable that causes the increase in the level 
of disclosure. Some examples of proxies in this group are as follows: 
 The proxy as an indicator variable. The measure that indicates the level of 
disclosure is derived from the perception of analysts, investors or other user 
groups of the disclosure practice through the use of interviews or questionnaires. 
The advantages and the disadvantages of this approach depend on the interview 
or questionnaire instruments used. In addition, while the scores are not labour-
intensive and can cover a sizable sample of organisations, there is a concern with 
the objectivity of the views of the user group investigated. 
 The existence of the American Depository Receipt (ADR) is an indicator 
variable of disclosure level. Non-US firms that listed in the US market via the 
ADR mechanism are considered to have an increased level of disclosure. The 
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convergence with International Financial Reporting Standards has made this 
approach lose its usefulness as indicating increased disclosure. 
 Attributes of analysts‟ forecast (AAF), and the number of analysts following the 
company are used as proxies for the indicator/causal variable for information 
disclosure. Firms with more informative disclosure are said to attract a larger 
analyst following and with more accurate forecasting. Therefore, the size of the 
analysts following and the accuracy of their forecasts are indicators of more 
informative disclosure. However, this notion has been challenged by the 
possibility of firms manipulating earnings toward financial analysts‟ forecasts. 
 Other proxies such as period of listing and event (change of GAAP or reporting 
requirement) are used because of the limitations faced by researchers on time 
and access to relevant data. The use of the period of listing as a proxy is based 
on the logic that the longer the period a firm is listed in the market, the better is 
its disclosure practice. The use of an event of change in the reporting 
requirement is based on the assumption that the new requirement produces a 
better information environment. 
 
Proxies for disclosure in the second group are proxies that are generated by 
analysing the disclosure vehicle directly. Some examples of proxies in this group are: 
 Content analysis is a research technique that analyses the content of a text to 
make replicable and valid inferences from the text (Krippendorff, 1980). Hassan 
and Marston (2010) suggest that there are two types of content analysis: 
conceptual content analysis and relational content analysis. The conceptual type 
of analysis is used to determine the existence of concepts within a text by 
measuring the frequency of key words in the text. The relational type of analysis 
not only determines the existence of the concepts but also examines the 
relationships among concepts in a text. 
 Disclosure index is a research technique that tries to measure the extent of 
information reported in a particular disclosure vehicle, according to a list of 
selected items of information that completely represent a certain theme. Hassan 
and Marston (2010) differentiate this technique from content analysis, while in 
this study, it is argued that this technique is a part of textual research techniques 
under the umbrella of content analysis. This technique will be discussed further 
below. 
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 Management forecasts are a specific type of information that may be disclosed 
in a disclosure vehicle. They are used as a proxy for disclosure quality due to the 
availability of verification of these forecasts from subsequent disclosure. 
However, similar to the problem of using analyst forecasts as proxies, these 
forecasts could also be subjected to earnings management, thus reducing their 
usefulness in research. 
 The research may also classify firms‟ disclosure into good news or bad news and 
study the characteristics of good news in contrast to those of bad news. 
 Disclosure frequency and changes in the frequency of disclosure are other 
proxies used to measure the level of disclosure. The level of disclosure is 
considered to increase if the disclosure frequency increases.  
An Overview of Content Analysis 
 The methodology used in earlier studies of accounting disclosure is based on the 
content analysis approach developed in communication studies. However, some aspects 
of content analysis have been modified specifically for accounting research and this 
results in the recognition of these approaches being dealt with separately from 
established content analysis methodology, by some researchers such as Hassan and 
Marston (2010).  
 Content analysis is a research methodology initially developed for research in 
the communication field of study to study the message of communication, not the 
communicator or the audience. As Kassarjian (1977) asserts, the unit of the analysis is 
the signs and symbols rather than the intent of the communicator or the actions of the 
audience. This analysis is an observational research method used to evaluate 
systematically the symbolic content of recorded information (Kolbe & Burnett, 1991). It 
is also a “scientific method that requires rigorous and systematic analysis” (Barcus 
1959, as cited in (Holsti, 1968)). 
 The earliest definition of content analysis is offered by Berelson (1952), as 
quoted by Kassarjian (1977), stating that it is a research technique to describe the 
manifest content of communication in an objective, systematic, quantitative manner. 
Fearing (1954), as quoted by Kassarjian (1977), expands the definition by including 
latent content of communication as the object of the study and explaining that the 
process of analysis should be done by judges/scorers using objectively defined criteria. 
Thus, content analysis is a research method used to study the latent and manifest content 
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of recorded communication by employing judges to objectively and systematically 
apply categorisation rules based on selected criteria. 
 Accounting researchers have borrowed this method of analysis to use in their 
studies on narrative reporting. In the accounting literature, studies utilising content 
analysis are classified into two categories: studies investigating syntactic structure of a 
narrative and studies focusing on thematic structure of a narrative. The focus of 
syntactic analysis is the structural organisation of text, which is mainly about readability 
of narrative reporting in most accounting studies, while the focus of thematic analysis is 
the content of the information (Sydserff & Weetman, 2002). 
 Smith and Taffler (2000) further differentiate studies using thematic analysis 
into “form-oriented” analysis and “meaning-oriented” analysis. Form-oriented analysis 
is similar to the conceptual type of analysis according to Hassan and Marston (2010) 
that measures the frequency of key words or counting of words in a narrative reporting. 
In this analysis, researchers rely on some form of objective and computerised analysis 
of text based on a catalogue of keywords. While the counting itself is objective, there is 
a certain degree of subjectivity in constructing the catalogue of keywords. Meaning-
oriented analysis focuses on identifying the underlying themes in the text under 
investigation. The themes can be constructed in the form of opposite themes, such as 
positive statement or negative statement, failure or success, internal or external 
attribution, or in the form of a list of themes that convey a complete (comprehensive) 
communication of a certain intention, such as reporting corporate social responsibility, 
reporting intangible assets, or reporting for accountability purposes. Since the themes 
identified can be constructed in several ways, researchers can then analyse whether 
there is a pattern of causal reasoning and attribution of a certain theme to another. For 
example, whether the theme that conveys success would relate to the theme that 
conveys internal attribution or whether the theme that conveys failure would relate to 
the theme that conveys external attribution. Alternatively, the themes identified can also 
be found in other organisational or external variables, such as the relationship between 
the comprehensiveness of disclosure in the area of corporate social responsibility and 
the degree of political pressure faced by firms. This second type of analysis covers the 
relational type of analysis of Hassan and Marston (2010) and disclosure index 
methodology. 
 Holsti (1968) claims that content analysis is useful for three general classes of 
research problems that may occur in most disciplines and areas of enquiry. First, content 
analysis will be important if researchers face data accessibility problems and the 
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available data is restricted to documentary evidence. Second, if the subject‟s own 
language and mode of expression is crucial in the investigation then content analysis is 
a necessary instrument for the investigation. Third, content analysis can be used in 
research in which materials should be evaluated objectively and systematically but the 
volume is too great to be handled by a single researcher. Content analysis allows for the 
use of trained assistants. This facility, in combination with systematic sampling of 
stimuli and interjudge reliability, makes content analysis an indispensable formal 
method of scientific analysis. 
 However, researchers need to be aware of the benefits and the limitations of this 
methodology. Kolbe and Burnett (1991) list several benefits and inherent weaknesses of 
content analysis. The benefits are: 
 Content analysis permits an unobtrusive appraisal of communication, which can 
be valuable in situations in which biased responses are generated when 
researchers use direct methods of enquiry. 
 Content analysis allows for relational analysis between environmental variables 
or source characteristics and message content. 
 Content analysis can provide initial empirical evidence for further research about 
the nature and effect of specific communications. 
 Content analysis is a useful companion research method in multi-method studies 
that can enhance the validity of the research results by mitigating method biases. 
 
Kolbe and Burnett (1991) also list some inherent weaknesses of content analysis. The 
weaknesses are: 
 Researcher biases can affect decisions made in the collection, analysis and 
interpretation of data. 
 The potential of content analysis is limited to specific elements of 
communication. It is an exploratory research that is not anchored in specific 
theoretical perspectives. Therefore, it is not easy to identify the theoretical lenses 
used in the analysis. 
 Content analysis in essence summarises complex communications as categorical 
data. Sensitivity to subtleties in communications is reduced in this method. 
Other methods with higher-order scales may provide better sensitivity to the 
nuances of communications.  
 There are three distinguishing characteristics of content analysis: objective, 
systematic and quantitative. The objective characteristic refers to the requirement that 
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the categories of analysis be defined so precisely that if different judges (analysts) apply 
them to the same text then the same results would be produced (Berelson, 1952). The 
subjective predispositions of the judges should be controlled at the minimum level 
possible, by requiring that all decisions made are guided by an explicit set of rules 
(Holsti, 1968). The main test for objectivity is that if other judges use identical 
procedures and the same set of data, they will arrive at similar conclusions (Kassarjian, 
1977). 
 According to Kolbe and Burnett (1991), the objectivity of content analysis can 
be enhanced if research using this methodology includes two factors. First, there should 
be precise operational definitions and detailed rules and procedures for coding, to 
facilitate an accurate and reliable coding process. Second, multiple and independent 
judges are employed in the research and all of them are properly trained. Therefore, 
good research utilising content analysis should report five elements: rules and 
procedures, training of judges, pretesting of measures, independence of judges from the 
author and independence of judges from one another. 
 The systematisation characteristic refers to the requirement that analysis must be 
designed to obtain data relevant to the hypothesis or problem (Berelson, 1952). It means 
that criteria/rules used in the coding process should be based on the problem 
investigated or hypothesis stated in the research. The criteria should be consistently 
applied in the inclusion and exclusion of communication contents or analysis category 
(Holsti, 1968). 
 The last characteristic, quantification, refers to a measurement of the extent of 
emphasis or omission of any specified analytic category. The result of content analysis 
should be a quantitative score of qualitative data (text). Quantification can be in the 
form of a frequency count or a score to represent an emphasis or theme. With 
quantification, data resulting from content analysis can be amenable to statistical 
methods for precise and parsimonious findings and for interpretation and inference. 
 Kassarjian (1977) asserts that a typical procedure for content analysis should 
include four important steps. First, there should be a method of determining and 
selecting a reasonable-sized sample for study from the available population of 
documents to be studied. Second, there should be a determination of the units of 
measurement, such as specific words, an overall theme, or the existence or non-
existence of an item in the criteria. Third, the judges should be trained for categorisation 
of the content according to predetermined rules. And the last is that the procedure 
should include treatment and analysis of data, including the use of statistical analysis. 
 73 
 There are several choices for measurement units in content analysis. The first 
one is words, which may include compound words. Readability studies commonly use 
the word unit in the analysis. The second choice is a theme, which is defined by 
Kassarjian (1977) as a single assertion about a subject. He further argues that this unit 
of measurement is the most useful unit of content analysis but it is also the most 
difficult one. The discussion of issues, values, beliefs and attitudes is mostly in this 
form, so it is very useful for meaning-oriented analysis. However, it is not easy to 
identify themes in a text. In some cases, more than one theme may be present in a 
sentence. The judge must be able to identify these component themes before putting 
them into the proper categories (Holsti, 1968). In other cases, a single theme may be 
present in several sentences or paragraphs or in a non-textual presentation. The third 
choice is characters. This unit is mostly used in studies of fiction, drama, movies, radio 
or any other form of entertainment material (Kassarjian, 1977). The fourth choice is 
item, which is the whole text or material of the analysis. In a typical piece of accounting 
research, this may include a financial report, a company release, a letter, or any single 
identifiable form of communication material. The last choice is the space and time unit. 
The measures for this unit can be column inch, the line, the paragraph, the minute, the 
page, or the foot (Kassarjian, 1977). 
Reliability and Validity in Content Analysis 
 Kassarjian (1977) argues that reliability, or reproducibility, is the strong point of 
content analysis compared with other techniques of analysing communication content. 
There are two types of reliability: category reliability and inter-judge or inter-coder 
reliability. The first type of reliability depends upon the ability of the researcher to 
formulate categories and to present definitions of categories so that competent judges 
will agree on identifying which unit of analysis belongs to a certain category and which 
does not. It is about whether the criteria can be used by the judges to identify easily 
which unit of analysis belongs to a certain category in the criteria and not to the other 
category. If the coding is done several times using the same material and the same 
criteria, there is a high degree of consistency in the results of these trials in criteria with 
strong category reliability. This type of reliability is also called stability, which is the 
weakest type of reliability (Krippendorff, 1980). A common measure for this reliability 
is the ratio of coding agreements from one trial to another to the total number of coding 
decisions. The test-retest is the procedure to assess this reliability. In this procedure, a 
judge will repeat the same analysis after an interval of time. 
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 Inter-coder reliability is the measure of agreement among several judges coding 
the same set of research material using the same criteria. This reliability is the degree of 
consistency between judges. It is also called reproducibility (Krippendorff, 1980). This 
reliability is commonly measured by comparing the number of coding agreements with 
the total number of coding decisions. Since there is a possibility that some agreements 
may have occurred randomly, several different adjustments to this measure have been 
proposed, such as Krippendorff (1980)‟s alpha and Cohen (1960)‟s kappa. This 
reliability is influenced by the type of categories used and the decision made by the 
judges. Reliability can be increased if categories are narrowed and simplified and the 
decisions are made simple. However, the narrower the category, the less valuable is the 
validity of coding criteria (Holsti, 1968).  
 Milne and Adler (1999) argue that it is not an easy task to formally measure 
inter-coder reliability and to establish minimum standards to be achieved in disclosure 
studies. Each method developed using content analysis generates different theoretical 
and working limits. Therefore, there is no general rule that can be adopted in order to set 
an acceptable level of reliability in disclosure research using content analysis. They only 
advise on two aspects: researchers should be careful in interpreting the results of the 
analysis and researchers need to understand the tools, their limits and the research 
context. 
 Validity of a methodology is also an important issue. Validity refers to the 
extent to which an instrument measures what it claims to measure (Kassarjian, 1977). 
There are many types of validity, but the most important one for content analysis is face 
validity or content validity. Face validity is about the accuracy of correspondence 
between construct (such as theme, level of accountability, level of comprehensiveness) 
and its respective measurement (such as coding methods, disclosure index) (Jones & 
Shoemaker, 1994). Usually, this validity is assessed by seeking a subjective judgment or 
opinion from professionals or experts in the area that is measured by the instruments. 
For example, disclosure indices on intangible asset disclosure are usually discussed with 
experts in the reporting of intangible assets and some interest groups (such as managers, 
bankers and analysts). 
Research on Disclosure using Disclosure Index Methodology 
 The objective of thematic content analysis is to identify and analyse themes, 
such as specific trends, attitudes, or content categories, inherent in the narrative (Jones 
& Shoemaker, 1994). This type of content analysis has been widely used in the 
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accounting literature to study accounting narrative, especially in studies of the extent of 
disclosure in annual reports. 
 Guthrie & Abeysekera (2006) categorise content analysis used in measuring 
disclosure into two approaches. The first approach is to identify the overriding themes 
in a text by way of measuring the frequency of words or expressions that resemble the 
themes. This approach is usually used in research that investigates the presence of 
opposite themes, as previously explained. The second approach uses disclosure index as 
the research instrument. The focus of the first approach is on the quantity of disclosure. 
The disclosed information is measured by counting all the data items, such as number of 
words and numbers. The problem with this approach is there is repetition of certain 
numbers and words in the accounting narrative. In addition, numbers on their own do 
not have informational content or represent a single category unless they are 
accompanied by explanatory words (Marston & Shrives, 1991). 
 Studies focusing on quality of disclosure assess what is actually being disclosed. 
As Guthrie and Parker (1990) assert, these studies should focus on what was said and 
how it was said: theme, evidence (monetary, non-monetary, declarative, none), amount 
and location of a disclosure. Similarly, in their study on the quality of environmental 
disclosure, Gray et al. (1995) and Hackston and Milne (1996) focus on examining 
themes, evidences, amount, auditability and news to infer the quality of disclosure. 
 Disclosure index is the selected instrument used in most studies focusing on the 
quality of disclosure. This instrument, as stated by Marston and Shrives (1991), is a list 
of themes or disclosure categories to assess, compare and explain differences in the 
extent or comprehensiveness of disclosure. There is a well-established area of disclosure 
study utilising this instrument in the accounting literature. A majority of research 
focuses on whether disclosure of specific items is considered important for 
accountability. An accountability index or modified accountability index is quite 
popular in this area of the accounting literature. 
 A disclosure index is a research instrument used to measure the 
comprehensiveness or the level of disclosure in the specific context for which the index 
is devised (Guthrie & Abeysekera, 2006). It contains a series of preselected items, in 
which each will be scored based on the existence of the item in the targeted documents 
or the extent to which the information on that item is disclosed. A comprehensive 
disclosure for a certain context means that all relevant information for that context is 
reported. For example, an annual report of a public institution is considered 
comprehensive for accountability purposes if all relevant financial and non-financial 
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information has been reliably reported. The researcher then develops a public 
accountability index containing a list of items that should be reported in the annual 
report that is considered to fulfil the accountability purpose. When the index is used to 
assess annual reports of public institutions, the score result is viewed as the level of 
comprehensiveness of the reports to fulfil their purpose of delivering accountability. 
 The selection of the form of disclosure index involves a trade-off between 
reliability and validity. The simplest form of disclosure index uses a binary coding 
system. Each item measures the presence or omission of information in the assessed 
documents. The total scores represent an aggregate measure of the quantity of 
disclosure. This form of index usually produces the highest level of reliability if it is 
designed properly by the researcher. However, unless the level of quality can be 
represented by some form of quantity or comprehensiveness measure, this index has 
lower validity than more complex indices. Complex indices allow for variation in the 
quality of individual items. The quality of disclosure for each item can be assessed 
using ordinal scales. Thus, validity increases if the quality of reported information is 
measured in a certain context. In spite of this, it is not easy to design a non-binary 
scoring system that has a high degree of reliability. More judgment is needed in scoring 
with ordinal scales and this reduces the reliability of the index. 
 There have been numerous studies on annual report disclosure. Some of the 
research has concentrated on overall annual report disclosures, such as research by 
Adams & Hossain (1998), Baker & Haslam (1973), Buzby (1974), Choi (1973), Chow 
& Wong-Boren (1987), Leventis & Weetman (2004), Singhvi & Desai (1971) and 
Zarzeski (1996). Other studies focused on specific information in the area of social 
corporate responsibility, environmental reporting and intellectual capital, such as studies 
by Adams et al. (1998), Bozollan et al. (2003), Brennan (2001), Bukh et al. (2005), 
Cowan & Gadenne (2005), Guthrie & Abeysekera (2006), Ho & Taylor (2007), Ingram 
& Frazier (1980), Milne & Adler (1999), Ratanajongkol et al. (2006), Roberts (1992) 
and Vandemaele et al. (2005). Some other studies focus on the disclosure of specific 
items under the notion of public accountability, for example studies by Bank et al. 
(1997), Gray & Haslam (1990), Hooks et al. (2001) and Ryan et al. (2002).  
A disclosure index is a popular approach used in accounting research that 
investigates the quality of information issued to the public. From the sample of studies 
identified that use a disclosure index (see Appendix 2 for the list), most of the studies 
take all the information in the annual report as the object of analysis (Belkaoui & 
Karpik, 1989; Brennan, 2001; Cowen, Ferreri & Parker, 1987; Leventis & Weetman, 
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2004; Robbins & Austin, 1986). These studies investigate the relationship between 
external/internal variables of an organisation and the quality or extent of information 
disclosure. One study examined the quality of information in a prospectus (Bukh et al., 
2005), and its relationship with organisational variables. Another study (Bryan, 1997) 
investigated a section in the annual report (management discussion and analysis) while 
another study (Ho & Taylor, 2007) investigated the annual reports, stand-alone reports 
and special website reports for similar associations. 
The indices used in these studies are based on a variety of sources. The bases 
cited are literature review (Bukh et al., 2005;  Ho & Taylor, 2007; Leventis & 
Weetman, 2004), surveys carried out by others (Belkaoui & Karpik, 1989; Cowen et al., 
1987), surveys carried out by the researchers (Robbins & Austin, 1986), frameworks 
developed by other researchers (Brennan, 2001; Leventis & Weetman, 2004), and 
disclosure regulation (Bryan, 1997). Most of the studies, other than Robbins and Austin 
(1986), use unweighted scores. One study (Bryan, 1997) looked at the direction of 
disclosure (unfavourable, neutral, favourable or missing) instead of just the presence or 
omission of the information. 
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IV. METHODOLOGY 
A. Overview 
 This study utilised library research, archival data analysis and semi-structured 
interviews. The library research was conducted to develop the possible and relevant 
theoretical arguments in the practice and quality of outcome reporting in the public 
sector, as well as the possible determinants of the quality of the reporting. Disclosure 
analysis using an index was used to assess the current practice of output and outcome 
disclosure over the period of analysis, in the form of a score. To determine the internal 
and external factors that influenced the increase in the quality of reporting, a semi-
structured interview, combined with archival data analysis as far as possible to validate 
the interview results, was the main method used. The results were then compared and 
contrasted with the theory selected. 
B. Research Method 
 Three critical steps were carried out in the research for this study. First was the 
development of a disclosure index as the measurement tool. Second was the application 
of the index to score the comprehensiveness of performance information in the SOIs 
and annual reports. Third was conducting interviews and analysing the results in 
conjunction with the results of the disclosure analysis, to explain the factors that 
influenced the observed performance reporting practice. 
1. Disclosure Analysis 
The methodology used in this research can loosely be described as the meaning-
orientated (subjective) approach of thematic content analysis. This approach focuses on 
the quality of the content to represent certain themes. What is being disclosed is not 
indicated solely by the quantity of the content (Frost & Wilmshurst, 2000). Some 
studies in this approach focus on the investigation of the presence or omission of certain 
themes (Sydserff & Weetman, 2002). Other studies in this approach require researchers 
to select (develop) narrative (disclosure) indices to assess, compare and explain 
differences in the extent and comprehensiveness of the content in accounting narratives 
(Marston & Shrives, 1991). For example, a researcher could study whether the 
disclosure practices comply with regulation and/or the level and extent of voluntary 
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disclosure. An index could be developed to include a mixture of required and voluntary 
items to suit the purpose of the research. This disclosure index method is the one which 
was used in this research. 
The decision to use disclosure index was based on the fact that there is no other 
proxy available that represents the quality or level of comprehensiveness of 
performance information. While the overall assessment of information quality in the 
New Zealand public sector, as published by the Office of Auditor General (2008), is 
available, there is no publicly available assessment result for each individual public 
agency in New Zealand. Therefore, there is a need to develop and apply a proxy to 
represent the quality of information to permit this individual assessment. In addition, the 
study also offered an assessment method of information that had some degree of 
objectivity and which could provide quantitative assessment for qualitative objects. 
The disclosure index technique was the method that was deemed appropriate 
since it offered a way to answer some of the problems addressed in this study. First, the 
quality of performance information could be measured with this technique. Second, the 
scores produced by applying this technique could be used to find out whether there had 
been progress in the reporting of outcome information by NZ central government 
agencies over time. Third, the scores could also indicate the extent to which the 
disclosure of performance information by NZ central government agencies had followed 
the available guidance or benchmark over time. 
Methodological contribution of this study is the application of the disclosure 
index technique to disclosure research on non-financial performance reporting in the 
public sector. The disclosure index technique has not previously been used in studies 
that focus on non-financial performance reporting. The common technique to assess the 
quality of performance information is by indicator counting and categorisation. 
Disclosure index is usually used in public sector studies that assess the quality of overall 
disclosure in relation to the fulfilment of accountability objectives. These studies use 
some variants of disclosure index called a public accountability index. Whilst studies on 
specific reporting issues in public sector, such as those reporting on intangible assets or 
environmental aspects of operation, have utilised some versions of disclosure index 
techniques, currently there is no single research study in the public sector that applies 
this technique to investigate the quality of specific parts of the information disclosed. 
Thus, a key aim of this study was to fill this gap by demonstrating that disclosure index 
is a powerful yet flexible measurement technique that can be used in any research that 
attempts to assess the quality of a narrative. 
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Research Index Design 
Before designing a disclosure index, researchers need to specify the purpose of 
this instrument in their research. Once the purpose has been decided, items to be 
included in the index are selected. The index will then consist of a series of pre-selected 
items with a scoring system that can show the level of disclosure in the context of the 
purpose of the study. Therefore, the usefulness of the index as a measurement tool 
critically depends on the selection of items to be included in the index and the related 
scoring system. 
 The purpose of this research was to assess the changes in comprehensiveness of 
output and outcome information over a period of time; therefore the items included had 
to consist of an ideal or a complete set of output and outcome information. This set was 
approached by investigating the current literature and guidance related to the targeted 
information. Since currently there is no accepted framework for output and outcome 
information, documents that are available as guidance and reference for reporting 
outputs and outcomes, as previously outlined at the end of Chapter II of this thesis (see 
page 46-48 above), were used to identify items forming an ideal set of performance 
information.  
 When the item was identified, the possible level of disclosure of each item for 
scoring development was determined. There are four distinct levels of measurement: the 
binary scale, the ordinal or ranking scale, the interval scale and the ratio scale. Since the 
last two scales are not applicable in disclosure index methodology, the ordinal scale as a 
higher order scale was considered first. However, after the first iteration of the scoring 
process using this scale, the reliability of this scoring was not at an acceptable level. 
When the scoring system was trialled by different scorers (judges), they came up with 
quite different score results and disagreements between scorers were more the rule than 
the exception. The scorers had to employ a high degree of judgment in considering a 
score from more than one scale. While it was easy to spot the zero level of disclosure on 
the items, it was quite difficult to agree whether a certain disclosure should be assessed 
at the low level (score 1), medium level (score 2) or high level (score 3). The level of 
scoring consistency was not at an acceptable level, so it was decided that a binary scale 
instead would be used in this study.  Even though binary coding is the least preferred 
method of capturing an increase in the comprehensiveness of information, it was used to 
get more objective and consistent scoring. The comprehensiveness was captured by the 
number of items reported, or in this case the number of total scores, and it was 
considered as being the proxy for information comprehensiveness. 
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The selection of binary coding made it easier to score the items; however it 
required an expanded set of items of disclosure. The previous list of items was 
expanded to capture more detailed components of disclosure than was previously a part 
of an item. For example, an item that previously was scored on a three-rank scale (0, 1, 
2, and 3, with a 0 score for no information disclosed) was then expanded into three 
items, each with binary scaling (0 and 1). It was easier for the scorers, since they simply 
needed to identify whether the item was disclosed in the documents. If the information 
was presented, the scorers assigned a score of 1 for that item category in the index. 
The development of disclosure indices provided some important lessons. The 
index should be neutral to the number of outputs reported. Some agencies may report 
many outputs and some may disclose a few outputs. The score should not be affected by 
this difference. The scoring system should be able to make the same differentiation for 
binary-type outputs (especially for policy advice) and for high-volume outputs. In the 
case of binary-type outputs, the development of items to represent a more 
comprehensive disclosure was implemented after scanning a sample of documents to 
identify the variation of how the information on these outputs was presented. This type 
of output created something of a challenge because when it was reported, the 
information about planned and actual quantity was automatically presented, since its 
quantity was one. In high-volume outputs, this information needs to be presented 
separately. The results of the document scan showed that there were two variations on 
binary-type output reporting: a simple presentation only disclosing the name of the 
output and a detailed presentation disclosing not only the name of the output but also 
the milestones or deliverables of the output. It was decided that for this type of output, 
the information of planned and actual quantity was presented if the document contained 
planned and actual milestones or deliverables for the outputs. 
Clear instructions were developed for scoring the comprehensiveness of 
performance information of binary-type outputs. Decisions also needed to be made in 
cases where the targeted indicators were not explicitly noted. For example, some 
indicators of actual results were presented in percentage form. A consistent rule was 
needed to decide whether the targeted indicator was simply not available or the target 
was implicitly stated at 100%. The most important lesson learned was that the scoring 
instructions should be as clear as possible, to enable consistent treatment across the 
sample.  
 The scoring system also had to take into account the fact that different 
documents assessed have different applicable sets of disclosure items. For example, 
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some documents may contain variation in the measures reported, and therefore a 
disclosure item that disclosed an explanation for this variation was expected. 
Consequently, for these documents the number of applicable disclosure items in their 
complete set of information was more than the other documents that did not report 
variation. In this case, index scores were later converted by dividing the actual score by 
the maximum score possible for every entity, to a relative score, as suggested by 
Marston and Shriver (1991).  
Testing the Index 
 Once the items were identified and the scoring method was designed, the draft 
of the index was developed, tested, validated and retested again. It was during this first 
test of the index draft that the decision was made to change the ranking scale into the 
binary scale, after considering the unacceptable level of consistency when using the 
ranking scale. The index based on the binary scale was then tested again. After an 
acceptable level of reliability was achieved, the index, which was called the alpha index, 
was ready to be tested using a bigger and more varied sample.  The index was then 
tested to score a sample of reports. The reports were randomly selected from the 
population of documents to be scored. The purpose of this test was to find the degree of 
difficulty and the weaknesses of the scoring system that could reduce the reliability of 
the measurement. The researcher and an assistant familiar with government reporting in 
New Zealand performed the tests. 
 An auditor working at the OAG was an ideal candidate as a scorer/judge because 
of his extensive knowledge of public sector reporting in New Zealand through his 
experience as an auditor. Before he conducted the scoring of all documents assigned to 
him, he was trained in the disclosure index methodology. Then, the researcher and the 
assistant did a run-down of scoring instructions using a set of documents to be assessed 
(a pair, the Statement of Intent and the annual report). Any confusing instructions were 
clarified during the process. The assistant was then deemed to be ready to perform the 
scoring test for the alpha index. 
This test revealed another difficulty in scoring the information, as most agencies 
only disclosed clear identification of performance indicators at output class level, 
instead of at a more detailed output level. The scoring at output level produced a higher 
degree of differentiation than the scoring at output class level. Therefore, it was later 
decided that the scoring would be applied at output level for some disclosure items. 
However, it was noted that there was a substantial degree of inconsistency in identifying 
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the outputs in each output class for some agencies, especially those that provided no 
clear identification of outputs within their output classes. To overcome the difficulty, it 
was decided that the output identification would be done separately. Before conducting 
an assessment of a set of documents, each scorer identified the outputs individually and 
met later to resolve the difference.  
Once the scores agreed on the output identification, they proceeded with the full 
assessment of the documents. The scorers conducted the scoring separately for the 
sample reports. The test results between these two for the same sets of documents were 
then compared so that the reliability of the scoring system could be assessed. The 
scoring system proved to have a high degree of consistency, with less than a 1% scoring 
difference between the two scorers. The difference was discussed and the scoring 
system was refined further. 
Validating the Index   
The next step was presenting the index in two rounds to a group of selected 
experts in the New Zealand public sector reporting, for four purposes: (1) validating the 
items proposed in the index, (2) capturing any missing items suggested by the experts, 
(3) assigning weights to the items in the index, (4) assessing the validity as well as 
reliability of the scoring system. The experts were academicians in public sector 
accounting, officials from the OAG and a former official of the Treasury who was 
previously involved with the MfO initiative. The validated index used in the final 
scoring, as shown in Appendix A, contains the expert corrections and recommendations. 
The index weighting was abandoned, as some of the experts were concerned that 
applying the weighting would distort the index from its intention of capturing the 
comprehensiveness of the information. Once the index was validated, it was retested 
again against a very small sample of reports for the same purpose as the test conducted 
in the alpha index, but directed mainly to new items and/or a new scoring system 
resulting from the consultations. At this stage, the scoring was also done by two people 
for the purpose of calculating the reliability measure. 
Reliability Testing 
 Reliability of the methodology was the main concern in performing the 
disclosure analysis. The index score awarded to agencies was considered reliable if the 
results were consistent from one assessment to another and, when other researchers 
repeated the process, the results were similar. Since documents in which the scores were 
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extracted from remain constant over time, there will be no threat to reliability from the 
data source. However, the researcher applying the index and the scoring system to 
award the score had some potential problems with the reliability of the research. One 
attempt to increase the reliability was to have the level of subjectivity in scoring kept at 
a minimum level by providing clearer instructions for some problematic areas identified 
during the testing stage. Later, two reliability tests were conducted. The first was a test-
retest procedure. The researcher scored all the reports and redid the scoring for a 
randomly selected sample of the reports one month later. The scoring results from the 
same sample of the two tests were compared and the level of disagreement was less than 
1%. The research assistant, acting as an „expert‟ judge, also did the scoring for a 
randomly selected sample of the reports. For reasons of resource limitation, the second 
scorer (the assistant) only scored 25 pairs of documents (50 documents) that were 
randomly selected. The scoring results from the same sample of the two judges were 
compared and the index was deemed to be reliable, as the level of disagreement was less 
than 1%. 
Data Set and Disclosure Analysis 
The periods covered in this research were the first five of the fiscal years 
affected by the MfO initiative. The ex-ante reports (SOI) and the related annual reports 
for the period of 2003/2004 to 2007/2008 were used, and therefore for each executive 
agency 10 documents were analysed. Most of the reports were downloaded from the 
agencies‟ websites. Since some agencies could not provide all the reports, the reports 
were requested by applying directly to the agencies. Some agencies were new, or as a 
result of reorganisation they did not have the complete set of documents for the period 
covered in this analysis. Therefore, they were not selected for this analysis. Some other 
agencies could not provide all the required reports for the period covered, so they were 
also excluded. Out of 41 agencies, 27 agencies were selected as a sample for this 
research, because all documents for the analysis were available for these entities. In 
total, 270 documents were analysed in this study. The list of the agencies selected is 
available in Appendix D. 
To assess the representativeness of the sample, the list of departments/ministers 
was referred to three academicians with extensive experience of the New Zealand public 
sector. None of them raised any concern about the selection being biased. They 
concluded that the sample was representative of the population of New Zealand central 
government agencies. 
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After all documents were scored, the overall results were analysed to find out 
whether some components of the index had such a low occurrence level that the 
inclusion of them would skew the overall results. In this analysis, it was decided that 
one disclosure item group, which is location performance information, should be 
dropped from the list and the scoring results, since only three agencies disclosed this 
information, and two of them only disclosed it for one set of accountability documents.  
The total raw scores for each department were then transformed into relative 
scores, to take into account the fact that some agencies may have more disclosure items 
due to the existence of variances in their reported measures. This relative score of an 
agency was calculated by dividing the raw score and the number of total disclosure 
items applicable to that agency. In essence, this relative score represents the percentage 
of performance information disclosed in relation to the complete set of that performance 
information.  
Limitations 
 The validity of this study‟s finding may be subject to the limitations of the 
disclosure index technique. First, there was an assumption that the scope (or coverage) 
of a disclosure was a proxy for disclosure quality. The validity of the scoring results to 
represent the quality of the disclosure depended on the acceptance of this assumption. 
Second, the method involved scoring and quantification to come up with a single figure 
representing the overall quality of a narrative. It may take into account the relative 
importance of each item in the index by way of using weighted scores. The study did 
not take this into account due to the consideration that the relative importance of each 
item may be cancelled out if the narrative is intended to be a means of communication 
to the general public. One factor that is deemed important by some members of the 
public may be considered as not important by other members. Unless a study is intended 
to assess the quality of information from the perspective of a specific group, un-
weighted scores are more appropriate. However, this consideration has not been subject 
to a rigorous analysis. Third, construct validity cannot be assessed since this was the 
first study that assessed the quality of non-financial performance reporting using a 
disclosure index technique. Fourth, there was a level of subjectivity in the selection of 
the items and the coding process. Therefore, it was only valid to the extent that the 
index used was appropriate (Hassan and Marston, 2010).  
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2. Case Study for Analysis of Relevant Factors 
To identify the external and internal factors influencing reporting practice, a case 
study was utilised. This methodology was selected because it facilitated the 
understanding of complex inter-relationships in the public sector relating to 
performance reporting practice. It could also facilitate the exploration of the process 
involved in the causal relationships. This methodology fitted with the purpose of the 
research in describing complex factors that were likely to influence reporting practice 
by investigating the complex relationships of actors in the public sector.  
There are five steps to take in a typical case study. The first step is to determine 
the theoretical framework used to develop the pattern of concepts to be identified in the 
case study. This framework provides some notions of where to begin the inquiry. It also 
serves as a sort of checklist of points to investigate during the course of the study. The 
next step is to determine and apply appropriate data collection methods. The objective 
of this step is to obtain rich data that can be used in the analysis. Case studies usually 
use multiple data collection techniques, such as observation, document study, interview, 
documentation etc. This study used only two methods of data collection, which were 
interview and document study. Once data collection was completed, the analysis was 
carried out to identify and tabulate meaningful events as directed by the research 
framework. These events serve as findings in the research to support the next step of 
building explanation. In this step, explanations are developed by comparing and 
contrasting the findings with the concept pattern in the theoretical framework in order to 
confirm or reject all or parts of the concepts. The last step is a consideration for 
conducting multiple case studies. In this study, this consideration was important because 
the case studies undertaken were not intended to be used to gain an understanding of a 
particular issue pertaining to any particular entity. The aim was to investigate the factors 
that even common to a certain group of entities. Thus, case comparison was important 
to ensure that the findings could be generalised to a certain extent.  
This study used multiple cases to generate findings. The same case study 
methodology was repeated with a sample of entities so that similar results could be 
identified and contrasting results could be explained. The strength of this multiple case 
study was that it permitted some level of generalisation. However, in order to cover 
more cases, the depth of the study was reduced so that the investigation of multiple 
cases was still manageable. Consequently, the depth of analysis in this study may not be 
as deep as the analysis in a typical case study. 
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Data was collected in this study using interview and document study. 
Observation technique was not used because the events investigated occurred in the 
past. Out of these two techniques, interview was the main means for data collection 
since most of the concepts or events being investigated were mainly in the form of past 
experience. Interviews are particularly useful in obtaining the story behind a 
participant‟s experiences. Interview can also be used to pursue in-depth information on 
a topic. When relevant documents are available, they are analysed to gather findings 
that can be compared and contrasted with the results of the interviews. Interviews may 
provide an insight into the mechanisms of implementation and the causal links to a 
particular programme or initiative. It helps to identify success stories and obvious 
shortcomings. It may also help in proposing solutions and recommendations for 
initiatives in the future. 
Identification of Interview Targets and Initial Contact 
The agencies were grouped into three categories based on their disclosure 
scores. The first group consisted of nine agencies with the highest scores, the second 
group consisted of those with the next nine highest scores, and the last group consisted 
of the nine agencies with the lowest scores. The rank was determined using the average 
of total scores for all periods covered. Three agencies were selected randomly from each 
group. They were subject to two requirements: first, the agencies were not central 
agencies, and second, the official(s) that prepared the accountability reports at least 
worked with the agencies during the last three years of the period covered in this study. 
The focus of the case studies was those agencies that had a pure role as the preparers of 
information. The central agencies were not selected, because they have an additional 
role in the MfO initiative as the regulator. Since interviews were targeted at the officials 
who understood the process and the development of accountability documents during 
the period covered in this study, it was necessary to target the agencies that still 
employed those officials. Five agencies that were selected said in their response to the 
interview request that none of their officials met the second requirement mentioned 
above. Therefore, other agencies were selected to replace these agencies. 
The central agencies (in this case the Treasury and the SSC) and the OAG were 
targeted for a different role, not as preparers of the information but in their role as the 
regulators and as supporters of the MfO initiative. These agencies were also consulted 
to corroborate some of the issues raised by the preparers, in relation to the level of 
support in the MfO initiative and the regulation of performance reporting. 
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Interview Questionnaire Development 
 To identify factors that promote or hinder improvements in the performance 
reporting practice of New Zealand central agencies, a framework of analysis was 
developed to guide the process of data collection and data analysis. Three aspects in the 
agency theory framework were investigated in this analysis. First, to investigate the 
existence of information asymmetry, the roles and actions of ministers (as principals) 
and chief executives (as agents) in the development of performance measures and 
targets in the planning process, especially those that were related to the provision of 
information, were explored. Document studies and interviews with officials from 
selected departments and the Treasury were the main methods of data collection. 
Second, to identify problems, constraints and difficulties, data was gathered from 
interviews with officials of the selected departments, the Treasury and the OAG. Third, 
these interviews were also a means for collecting data used to analyse various 
mechanisms used or operated by the principals, via the Treasury, the SSC, and the 
OAG, and to assess the effectiveness of these mechanisms in improving the quality of 
performance information over time. These interviews, to the extent that  it was possible, 
were corroborated with the data by studying publicly available documents.  
 The list of questions asked in the interviews was developed by referencing the 
theoretical framework used, which in this case was a combination of public choice 
theory and agency theory. The draft of the questions was tested three times with three 
former public officials in New Zealand that were involved or knowledgeable in the area 
of output and outcome reporting. The tests were conducted to ensure that the questions 
were appropriate for the New Zealand public sector context and the concepts used were 
easily understood by targeted respondents. The tests were intended to identify any 
misunderstandings that might occur on the part of the interviewees. The list of the 
questions was later revised to reflect recommendations from the tests. This list is 
presented in Appendix I. 
Interview Process and Data Analysis 
In the end, while 15 interviews were planned only 14 interviews were able to be 
conducted for this study. One was cancelled due to a scheduling issue, but the 
interviewees provided a joint written reply on the list of questions sent to them. 
Interviewees were from two central agencies (SSC and the Treasury), the Office of the 
Auditor General, and nine other central government agencies. For interviews targeted to 
 89 
agencies as preparers, two persons were interviewed from each agency: one was the top-
level official responsible for the coordination of publication of accountability 
documents and the other was the lower-level official who was responsible for compiling 
information for accountability documents. In three cases, only one person was 
interviewed. In two out of these three cases, a scheduling problem was a factor, but the 
persons interviewed, who were lower-level staff, had informed the interviewer that they 
had discussed the question with their superiors and were able to speak on behalf of them 
on some of the questions asked. In another case, the person interviewed was from one 
small department where he was the only person responsible for the whole process of 
coordination and development of accountability documents.  In the other six agencies, 
two persons from each agency were interviewed. In four cases, the two persons were 
interviewed together. In two cases, because of a scheduling issue, the two persons were 
interviewed individually. From central agencies, three persons interviewed were high-
level officials who were involved either in the MfO initiative or in the review of 
accountability documents. Two high-level officials from the Office of the Auditor 
General were interviewed together. 
The main objective of this process was to get information that was not available 
from archival data regarding the agencies‟ experience in the production of 
accountability documents and the challenges that they faced during the process. The 
other objective was to reveal the dynamic interactions between the agencies and their 
political principals on one side and between the agencies, central agencies and the 
auditor on the other. The questions asked were about the process of preparing output 
and outcome information, the interactions of agencies with various parties in relation to 
output and outcome information, the incentives for reporting performance information 
and the challenges experienced in the process.  
The interviews were flexible and were done interactively. The order of the 
questions asked was different from one interview to another, depending on the issue that 
emerged first during the opening discussion. Some interviewees discussed some of the 
questions at length, while there was not much discussion of the same questions in other 
interviews. Therefore, while the set of questions being asked was the same for the nine 
agencies that were targeted as the preparers, the responses varied depending on the 
issues being stressed by each interviewee. Each interview lasted between three quarters 
of an hour and an hour and a quarter, except for one interview that lasted for two hours 
and a quarter due to the interviewee‟s desire to provide more elaborate responses for 
each question asked. The interviews were recorded and transcribed into Microsoft 
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Word. All interviewees declined when they were asked whether they would like to 
check the interview transcript, but some of them said they would like to receive the 
summary of findings from the interviews. This summary was sent to them and no 
objections were received in their responses. 
The interviews were analysed according to the themes identified in the 
theoretical framework. For each theme, a code was created. The codes were assigned to 
relevant passages in the transcription text. The passages were then categorised in a 
tabular format based on the theme, the agency interviewed and the grouping of the 
agency. Four Word documents were created for this categorisation, three documents for 
these nine agencies and one document to categorise the relevant passages from central 
agencies‟ and the OAG‟s interviews. Each theme was then analysed to find similarities 
or dominant patterns to be identified as findings. Variations were noted and presented as 
a part of the findings. 
Limitations 
 The validity of the findings from case studies relates to the limitations of the 
methodology. The first limitation is that the findings cannot be used to make scientific 
generalisations. The findings can only be generalised in relation to the theoretical 
propositions used and to the selected sample investigated. The second limitation is that 
sample selection, data handling and analysis are prone to influence from a researcher 
bias. The cases (entities) selected are not representative of diverse populations, therefore 
the findings are not applicable to such populations. The identification of events or 
concepts from the document study and interview involves some degree of researcher‟s 
subjectivity. Therefore, the study cannot be replicated to come up with similar results. 
These case studies can only make tentative conclusions on how much a particular 
variable affects the outcome in a particular case or type of cases. The case studies are 
meant to be used to identify the scope of the influence of particular theories and to 
assess arguments about causal necessity or sufficiency in particular cases. Lastly, the 
limitation of this study is also related to the use of interviews as the data collection 
method. Interviewees may be reluctant to give truthful answers and instead provide 
rather more socially acceptable ones.  
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V. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
A. Findings and Analysis from Disclosure analysis 
The findings support the Auditor General (2008)‟s assertions about the 
disappointing level of the quality of performance information in accountability 
documents. In addition, the study documented the pattern of increase in information 
comprehensiveness over time. In terms of output information, the level of information 
provided was predicted to be stable over the period of analysis, as the practice of 
disclosing this information had been established for more than a decade before the 
period of analysis. However, the only measure in the output information that was 
disclosed comprehensively was the quantity measure. The quality, timeliness, location 
and cost measures of outputs were only partially disclosed. In terms of outcome 
information, there was a noticeable jump in the amount of outcome information 
provided in the first period, but a very small increase in information over time. On 
average, the information disclosed was about 24% of the complete set of information in 
the first year of the MfO initiative, increasing to only 34% at the end of the period under 
analysis. The quality of disclosure was good in only two aspects: the outcome definition 
and the outcome framework. Other aspects, such as outcome measures, intervention 
logic (attribution from output to outcome) and risk identification were partially or 
poorly disclosed. 
1. Output Information 
The quality of output information in the accountability document tended to be 
stable over time, as presented in Table 1 of Appendix E. The average relative score 
remained stable over time, around 0.68 – 0.69. This meant that the comprehensiveness 
of information reported was on average 68% of the complete set of information 
suggested by reporting guidance. The yearly scores for each agency also did not vary 
much. This reflected a high level of reporting consistency over time. This result was 
expected, since the reported information was a product of the first established regime of 
New Zealand public sector reforms during the late 1980s. Since the reporting practice 
was already well established, there was a definite structure found in the reporting 
environment that meant the reported output information was consistently presented over 
time. In addition, the output information was reported in a specific format in the 
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Statement of Service Performance and was audited, so there were strong incentives for 
consistency in reporting.  
The results presented in Table 1 of Appendix E also show that there was 
considerable variation in quality among the agencies. The best agency provided 86% of 
the complete set of information, while the worst agency provided only 27%. The New 
Zealand Defence Force, an agency with a service delivery focus, set a good example 
with its reporting practice, while the worst agency was the Ministry for the 
Environment, which focused on policy advice delivery. However, there was no 
indication that policy advice agencies produced lower quality performance information 
than service delivery agencies. Three of the top five agencies in terms of output 
information quality were policy advice agencies and three of the bottom five agencies 
were service delivery agencies. The high degree of cross-sectional variation in quality 
reflected the fact that there was still a high degree of discretion in reporting output 
information. It seems that there was no mechanism to ensure that cross-sectional 
consistency was promoted. It is also important to note that when interviewing the 
respondents from some of these bottom five agencies, they acknowledged that they had 
been given an unfavourable assessment in a management letter from the auditor 
regarding the quality of output information. However, they did receive a clean audit 
report for the information. 
The agencies presented output information at a high level in the areas of 
information that included output description, quantity information, quality information 
and timeliness information, as can be seen in Table 2 of Appendix E. All documents 
analysed disclosed all output descriptions at output class level, which was the level of 
detail of output information included in the budget process, but around 7% did not 
disclose this information at a more detailed level for each individual output. One 
disclosure item that was not reported at all well in the output description item group was 
the explanation of output class changes. TPA-9 requires the preparer to provide a 
description of output class changes, but for the majority of output class changes, no 
explanation was disclosed. Agencies also provided almost all cost information at the 
output class level. It seems that if the information was available via a budget process, 
this information was reported completely in the accountability documents, resulting in 
almost perfect scores. 
The scoring for information on quantity, quality and timeliness was assessed at a 
detailed level for each individual output, so it was more refined and showed more 
differentiation when the quality of information was assessed. In these groups of 
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disclosure items, there are a few things to be noted. First, agencies did not disclose 
performance measures for all outputs. The most comprehensive one was quantity 
information, followed by quality and timeliness information. Second, some planned or 
targeted measures were not reported for these three types of performance measures. 
Third, there was no consistency rule with reporting variances. In some cases small 
variances were reported, in other cases the larger ones were not reported. To ensure 
consistent scoring, it was determined that if the actual result differed by more than 10% 
from the planned results, it was considered a variance for which an explanation should 
be presented. Therefore, the scoring results on these variance disclosure items should be 
interpreted as the percentage of variance information reported consistently under this 
rule. The 10% threshold was selected, since it was the figure used the most as a 
threshold in the accountability documents analysed that did report variance information. 
 The most disappointing result was seen in the information quality of cost 
measures at output level and also disclosure on the cost allocation method. The cost 
allocation method was disclosed by only one agency in one reporting period (the New 
Zealand Police for the accountability documents for 2004/2005).  Less than 20% of 
accountability documents analysed disclosed cost information at the output level. One 
possible explanation for the low quality found inthis area of information was because 
the TPA-9 only recommends this information to be disclosed for encouraging 
transparency in government. Since it was voluntary information, it seems that agencies 
would report it if it was already available within their systems. It might also indicate 
that the majority of agencies were not managed efficiently at output level. 
 One important thing that should be noted here is that it seems that the level of 
comprehensiveness of output information has not increased significantly, even during 
the last 15 years. A carried out done by Coopers and Lybrand in 1995 on departmental 
and Crown financial reporting, as quoted by Petrie and Webber (2006), reported the 
same result. The reviewers concluded that the output information was quite accurate at 
output class level. However, there were strong concerns about the system and the 
accuracy of performance information at output level. 
 To provide a more comprehensive picture, a detailed analysis of the score results 
is presented below. The discussion is divided into five parts: output description, output 
costs, quantity dimension, quality dimension, and timeliness dimension. 
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Output Description 
 There are four items in this group. These items are information at the output 
class level: description of output classes, a list of detailed output, a description of 
detailed output, and explanation of output class changes.  
 As previously explained, performance information at output classes was more 
comprehensively reported by agencies. All agencies described their output classes in the 
accountability documents. However, there was one item of information at this level in 
which the scores were disappointing. Agencies are required by the TPA-9 to explain if 
there is an output class change. The average score for this item for the five-year period 
was 33%. Thus, the agencies properly explained it only once in every three cases of 
output class changes. There is a possibility that the disclosure of this information was 
ignored because output class changes were not very frequent. Nevertheless, this 
information should be reported, considering that it is information required to be 
disclosed if TPA-9 is followed properly. The omission of this information may be due 
to the fact that TPA-9 was not referred to in the reporting of performance information. 
There is also the possibility that the changes were already explained in the budget 
documents, so there was less need to explain them in the SOI and annual report. 
Output Costs 
 There are seven items, organised into two groups, that relate to the disclosure of 
output costs. The first group that contains information at output class level consists of 
four items: total actual cost, total planned cost, disclosure of cost allocation method and 
disclosure on variance (if applicable). The second group that lists cost information at 
output level consists of three items: actual cost, planned cost and disclosure of variance 
(if applicable). 
 At output class level, only quantitative information was disclosed 
comprehensively. Almost all total and planned cost information at this level was 
reported. This result was expected, since this information was easily available through 
the budget system, so it was simply a matter of pulling out the mandatory information 
from the budget process and disclosing it in the SOI and annual report. However, when 
other information was not available in the budget system, almost no effort appears to 
have been made by the agencies to disclose it in performance reporting. One such piece 
of information was, as discussed above, disclosure of cost allocation method. Other 
mandatory information, such as disclosure of variance, was also not reported in the 
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majority of cases. The disclosure was presented in 19% of cases for 2003/2004 to 42% 
of cases for 2006/2007, with an average of 35% in other periods of observation. 
 The comprehensiveness of cost information reported is more disappointing at 
output level. In all periods, less than 20% of the cases, agencies reported the 
information of budgeted/planned cost for their outputs. Reporting of information on 
actual cost and cost variance was even less. In cases of non-reporting, there is the 
possibility that the cost information at output level was not available in the management 
system of the agencies. This may also indicate that cost management was scarcely 
implemented at output level by most agencies. Furthermore, this information was not 
mandatory, thus there was less pressure to provide this type of information. 
Quantity Aspect of Performance  
 Information on indicators for quantity was disclosed quite comprehensively. 
This aspect of performance was assessed by identifying the presence of information on 
the planned quantity and the actual quantity of outputs produced and the explanation 
disclosed. The scoring for these items was assessed at output level. Agencies 
consistently reported the quantity of their outputs if the outputs were identified in their 
reports. Giving the scoring system used, only in a very few cases was this information 
not available. This could be seen by comparing the scores in the disclosure items titled 
“a list of detailed outputs” and “actual quantity”. In these cases, agencies did not 
disclose deliverables or milestones of their policy advice outputs and thus no score was 
given on this information.  
 The level of comprehensiveness found in the information presented on planned 
quantity and variances was not as high as that for actual quantity information. On 
average, during the periods of observation, planned quantity information was disclosed 
in only 71% of cases. The corresponding figure for variance disclosure was much lower, 
around 53% of cases. The low scores in the planned quantity information category may 
be due to the fact that this information was not available in the budgeting system. 
Outlines of detailed outputs to be produced are the responsibility of the agencies and 
their respective ministers as they prepare the Output Plans. Since this documentation is 
available to the public, there is a possibility that only selected or summary information 
is disclosed in an SOI and annual report. If someone wants to have this information in 
detail, they can refer to the Output Plans. When planning information is missing from 
the annual reports, readers may not easily assess the performance of agencies regarding 
their achievements in delivering the output promised at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
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Readers have to spend more effort on accessing and studying Output Plans in order to 
make an assessment. The low scores in the variance disclosure item reflect lack of 
consistency of reporting practice. While some agencies explained any variances 
reported in the documents assessed, other agencies disclosed nothing relating to the 
same information. It seems to be a matter for each individual agency‟s policy as to 
whether or not that information is reported. 
Quality Aspect of Performance 
 Eight items in the disclosure index, which are arranged in three groups, 
represent the quality areas of performance. TPA-9 requires only two out of these three 
groups of items: quality description and quality measures. Information on quality 
benchmarks is included in the index because TPA-9 shows a preference for quality 
measures. Measures that are externally benchmarked and assessed are the best 
measures. Thus, if an agency used external measures for the quality aspect of 
performance, this agency was considered to disclose better information. It was also 
noted during the development of the index that if agencies were reporting externally 
benchmarked quality measures, they also reported internally benchmarked measures. 
These are the reasons for incorporating three items in the group of information on the 
quality benchmarks used, so that the index can produce a higher differentiation in 
assessments. 
 The level of comprehensiveness of information presented on quality areas was 
still quite high, with average scores ranging from 60% to 92% (refer to Table 2 of 
Appendix E for the detail), but it was lower than the level of comprehensiveness of 
information disclosed on output description, cost measures and quality measures. 
Agencies disclosed more comprehensively on the list of quality dimensions, but they 
disclosed less when describing dimensions and presenting measures. There was a high 
degree of preference for using external benchmarks for quality measures. In four out of 
five cases of reporting quality measures, an external benchmark was used. When this 
benchmark was used, it was usually assessed externally, mostly by customers of the 
agencies. 
 The scoring results in this area of performance reporting showed that agencies 
were concerned with the quality of most of their outputs. Planned and actual measures 
were reported in more than 75% of the cases. In addition, when there was a variance 
between the planned and the actual indicators, agencies tended to give reasons for any 
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variance. Even a very small inconsistency was reported. In a small number of cases, 
either the targeted measures or the actual measures of quality were not reported. 
Timeliness Aspect of Performance 
 The level of comprehensiveness seen in this area of performance reporting was 
lower compared with other areas, except for the reporting of cost information at output 
level. This aspect of performance reporting was assessed by three items in the index: the 
planned and actual measures of timeliness and the explanation of variance. There was a 
small number of inconsistencies found when these measures were reported on; 
sometimes planned measures were not reported at all in cases that did report actual 
measures. Similar to previous cases of reporting inconsistency, this inconsistency may 
stem from the unavailability of relevant information for the planning process. It may be 
difficult to set a timeliness target in advance for some activities/outputs undertaken in 
the public sector. 
2. Outcome information 
 The level of the quality of outcome information disclosed, as presented by 
scores shown in Table 3 of Appendix E, was very low. After 5 years of the MfO 
initiative roll-out, on average the amount of outcome disclosed was only around one-
third of the complete set of outcome information prescribed by guidance documents. 
The information quality also changed very little from the first accountability documents 
reported under the MfO initiative to the last period analysed in this study. Based on 
average scores, there was a noticeable rise in information disclosed in the first year, and 
then a small increase was noticed in the second year, but the quality then remained the 
same for some periods, and lastly there was a small increase in the fifth year. 
 The pattern of quality improvement over time was seen mostly in very small 
gradual increases, except for some agencies. Five agencies that scored the highest in the 
first year of observation were agencies that perform a great deal of service delivery, 
except for Treasury. Three agencies, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Social 
Development and Ministry of Research, Science and Technology, exhibited a noticeable 
jump in the comprehensiveness of information reported during the second year of 
observation. This may indicate that these agencies learned from their first year of 
experience to do better in the second iteration. The Department of Labour‟s scores 
decreased over the period of observation. The Ministry of Health and Ministry of 
Science, Research and Technology showed scores that increased during earlier years 
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and decreased in later years. Archives New Zealand was able to substantially increase 
its information comprehensiveness in the last year of observation. 
 The scoring results per disclosure item presented in Table 4 of Appendix E 
reveals that agencies were strong when reporting qualitative information. This 
information was also found to have been developed during the earlier stages of the MfO 
initiative. In the first year of the period it was clear that agencies were able to define the 
outcomes that they were trying to achieve. They were also able to further elaborate their 
outcomes and presented them in hierarchical order, depicting low-level (short-term) 
outcomes and high-level (long-term) outcomes. In most cases, they also explained their 
organisation‟s objectives/goals/purposes and linked them with both their organisation‟s 
outcomes and its health and capability. There was an indication that what agencies did 
at the basic level was to take the reporting format provided, fill it with simple narratives 
that were easy to develop, and add a more difficult narrative and some quantitative data, 
if they were able to provide that,  in later years. 
No agency presented comprehensive information on intervention. Almost all 
agencies described the link between objectives and outcomes and between low-level 
outcomes and high-level ones in a very simple way, either as a short narrative, or in the 
form of a tabular or graphical presentation. There were a few attempts to elaborate the 
links in the early years of the period, but later these attempts were abandoned. This 
seems to indicate that even at outcome level agencies were struggling to understand the 
relationship between short-term outcomes and long-term outcomes. A similar finding 
was also seen in the disclosure of intervention logic of outputs related to the intended 
outcomes. Most agencies showed intervention logic in simple assertions, either in 
narrative, tabular or graphical presentations. There were a few agencies who attempted 
to elaborate on why and how the outputs would contribute to the achievement of 
outcomes. However, the elaboration did not go far enough to show that these agencies 
had completed sufficient analysis of various potential outputs to see how these might 
achieve the targeted outcomes.  
Many guidance documents and tools available stipulate that the purpose of 
performance reporting is to tell a performance story. The tendency of agencies was to 
follow only the reporting format outline in the guidance documents, instead of 
developing and reporting outcome information based on the idea of telling a 
performance story. There was a lack of disclosure of the various output alternatives 
considered, when selecting the best mix of outputs to achieve the targeted outcomes. 
Discussion of factors affecting outcomes was also missing in a large number of the 
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documents analysed, which may imply that outcome-based management had not been 
properly implemented, so as to enable agencies to come up with a comprehensive 
performance story. Around a third of the agencies identified these factors in later years 
of observation, but very few of them provided any further explanation of these factors. 
Even worse, none of them tried to explain their projections in a way that indicated that 
they had anticipated these factors when pursuing their outcomes. 
Information about the cost effectiveness of interventions and its indicators, 
which was mandatory after the PFA was amended in 2005, was poorly provided. In the 
last two years of observation, more and more agencies were starting to give some 
information on cost effectiveness, but in the last year of observation the number of 
agencies reporting this information was still less than half. When presenting 
information, few provided quantitative information. 
The provision of quantitative information was most deficient in the area of 
outcome information. While output information was dominated by quantitative 
measures, outcome information infrequently contained such measures. The few 
agencies that disclosed measures, mostly presented information from previous years. 
Measures of cost-effectiveness and capability were almost non-existent. 
Planned/targeted measures were not found in the accountability documents. This may 
highlight two possible factors: first, the agencies‟ information systems were not 
developed sufficiently to enable them to produce this information, or second, the 
outcomes were too complex to be measured.  
 A detailed analysis of the score results for disclosure items of outcome 
information is presented below. The discussion is divided into five parts: 
goals/objectives identification, outcome description, outcome target/indicator 
descriptions, intervention logic discussion, and presentation of indicators. 
Goals/Objectives Identification 
 In the Public Finance Act, there is a distinction made between goals/objectives 
and impacts/outcomes. The Act recognises that not all outputs or activities or functions 
of a department, such as ministerial servicing, regulation drafting or departmental chief 
executive‟s appointment, are intended for pursuit of outcomes. These outputs/functions 
are not intended to produce direct societal, economic or environmental impact. 
Therefore, some agencies may include objectives in addition to outcomes to provide 
alternative targets.  
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 In practice, there was some degree of confusion among agencies. Instead of 
listing objectives alongside outcomes and linking them to some outputs, these agencies 
disclosed goals/objectives separately as the highest level of targets, then they listed and 
explained the outcomes that they pursued as intermediate targets to achieve their goals 
and objectives. To take into account this variation, in this study the links identified were 
not only links made between goals/objectives and outputs, but also between 
goals/objectives and outcomes. Therefore, the scoring results in this section should be 
interpreted with care. 
 Overall, the comprehensiveness of the information reported on goals/objectives 
was quite high. On average, in 75% of cases, agencies disclosed their goals/objectives. 
The score cannot be interpreted to show the cases in which there was no identification 
of outcomes of the agencies‟ activities/outputs for the reason mentioned in the previous 
paragraph. It can only be interpreted as the percentage of cases in which the 
goals/objectives of the agencies were identified. It cannot also be interpreted that in 
25% of cases, there was no identification of the goals/objectives of the agencies 
 An interesting observation is made concerning the information revealed about 
goal/objective linkages. In more than 70% of the cases during the period of observation, 
agencies that disclosed this information linked their goals/objectives with outcomes 
instead of outputs. This practice was quite confusing, given that the idea of the inclusion 
of goal/objective identification was to provide an alternative to outcomes as a target for 
output delivery. The percentage of cases in which agencies reported this link of 
goal/objective and outcomes was quite high and showed an increasing trend, from 
around 72% on average for the first two years of the period to 90% in the last year. In 
addition, there seems to be some degree of difficulty faced by agencies in disclosing the 
linkages. All of those that disclosed simply asserted the link without giving an elaborate 
explanation of why there was a link. The same finding is also noted in the disclosure on 
output-outcome linkage, which is discussed below at page 129. As previously stated, the 
OAG also found the same problem with the practice of linkage disclosure when 
reviewing the performance reporting practice of the agencies (Controller and Auditor 
General, 2008). 
Outcome Description 
 In terms of the comprehensiveness of information presented, the highest quality 
of information was found in the disclosure of outcome description, except for the 
linkage discussion component. There was an increasing trend to report this information 
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more comprehensively over time. In all years of observation, only one agency did not 
disclose its outcomes and that was only in the first year of the period. Most of the 
outcomes disclosed were explained. The trend for disclosing an elaborate explanation of 
outcomes was an increase from around 75% in the first year of the period to 96% in the 
last two years. In the other 4% of the cases each agency seemed to conclude that, a short 
description was enough to properly inform their readers.  
 The ability to produce an outcome framework, which outlined high-level and 
low-level outcomes in a graphical format, was seen as evidence that the MfO initiative 
was going in the right direction. Since most agencies wanted to be seen as making 
progress in their efforts to apply outcome-focused management, it was not surprising 
that there was quite a large number of cases in which an outcome framework was 
presented in the documents analysed. It seems that some agencies were facing 
difficulties in developing the framework in the first year of the MfO initiative, in which 
the framework was reported in only 59% of cases. In the next four years of observation, 
this figure increased to around 80%. The lack of an outcome framework in 20% of cases 
may be associated with difficulties in developing the framework or to the fact that the 
outcome was simple, so there was no need to elaborate it further by describing various 
levels of outcomes. However, similar to other parts of disclosure in which the links 
needed to be explained further, there were few attempts by agencies to provide more 
explanations. These limited efforts were seen only in the first three years of the MfO 
initiative. 
Description of Outcome Targets/Indicators 
 The scoring results for this section showed that ministries/departments were 
struggling during the learning process to come up with outcome targets/indicators. 
There were many more attempts to present targets qualitatively rather than 
quantitatively. In the first year of the MfO initiative, in only half of reported outcomes 
were the targets qualitatively discussed. In three out of four cases, the targets were 
multi-dimensional. In the fifth year of the MfO initiative, there were 82% of cases in 
which the qualitative targets were reported and 80% of them were multi-dimensional. 
Thus, more and more agencies were able to set outcome targets over time, indicating 
that there was a learning process going on during the implementation of the MfO 
initiative. The limited findings of the early review of the Pathfinder Project also 
indicated the difficulty. In their review, the Economic and Strategic Group (2003) stated 
that six agencies involved with the Project, which was supposed to help them develop 
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outcome targets, could still not point to specific (outcome-related) results in their 
activities just one year before the MfO initiative was mandatory for all agencies. 
 There was an indication that performance in the outcome area was not 
observable, making it difficult to set targets, even qualitative ones. There were still 
many cases of reported outcomes in which no targets were disclosed. The level of 
disclosure for quantitative targets for outcomes was very low. This information was not 
disclosed in more than 21% of cases in all years of the period. The difficulty was also 
noted by the Economic and Strategic Group (2003) in their review. The six agencies 
involved in the Pathfinder Project, which was a laboratory project for the MfO 
initiative, still could not come up with performance measures for outcomes. The review 
revealed that these agencies needed to assign significant effort or resources in order to 
be able to come up with outcome measures in their management systems, so that they 
could report them in the corporate documents. 
Intervention Logic, Output Alternatives and Other Factors Affecting Outcomes 
 Intervention logic is defined as „a systematic and reasoned description of the 
causal links between a department‟s activities, outputs, immediate and end outcomes‟ 
(The Pathfinder Project, 2003b, p. 1). Proper intervention logic contains at least two 
components: the outcomes to be achieved and the logic and evidence of the link 
between outcomes/goals and outputs. Intervention logic that is well developed shows 
the justification for the choice of outputs and the improvements in outcomes based on 
the effectiveness of the outputs selected. In the guidance document produced by the 
Pathfinder Project, there is a list of management applications of intervention logic. 
These applications, among other things, include the prioritisation and alignment of 
outputs to maximise outcomes and the identification of risks (factors) affecting 
outcomes or goals. When considering its definition and application, it seems that a 
comprehensive explanation of intervention logic would consist of the assertion of the 
link, the explanation justifying the link, discussion of outputs alternatives to show the 
prioritisation and alignment of outputs, and discussion of risks or factors affecting 
outputs and outcomes. 
 A compliance motive may be the overriding purpose driving agencies when 
reporting performance information in their corporate documents, instead of the priority 
of providing readers with the necessary information relevant to their assessment of an 
agencies‟ performance. If the purpose of reporting outcomes is to provide information 
on how an agency is effectively managing its outputs to achieve its desired outcomes, 
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the report should tell a credible story of performance. There should be an explanation of 
why the current outputs are selected instead of other alternatives. Since outcomes are 
less controllable by an agency, there should be some information on what other external 
factors influenced outcomes, so that readers of the report can assess the level of the 
agency‟s ability to control outcomes. If an agency‟s motive is to comply with reporting 
requirements, what it tends to do is disclose the minimum level of information required 
by regulations or guidance documents. In relation to intervention logic, central 
agencies‟ guidance on the preparation of an SOI requires agencies to discuss the links 
between outcomes and outputs and the risks involved in managing the delivery of 
outputs. If compliance is likely to be the main motive governing the preparation of 
agencies‟ reports, it is likely that a discussion of output alternatives and factors would 
not be widely available in the documents analysed. 
 The scoring results show that two factors may influence the level of disclosure 
in the area of intervention logic information. First, there was strong evidence that 
compliance was the main motive.  Agencies tried to report all mandatory information 
for the intervention logic disclosure. In an average of around 88% of cases during all 
years of the period, agencies disclosed the link between outputs and outcomes. 
However, no attempt was observed to disclose non-mandatory items of information, 
which in this situation meant a discussion of output alternatives. Second, there seemed 
to be some degree of difficulty faced by agencies in reporting the information. Not 
much discussion was presented to justify any links. Most of the presentations of 
intervention logic were in simple form, such as a simple assertion or a tabular or 
graphical presentation. Furthermore, the discussion of factors influencing outcomes was 
very limited. At best, agencies identified the factors in less than a third of cases, even 
though the trend indicated an increase from 26% of cases in the first year of the period 
to 37% in the last year of the period. Discussion of these factors in agencies‟ reports 
was infrequent. No discussion was presented on management‟s assessment of these 
factors. All these findings may indicate that the reporting of intervention logic is one of 
the most difficult parts of the MfO initiative to be developed and implemented. The 
findings may also indicate that there are some obstacles in the process hindering a 
proper implementation of managing for outcomes in New Zealand government 
agencies. 
 The review of the Economics and Strategy Group (2003) showed difficulties 
with the development of intervention logic. In the early stage of the MfO initiative, this 
Group reviewed all of the SOIs produced and concluded that the alignment of business 
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plans to outcomes in the SOI was recognised as a requirement, rather than as a reality, 
in the operations of government agencies. There was a standardised broad structure of 
intervention logic identified across agencies. Attempts to show the alignment, as 
acknowledged by senior managers when they were interviewed by the Group, were 
merely in the form of mapping existing votes and output classes to the new outcome 
structure. There was an expectation that the next stage of alignment would occur, in 
which the determination of a combination of outputs that better supported the priorities 
would be reflected in the outcome framework. However, this expectation never 
materialised.  
Presentation of Indicators on Outcomes, Cost Effectiveness of Intervention and 
Organisation Health and Capability 
 The PFA requires an extensive list of indicators to be disclosed in annual reports 
for outcome reporting. There are three groups of indicators: outcome indicators, cost 
effectiveness indicators and organisation health and capability indicators. At least two 
types of indicators should be reported for each group: the targeted indicators or 
standards and the actual or result indicators. One important issue that needs to be 
considered in reporting outcome indicators is the need for comparisons, either historical 
comparison or inter-organisation or inter-jurisdiction comparison (The Pathfinder 
Project, 2003a). Therefore, a complete set of outcome indicators would consist of 
targeted indicators, actual indicators in the current year, indicators from previous years 
and indicators from other organisations/jurisdictions. There should be an adequate 
explanation of these indicators. For indicators of cost effectiveness and organisation 
health and capability, the requirement for the set of indicators is not clearly spelled out. 
The only requirement, as stated in the PFA, is the disclosure of the main measures and 
standards. 
 The scoring results of these indicators clearly showed that it was not easy for 
public sector agencies to come up with quantitative information for outcome reporting. 
Outcome indicators were reported in less than 20% of cases during the years of the 
period of observation, except for the second year, in which the figure was slightly 
higher than 20%. Agencies may not have information systems which support the 
disclosure of these indicators. There was an indication that if the information was 
available in their systems, agencies would report it in their corporate documents. If 
agencies were able to report the current indicators of outcomes, they would be likely to 
report the comparative indicators in previous years. The pattern in the scoring results 
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may indicate the main factor for reporting of the indicators. There was no evidence of 
any outward trend in the disclosure of these indicators. This may indicate that agencies 
were struggling to come up with a quantitative measure of outcomes. 
 The disclosure on cost-effectiveness indicators was most disappointing. Even 
though it is required by the Act, the indicators were barely reported on in the corporate 
documents issued by the agencies. Cost-effectiveness indicators describe the link 
between outcome indicators and resource/effort indicators. Therefore, agencies needed 
to be able to produce outcome indicators first, before they could report cost-
effectiveness indicators. Since the level of information reported on outcome indicators 
was very low, so was the level of information reported on cost-effectiveness indicators. 
Some agencies came with measures for cost-effectiveness by disclosing descriptions of 
how cost-effectiveness would be measured, by using qualitative indicators. 
Furthermore, there was little elaboration on why these indicators were selected. On the 
other hand, there was a promising trend of more and more agencies reporting cost-
effectiveness indicators. Cost- effectiveness measures were described in only 4% of 
cases in the first two years of the period. That figure was 40% in the last year of the 
period. Still, it was a disappointing result, since most of these agencies were not able to 
properly disclose their cost-effectiveness even qualitatively.  
 Slightly better results were found in the reporting of organisation health and 
capability indicators. Agencies reported these indicators qualitatively in more than 67% 
of cases in the first year of the period. This figure increased to around 90% in the last 
year of the period of observation. Thus, there was an increasing trend of more and more 
agencies proposing the indicators needed to measure the health and capability of their 
organisation to deliver outcomes. Unfortunately, this was the most that these agencies 
provided. There was not much discussion on the proposed indicators. Furthermore, no 
quantitative indicators were reported.  
B. Findings from Interviews 
 The findings from the interviews are presented in several groups that represent 
the main themes identified during the analysis of the transcribed record of the 
interviews. When available, results from other published reviews are also presented for 
a comparison with the interview findings.  
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 1. MfO Initiative, Its Intention and Impact on Performance Information 
According to the interviews with officials from the central agencies, the MfO 
initiative was introduced following a series of initiatives undertaken by central agencies 
to support government agencies to adopt a result-oriented management system in their 
policy advice and service delivery operation. The MfO initiative was preceded by two 
pilot projects. The first one was the Capability, Accountability and Performance (CAP) 
Pilot and the other was the Pathfinder Project. The interviewees explained that these 
two pilot projects, especially the Pathfinder Project, were bottom-up processes in which 
participants led the projects and the central agencies supported the process by setting up 
a secretariat to facilitate the coordination of activities. Participants chaired all processes, 
both at the steering group level and working group level. When senior leadership in the 
government saw that through the Pathfinder Project an outcome-oriented management 
would be workable, central agencies decided to run the MfO initiative in parallel. Thus, 
MfO is a top-bottom initiative, under the direction of central agencies, initiated to apply 
the knowledge learnt during the Pathfinder Project to public sector agencies. 
The first official interviewed argued that the main idea of the MfO initiative was 
to change the management approach in public sector agencies. The production of 
outcome information was viewed as a by-product of the process which gave an 
indication that the result-oriented management approach was being successfully applied. 
It was not about accountability for outcomes but it was about the responsibility of chief 
executives to help ministers understand the outcomes being achieved by their agencies. 
In an interview, Respondent 1 from central agencies stated that: 
MfO is a managerial process … [and] involves ministers as well. So, it‟s 
not just departments and their silos but it‟s about open discussion, a 
willingness to change, a good technical appreciation of how you deliver 
results within your environment. But, it‟s not a spotlight from the press, 
shining on what is a problem and so on. (Respondent 1) 
  
The MfO initiative reflected a change from the public sector management 
previously established during the first public sector reform of the late 1980s that put the 
onus of accountability for outcomes on ministers while accountability for outputs was 
placed on chief executives. The arrangement whereby ministers were accountable for 
outcomes did not work in practice, as ministers did not have systems to identify and 
monitor outcomes. Respondent 1 described the situation as follows: 
The only people that can help … the minister are really the departments. 
And if they fail in their duty, then the ministers cannot really be held 
responsible for things that [they] are accountable for …, as [they] need 
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information about outcomes. [Ministers] need information about the way 
in which outputs link to outcomes. And without that, [they have been 
given] a job without giving them the means to perform. So, what the 
difference in the MfO [means was that departments] retain managerial 
accountability for output with obviously ministers signing up to output 
agreement and so on, but the departmental managers themselves, the 
chief executives, and so on, and through their reporting obligations, the 
entire department reporting to parliament becomes accountable for not 
so much the delivery of outcomes but they become accountable for the 
processes that should lead to outcomes. (Respondent 1) 
 
With the MfO initiative, a new set of performance information focusing on outcome 
achievement was being reported, not for the purpose of making chief executives 
accountable for outcomes, but for showing that outcomes were being considered in the 
selection of outputs to be produced, as this interviewee stated:  
…the chief executive's accountability for outcomes ([s] along the lines 
of know what your outcomes are, … measure the outcomes, have a … 
sensible way [of] linking outputs(particularly) the big things you spend 
money on, to those outcomes, to collect information on that and to 
respond sensibly to the performance information you get. (Respondent 
1) 
 
Several things were expected to result from the MfO initiative. The first 
interviewee argued that there would be more information coming into the system to 
support the perpetual debate between central agencies and auditors on one side, and the 
departments on the other side, on how to allocate resources properly to get the results 
intended. He further stated that in the MfO environment, a coupling between financial 
and non-financial information could be achieved, to allow for sensible decision-making 
in resource allocation within a public agency and across agencies in the public sector. 
Second, the MfO environment would foster evaluation processes in an agency, to 
understand what is working and what is not working and to use this understanding to 
propose a different direction for the organisation‟s strategy. Third, the MfO would 
encourage agencies to work together, as they realised that their outcomes were shared 
by other agencies. This, in turn, would reduce the dysfunctional silo effect resulting 
from output-based accountability. 
2. Stakeholders’ Interest in Performance Information 
 The response from stakeholders to the performance information reported in the 
accountability documents was very small. All interviewees stated that auditors were the 
only ones that consistently pressured them in terms of providing better information over 
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time. Ministers demanded some performance information, but in the majority of cases it 
was not that which was reported in the accountability documents. It seemed that 
members of parliament never give performance information any attention, since it was 
not likely that they would find anything that could be used to score points in political 
debate. Central agencies insisted only that agencies should show improvement in the 
quality of information produced over time, without any specific milestones set in 
advance. Any other stakeholders, such as users of the service or society, were not 
mentioned as having an interest in performance information. 
Ministers‟ attention to and expectations about reported information were very 
low. However, in some cases, they showed an interest and were willing to be more 
involved in the reporting process. As predicted in agency theory, if there is a possibility 
that any disclosed information might be considered bad news or a negative result or 
invite a negative public response, then ministers would get involved in the reporting 
process more frequently. One top-level official stated that: 
[When] ministers get involved frequently that is the case that points us to 
where it does not work. Where the interventions or the measurements 
show … negative trends …, that is where the ministers get a sense … 
that [a] public response might come out of that. (Respondent from 
Agency I) 
 
 Another area of information that ministers were generally interested in is output 
information. This information relates to the output plan that they and the chief 
executives have agreed on at the beginning of the fiscal year. With some agencies that 
produced policy advice outputs, there was a strong indication that ministers were trying 
to exert their control as purchasers by demanding information about what they could get 
for the allocated budget. This is quite rational for ministers, as they are the purchasers 
and users of the outputs provided. As purchasers and users, ministers want their 
concerns and priorities to be addressed by their agencies. Scrutinising the output 
information is an important way of ensuring these things are properly delivered. One 
interviewee from these types of agencies summarised this interest by saying: 
They want to see the things that are their priorities for the year within the 
output report. They want to know that they are paying the [right] price 
[for what] they get. (Respondent from Agency H) 
 
 When agencies requested a significant increase in the budget or funding, 
ministers would ask for more information to justify their support for the budget 
increase. They were interested in outcome information, interventions proposed and the 
cost of intervention relating to any increased spending. They wanted to dig deeper to get 
 109 
more information and they demanded that the information be clearly described, not only 
in any funding proposal circulated to the select committee, but also in the required 
accountability documents, especially those issued during the year the increased funding 
was granted. One top-level official in such an agency explained it this way: 
…in 2002, we were preparing a business case for a reasonably 
significant increase in funding to the Ministry. … So… when we were 
preparing our annual performance information and financial information, 
there was a strong focus on setting out what … we [were] wanting to 
achieve for the next five years, i.e. … our strategic priorities, and how 
much would that cost. So there was quite an engagement with the 
Minister of that time. (Respondent from Agency H) 
 
Lastly, ministers of small agencies showed their interest in outcome information, for the 
purpose of defending the existence of their organisation. The existence of these small 
agencies continues to be at political risk, either of their being incorporated into another 
agency or being dismantled. Their ministers would try to ensure that the planning 
documents showed their priorities so that they could support the existence of their 
agencies, because these agencies were pursuing outcomes that were important for 
maintaining or gaining the political support of certain constituents. 
 One possible explanation of why ministers‟ interest in the accountability 
documents was low is that they could access chief executives easily for information. As 
one respondent put it: 
… in day to day things …, the chief executive and the minister will 
agree [on the] things we want to do, where we want to go, and so on, 
[and that was] perhaps more important than these documents. 
(Respondent from Agency E) 
 
Another possible reason for low interest in the performance information is that 
management control systems still concentrated on the most controllable aspects of the 
system, which was input control. As one interviewee from the central agencies put it: 
And ministers never allocate resources on the basis of outputs. It's 
always on the basis of inputs, so salary costs go up to pay for that, or we 
need a new IT system, [so] we pay for that, and I need more staff, [so 
we] pay for that. But, they never sit down and say, “Look we need more 
of that and less of that.” And it is up to the CEO to decide how best to 
produce that. So, although we [have] got this outcome output focus in 
the legislation, on [a] day to day basis, almost all budget decisions are 
made on inputs not outputs. (Respondent 3) 
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Parliament, or in this case members of select committees, showed little or no 
interest in performance information. The ones who did show interest were members of 
the Opposition wishing to dig up bad news, as one top-level official put it: 
…question by Opposition but more on the retrospective side, more on 
negative results on the reported information… (Respondent from Agency 
A) 
 
Another top-level official elaborated on this tendency: 
…a select committee is not a part of [the] political setup [conducive] to 
openness in the government …. in the end it is [simply] more political 
games … without real benefit to us. [It] does not challenge us to be able 
to develop ideas. It challenges because it is trying to score political 
points. (Respondent from Agency I) 
 
Central agencies were cited as the main actor for demanding improvements in 
performance information. The SSC concentrated more on getting chief executives to 
pay attention to outcomes, while Treasury focused on the outcome linkage of price to 
quantity or the cost-effectiveness of an executive agency‟s intervention. Treasury 
particularly had more leverage in demanding information through the budget process, as 
output information went into government estimates and appropriations. One 
interviewee, who was involved in some budget development processes, summarised the 
situation: 
Treasury [was] … too focused on price, quantity and efficiency but 
[took] the lead in outcome linkage. Treasury tried to use leverage in 
terms of budget allocation, but … in subtle ways, [it looked] at the 
capability and performance information as indications for allowing some 
agencies to grow in budget, especially the ones [whose goals were] being 
pursued by the government. (Respondent from Agency A) 
 
 Another interviewee argued that central agencies should engage in more explicit 
action to get all elements of the New Zealand public sector management system to focus 
on outcomes. The system should provide strong incentives for agencies to improve the 
quality of outcome information. The audit function has done that to some extent. 
However central agencies should provide further pressure. He elaborated on his opinion 
as follows: 
So, if the outcomes are the central organising [principle] or focus for 
public servants, who is basically reviewing the quality of them? … I do 
not think central agencies are …. I do not think they [have] got the 
capability. Is it a function they should have? Yes. (Respondent from 
Agency G) 
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Auditors maintained their interest in performance information because of their 
mandated role of auditing the Statement of Service Performance (output information). 
They have an obligation to audit output information, so obviously there were a lot of 
discussions between agencies and their auditors regarding the presentation of output 
information. In auditing this information, auditors generally approached their job by 
concentrating on ensuring that the reported output information was reliable, in that it 
was corroborated and produced by a sound management system. They took a lighter 
approach when considering the appropriateness of output information in the 
accountability document. They stated in an interview that Treasury and the agencies 
themselves were the responsible parties for determining the relevance of the 
information, since they incorporated this information into the budget process.  
However, auditors started to show an interest in other parts of performance 
information and in recent years they criticised individual agency for the quality of 
information provided, as indicated in their management letter sent to the chief 
executive, minister and select committee of each respective agency. However, this 
assessment was not publicly available. The one assessment that was publicly available 
was a general assessment from the OAG made about the quality of performance 
information as seen across the public sector. This assessment was published as a 
Discussion Paper. However, the paper did not contain information on the quality of 
performance reporting for individual agencies. This shift in the auditors‟ interest in 
performance information was echoed in the statement of one interviewee who said: 
Audit had criticised and issued reports and now is starting to mark 
department‟s documentation and grade it… They criticised, that‟s useful, 
but they cannot tell us what to do. We have had to work it out for 
ourselves. (Respondent from Agency B) 
 
The consistent pressure of the auditors by means of auditing and reviewing performance 
information resulted in a strong incentive for government agencies to follow auditors‟ 
preferences on the types of information to be presented and the way it should be 
reported. One top-level official described this tendency this way: 
So, in the management letter they give [a] grading. That management 
letter goes to the minister and goes to [the] select committee. When [the] 
select committee looks at the annual report, there is a very strong 
incentive to put something in the place to keep the auditor happy as 
opposed to [whether the information] is good quality or not. (Respondent 
from Agency I) 
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As auditors focused more on reliability over relevance of information during the period 
covered in this study, it had the potential to create a situation where the information 
provided might not be that which is appropriate for the intended audience of 
accountability documents. It could also contribute to the presence of cross-sectional 
inconsistency in the reporting. 
 The review by the Economics and Strategy Group (2003) of the first iteration of 
the SOI preparation under the MfO initiative showed some dialogue and engagement by 
the agencies with their stakeholders. The initial discussions on outcomes were mostly 
held internally at senior management level. There was not much engagement with staff 
at levels lower than the second tier of management. External engagement was usually 
started once chief executives were comfortable with their outcomes statements. The 
level of this engagement varied from one agency to another. Ministers were effectively 
involved with output planning, but they were reported to have limited engagement in 
the preparation of outcome performance information for the SOI. Two obstacles were 
cited as the reason why the engagement of ministers was very low. First, there was a 
concern that some ministers did not have adequate knowledge of, aptitude for and/or 
interest in the planning process of their agencies. Second, some agencies faced 
difficulties in engaging with multiple ministers with quite different policy agendas and 
operational priorities. It was logistically difficult to get all ministers together to discuss 
relevant issues at the same time. The process of separate consultation could intensify 
fragmentation. Therefore, some agencies considered that the best way to develop an 
outcome framework was to do it in-house first, with ministers‟ engagement later for 
review and consideration purposes.  
3. Performance Information and Organisation Achievement 
All respondents were of the view that accountability documents are an important 
means of communicating an organisation‟s performance to stakeholders and to gain 
public trust and confidence in an organisation. However, they believed that the 
Statement of Intent and the annual report were not adequate if they were being used to 
assess the organisation‟s performance. Readers also needed to look at an Estimates and 
Output Plan in order to understand the overall picture of what an organisation had done. 
Nevertheless, the respondents contended that their accountability documents described 
the major achievements of their organisation. This assertion was stronger concerning 
output information relating to service delivery. However, for other non-financial 
performance information, they offered far less assurance. This level of assurance was 
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related to the notion of the organisation‟s ability to control the results. Therefore, they 
tended to be less explicit in spelling out the outcome they were trying to achieve and 
whether or not they had achieved it. One interviewee described it by saying: 
… I think one of the fundamental issues with the public management 
system that came in because of the PFA is that chief executives 
necessarily, in my view, move to define what they can manage, what 
they [can] measure, what they can deliver, [and] what they can 
guarantee. So… in an environment of uncertainty, you become very 
limited in your vision. (Respondent from Agency A) 
 
In terms of policy advice, the quarterly monitoring report on the output 
agreement, which was available only to ministers, better reflected the organisation‟s 
performance in delivering policy advice outputs. Measures reported in the 
accountability documents were usually a few selected measures that were made 
available in the output agreement to satisfy accountability requirements. Business 
decisions were not based on these measures, and as one interviewee put it: 
…service performance measures are not driving our output decisions, so 
business decisions [based on] what you are doing are not really relevant 
for service performance measures. (Respondent from Agency G) 
 
The output agreement and the monitoring report provided clear targets of performance 
and showed the organisation‟s contributions, so that people inside the organisation 
could draw a link between activities and outputs. One interviewee explained it this way: 
Our main measure of have we done what we said is actually our 
reporting against the output agreement with the Minister, which for us is 
done now quarterly and monitored quarterly by senior management team 
… the business is our output agreement [with] the Minister and we're 
actually having more detailed [input into] that … we actually have our 
group business plans, which [have all] that we're doing in the Ministry 
and we monitor ourselves and then report against that. (Respondent from 
Agency F) 
4. Development of Output Measures 
Agencies developed all indicators for output reporting by themselves, with 
minimal involvement from stakeholders. Ministers were involved mostly in setting 
direction and sometimes signing off reports, especially for the planning documents. 
Auditors maintained an interest in the reliability of the reported information. Central 
agencies were involved indirectly by issuing guidance documents to be used as a 
reference when reporting. Professional guidance (TPA-9) was not mentioned as being 
used in the reporting process. 
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Ministers were involved at the early stage of the planning process by setting 
priorities. They set goals and selected some areas to focus on for the next fiscal year. 
Chief executives prepared all the detail in the corporate plan, including the indicators to 
be used and the targets set for each indicator. Ministers appeared to accept most of the 
agency‟s proposals. The typical process was described in an interview as follows: 
I would say it is not a structured process… what we do is the Minister 
sets the goal for the year. … He [sets] a limited number of priorities…, 
[he gives] agreement on some plan for doing it but it might not [be a 
fully detailed] plan, fully elaborated and … the job of the Ministry is to 
work out how to get there. So, at the operational level, we choose the 
outputs. Now, some of [that] would be opportunistic, sometimes you set 
something [to happen] that you couldn't foresee when the planning was 
done. (Respondent from Agency B) 
 
Thus, the selection of output measures was very much at the discretion of agencies, with 
no influence or control from ministers. This process raises a concern that agencies 
might select measures that would not show bad results, rather than select measures that 
were appropriate to their activities. As one top-level official put it: 
I guess [this involves] quite a bit of trust in the reporting entity that they 
picked the … right ones and they are not hiding something. They are not 
avoiding [a] quantity measure that shows they are not doing well. 
(Respondent from Agency I) 
 
Auditors also did not play any role in ensuring that the measures adopted were 
appropriate. They audited what was reported and provided an opinion on the reliability 
of information presented, but not so much on the relevance of the information provided. 
The auditors‟ approach was outlined in one interview: 
… OAG and through their auditors took the approach that basically what 
you come up with, whatever you [are] going [to] come up with … we 
will provide an opinion on it. (Respondent from Agency I) 
 
An interview with officials of the audit function revealed that: 
We‟ve attested that they [performance measures] fairly reflect the 
forecast set …. And that was on the basis that we assume that others, 
such as Treasury and SSC, were helping [agencies] to think about what 
is appropriate. … And, it‟s [at the] discretion of preparers to think about 
and approach intelligently, as [Respondent 5] says, thinking about what I 
need [to report] to be accountable to Parliament and the public about. 
This is taxpayers‟ money; how do I demonstrate to them that I am 
managing that output well? (Respondent 4) 
 
However, over time there were indications that auditors were becoming more interested 
in the architecture of measures and standards. This pressured some agencies to do more 
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in some cases, even hiring consultants to help them come up with better measures for 
outputs. 
Four respondents from two agencies argued that since output information 
development was part of the budget process, there was a robust process already in place 
to ensure that the measures selected were fit for the accountability purposes of the 
government budget. One top-level official argued for the appropriateness of selected 
measures by saying: 
I think [with] outputs, the coherence of output structure is really strongly 
robust because it is driven [by] the framework for financial management. 
It is [a] reasonably robust legacy of thinking and technical expertise … 
[it is] typically properly managed through [the] budget and costing 
mechanism…, which aggregate outputs. (Respondent from Agency A) 
 
Since output measures are developed as part of the output plan and output agreement 
development, measures are available in the information system to support the budgeting 
process and subsequent accountability reporting requirements. On the other hand, the 
information would be high quality only at output class level, the level required by the 
budget process. There was no strong pressure for the development of more refined 
output information, such as availability of measures at output level, with cost and an 
organisation‟s resistance being cited as the main causes for this absence. While the 
current information system can provide some information on quantity, quality and 
timeliness indicators, there was not much information on the cost of each output, which 
required agencies to set up a sophisticated costing system. In an interview, one top-level 
official revealed this concern: 
We talked internally just in the last few months about the need to get a 
much greater level of granularity around what outputs we produced 
below the output class level …, the information at the moment [is] 
unsatisfactory and it comes with [a] compliance cost and to be blunt 
about [it] some organisations resist … the management system that [it 
needs]. (Respondent from Agency A) 
 
Another interviewee even acknowledged that the measures that were reported in 
accountability documents were not useful internally. He stated that: 
One thing we found at [Agency C], if I go back to that as an example, 
was that early on we had some output measures which were being 
measured and reported [on] only in the annual report. So, therefore it 
was a nuisance [to have these output measures and required], an 
additional compliance effort from the people around the country. So, 
they did not care. They were not capturing good quality …, robust data. 
They would just [comply] because they had to do it because that 
 116 
[information went] into the annual report, and they were not using that, 
[as it] was not useful to them. (Respondent from Agency C) 
 
In general, selection of output measures focused on determining the processes by which 
agencies collected the data to be able to justify and prove that they had the systems. If 
agencies did not put a priority on upgrading their information systems, that would be 
reflected in their accountability documents. 
 When respondents were asked about the reporting standards required as the 
reference for measure selection and output reporting, they only mentioned Treasury‟s 
guidance for preparation of the Statement of Intent and Annual Report. Only one 
respondent acknowledged the presence of TPA-9 which provides guidance for service 
performance reporting. Even respondents from central agencies did not have any 
knowledge of this reporting guidance. The respondents from the audit function were 
quite surprised at this finding, since they assumed that the accountability reports were 
developed with reference to TPA-9.  
5. Development of Outcome Measures 
Agencies developed all indicators for outcome reporting by themselves, with 
some degree of involvement from stakeholders. As in the case of output reporting, 
ministers also were only involved in setting their agency‟s direction in advance and 
sometimes signing off its planning reports. Auditors assessed the reported information 
in later years and reported back to the management in a management letter. In some 
cases, central agencies were involved actively by way of facilitating the process of 
outcome framework development, especially in the early stages of the MfO initiative. In 
addition, they also issued guidance, to be used as a reporting reference. Some agencies 
worked together with other agencies to develop shared or sector outcomes. There was 
no involvement of other stakeholders, such as society and the users of services. 
Similar to the process of the development of output measures, ministers were 
also passively involved in the development of outcome measures, even though 
theoretically they were responsible for outcomes. In most cases relating to policy advice 
on output delivery, they were involved in the process in the early planning period by 
providing direction on priorities and a general description of targets or objectives. It was 
up to agencies to frame them into outcome statements or targets. In these cases, 
ministers signed off what would be reported in the Statement of Intent, including 
outcome information. Thus, the process of outcome measure development was 
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essentially a top-down approach. A typical process was described by one interviewee as 
follows: 
So this is our process: direction setting at the highest level from the 
government, confirming with the Ministers, developing a written 
understanding of what the priorities are and translating that into the 
Statement of Intent, and developing operational plans for twelve months 
so that everyone throughout the ministry, not only the units, the business 
units, but all staff in every unit has six key tasks which are related to the 
goals of the business unit. (Respondent from Agency B) 
 
For outcomes of service delivery, the approach was mostly bottom-up, in which units 
within an agency came together to define what their success (outcomes) would look like 
in each of their areas, how each of them would contribute to the success, and what the 
indicators for that success were. However, the process stopped at outcome definition 
and descriptions of indicators; no quantitative measures were developed. Ministers also 
signed off what was reported in the Statement of Intent. Here is a description by one 
interviewee, from an agency that provided extensive service delivery, on the process of 
the development of outcome measures: 
And, when the first SOI was established in 2002, there was a process 
that we went through to say what are the… outcomes we would be 
looking for in relation to let's say [an area]. And, then the question was 
how we can contribute to that, so working out the intervention logic. 
And then, how would we know if we're making a difference?. … that's 
just a fundamental and so how would we know … the measures [used] 
should [tell us]. (Respondent from Agency E) 
 
Overall, ministers‟ engagement in the development and the selection of outcome 
measures was minimal. However, an interesting development happened recently outside 
the periods covered in this analysis. One interviewee revealed that in his agency the 
minister himself selected a set of medium-term outcomes, forced them on the system, 
monitored them periodically and published the measures publicly. This may be a sign 
that ministers are starting to engage more in outcome-based management of their 
portfolios. 
 Some agencies worked together to develop shared outcomes in their sector, 
since they see that their outcomes can only be achieved if they worked together. 
Agencies in the justice sector that were involved with the Pathfinder project pioneered 
such collaborative work to develop outcome definitions and measures in their sector. 
Two interviewees from different agencies also described the involvement of other 
agencies in developing shared outcomes. One agency, which was also involved in the 
Pathfinder project, pursued this approach only in some areas where there was a function 
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overlap. Another agency recently set all its outcomes as shared outcomes, working 
closely with other related agencies in setting targets and planning its contributions. 
 Officials from central agencies, consultants and auditors were cited as other 
actors involved in the development of the components comprising outcome information. 
Respondents from five agencies stated that they asked for central agencies‟ involvement 
both in the early development and in the later revision phase of outcome framework and 
measures. They argued that the tools and guidance that were available for them were not 
clear enough, so it was necessary to include officials from central agencies, whom they 
assumed were experts in the area of outcome management. Two agencies hired 
consultants to help them during the process, especially in understanding the intervention 
logic aspect of the outcome framework. Auditors joined in the development in later 
periods, when the OAG initiated a review of the quality of performance reporting 
(Controller and Auditor General, 2008). Thus, typically the involvement of auditors and 
central agencies was described in an interview as follows: 
The main measures of the department's performance are based on the 
outcomes framework. These measures are developed using a 
departmental-wide approach and in collaboration with the Office of 
Auditor General, the Treasury and the State Services Commission. 
(Respondent from Agency C) 
 
 This study‟s findings are consistent with the results of the review done by the 
Economic and Strategy Group (2003). Even though the review did not disclose the 
various actors involved in the process of outcome reporting, it identified that much of 
the work of establishing outcome frameworks and specifying outcome measures was 
done internally within agencies. It was argued in the review that external dialogue 
involving the presentation of the outcome framework was more for the purpose of 
communicating it, rather than for gathering inputs to improve the framework. 
6. Information System for Performance Information 
The level of investment in a new information system that was specifically 
developed to provide performance information for accountability documents was very 
low. This was not a surprising finding, since the level of external pressure to reveal 
information was found to be very weak. The incentive was not strong enough to justify 
such investment. Agencies tended to use data that was available internally and adjusted 
the information system over time to provide more appropriate measures. 
Since auditors generally checked an information system to determine whether it 
was robust enough to support the output measures reported in the audited Statement of 
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Service Performance, agencies only reported the measures that were available in their 
system. One of the processes that an agency used to ensure that data was available for 
audit purposes was requiring everybody in the agency to confirm the availability of data 
in their system. An interviewee described this process by saying:  
We require everybody within the organisation … to confirm at the start 
of the year that they have information that will support that [output] 
measure and we do it [through an] internal audit process to make sure 
that we just get the second report back to the Minister, … and that's two 
three weeks. We have said to these guys, „you said that, prove it to me, 
show me the documentation.‟ (Respondent from Agency D) 
 
Respondents from two agencies found that their data was not consistent over time 
and/or across the organisation, and they tweaked the information system to enable it to 
produce consistent performance measure data. The database tended to be maintained 
locally, except in the case of agencies that had offices in various locations around the 
country and/or around the world; in such cases the databases were maintained centrally. 
In the case of policy advice output production in which the database was not available, 
an agency relied on internal periodic reporting as the source of data for its 
accountability documents. There was one case of policy advice delivery where an 
interviewee stated that they maintained the database only for accountability reporting 
purposes, and not for any internal use.  
For outcome information, the approach for data availability was different. Since 
the information was only reviewed by auditors and not audited, the pressure to invest in 
the information system for outcome reporting was much weaker. Only two out of nine 
agencies interviewed were able to provide some measures on outcome information. One 
agency had already adopted its outcome-focused management system some years before 
the MfO initiative was rolled out, so it already had an information system that was able 
to produce such outcome information. The process of developing new measures was 
directed more to internal needs, as one interviewee put it: 
…from time to time we develop new indicators where we think that 
there is a value of doing that and a good reason for it… So, yes and 
similarly with performance measures, often you know you have a trap if 
you put in measures just because you [have] got the data to do them… 
these are two cases where we have developed from scratch. (Respondent 
from Agency E) 
 
Thus, only if the agency‟s information system was able to produce outcome measures 
for internal uses was this information reported for external purposes. 
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All agencies had their own units to process data for performance reporting 
purposes, as well as the units that usually processed financial information. These 
separate units collected the data and analysed them for the purpose of preparing 
accountability documents. Some bigger agencies used such units to provide internal 
performance assessments, especially for units or employees responsible for service 
delivery outputs. Smaller agencies combined the production of financial information 
and non-financial information in one unit and hired consultants in some cases to help 
with difficult sections, such as outcome framework development. 
7. Motives for Providing Performance Information 
At a basic level, agencies were reporting performance information because of 
the accountability requirement. To the extent that they were able, they would provide all 
information required to be reported in the accountability documents. Unfortunately, the 
regulations specified the information requirement for outputs and outcomes in general 
terms only, so there was a large degree of discretion available to agencies when 
reporting the required information. All organisations disclosed the information required 
in their accountability documents only if they already had it in their information systems 
developed for other purposes, such as budgeting purposes or internal uses. This was 
very different from the reporting behaviour seen when agencies developed an 
information system solely for the reporting of financial information for external 
purposes.  
Getting a clean audit opinion provided another pressure, but for unaudited 
information the pressure forcing agencies to improve the quality of information was 
very low. Even some mandatory information, such as cost-effectiveness measures, was 
not reported properly by eight out of nine agencies targeted for interviews, since it was 
not part of the information required for auditing. One interviewee whose agency 
recently provided such measures raised his concern on this issue: 
There [are] only two statutory components: your financial and your 
service performance information. Everything else is optional. Our 
outcome measures in the front of our two annual reports, I [have put] 
them in there because we have done this work and because we need to 
[include it], because [of the] statutory accountability to report on the end 
outcomes. [But], as far as I can see nobody has been trying to report it. 
(Respondent from Agency G) 
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Improvements, if they ever occurred, were slow and piecemeal, following the yearly 
audit cycle. If improvement was made in one period, it could only be incorporated into 
the next period. One interviewee commented: 
So, [there are these] fixed points in time when you can make 
improvement[s] so if you use your SOI for a particular measure, 18 
months later you had to report against it even if you have made 
significant improvement[s] in the measures you want to use along the 
way and in the intervening time. (Respondent from Agency I) 
 
Agencies would disclose more, if they had other motivations to do so. One such 
motivation would be to enable them to get more funding. When a situation is conducive 
to making requests for more money, an organisation is motivated to produce more 
performance information to support its request. For example, when a new minister 
assigned to a department is a strong political figure in government, his/her department 
uses this occasion to obtain significant increases in funding, as has been discussed 
previously in the section regarding ministers‟ interest in performance reporting. These 
ministers would be willing to invest more in the system to produce such information. In 
discussing the funding motive, a top-level official from one such agency revealed that: 
The ability for the system to engage [in developing] a framework of 
outcomes … is reasonably helpful and it does put people whose 
professional upbringing and mindset is not in that public service … into 
a shared debate here. … Of course, most of the debate is about extra 
[funding] … and better access to service … one of the most difficult bits 
is having a debate about what are we going do less. (Respondent from 
Agency A) 
 
In other cases, an independent underperforming agency was included in another 
ministry because of reorganisation. The ministry was able to secure more funding for 
this ailing agency and its accountability documents were used as a part of the 
negotiations with the select committee for that purpose. 
 The presence of the funding motive ensured that some agencies‟ activities 
already had their outcomes set in the budget process. Agencies were likely to report 
performance information if outcomes were established during their budget process. 
Even though there was no requirement for ministers to provide outcome measures in 
support of any new proposals, there was a requirement to indicate how the intervention 
indicated in the proposal would be evaluated. Treasury might negotiate the criteria used 
for evaluation, so there was an external pressure on agencies to provide appropriate 
criteria/measures for such evaluation. Thus, in such a case, as Ussher & Kibblewhite 
(2005) argued, outcome goals drove the budgeting process which in turn drove the 
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management process of intervention delivery. Unfortunately, this evaluation process 
was not that clear for the existing (baseline) expenditure, resulting in less incentive for 
agencies to develop outcome measures. 
For small agencies whose existence was at political risk, there was a strong 
motive to use accountability documents for public relations purposes. This motive was 
also strong for agencies where the public perception of them was unfavourable, as a top-
level official in a small agency stated: 
One of my criticisms with the MfO thing is that in the end [it 
encourages] you … to tell [a] beautiful story that actually does [happen, 
rather] than link [it] to your influence in the work that you do. 
(Respondent from Agency F) 
 
Reputation was also a strong motive for putting more effort into and paying 
attention to the quality of reported information being provided. There was a case in 
which a minister used the publication of performance information as an incentive to 
improve the work of his organisation. He periodically asked some regional units in the 
organisation to publish some performance measures, where the units were able to 
provide information to back up the performance. These requests certainly gave added 
incentive to regional managers‟ efforts to achieve results and focused attention on the 
performance information produced. As one interviewee put it: 
…the incentive mechanism he [uses] here is shame. It is a shame based 
model. So, he has thought (about) the problem, [he] cannot manage [the] 
chief executive pay … [so] … he has used shame plus competition, 
[where] the … organisation [is made] to feel sensitive that they're at the 
bottom of some arbitrary rank. (Respondent from Agency A) 
 
Respondents from two agencies also discussed the implications of poor credibility and 
reputation when agencies received a qualified audit opinion or an unsatisfactory review 
from auditors regarding the information in their accountability documents. It was 
necessary for agencies to report at least to the level that was satisfactory to the auditors, 
so as not to receive negative attention from the minister and members of the select 
committee.  
Concern about reputation is strongest where certain individuals, who are either 
appointed as chief executives or who are employed as those responsible for preparing 
accountability documents, are well known in the New Zealand public sector 
environment as experts in the area of outcome-orientated management system. Mr. 
Mike Byers is one such individual. He is known for his involvement in many 
organisational and governmental reforms, including New Zealand public sector reforms 
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in the late 80s and early 90s. He was then appointed as the first chief executive of the 
newly established Department of Corrections, and was known as one of a few chief 
executives who were pioneering the application of an outcome-oriented management 
system in the New Zealand public sector. Because of his leadership, the Department of 
Corrections was praised for its initiative in its reporting practice for output and outcome 
information, even before the MfO initiative was rolled out. Some of his team members 
at Corrections were later either involved with the roll-out of the MfO initiative or 
employed in some agencies pursuing better performance information reporting. In an 
interview, respondents from one agency stated that they were referred to these people 
when they asked for help in dealing with difficulties in preparing their agency‟s 
accountability documents.  
 These individuals were willing to take risks and put more effort into pursuing an 
improved reporting practice in their respective agencies. One of two respondents who 
worked with Mr. Mike Byers for a while recalled that he was given a secure 
environment for experimenting with ways of improving performance information in 
managing the organisation. Their organisation invested a lot of time and effort in 
pursuing better performance reporting. In one case, for example, they were given three 
years to find ways to produce a performance reporting system that enabled them to link 
their resources and the targeted outcomes chosen. Another respondent, who is now the 
official responsible for developing accountability documents in another agency, pressed 
the top management for more resources to be put into his efforts to develop cost-
effectiveness measures. He claimed that this investment had made his organisation one 
of the few that was able to report on quantitative measures for cost-effectiveness in its 
accountability documents. 
 8. Disincentives for Revealing or Improving Performance Information  
 The issue of controllability has led to a sense of uneasiness in agencies when 
reporting outcome information. There was a concern that controllability drove risk-
averse behaviour that later killed off many initiatives that potentially would improve 
outcomes. Putting outcome information into accountability documents produced more 
of an „under-promise and over-deliver‟ type of behaviour in public sector officials, even 
though they were not responsible for the outcome. The main factor behind this 
behaviour was the tendency of the competition, in the political setting, to 
asymmetrically value bad news much more than good news, as bad news was more 
likely to be used in order to score a political point in politicians‟ parliamentary or public 
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debate. An accumulation of bad news made it easier to change the public‟s political 
perceptions than an accumulation of good news. As outcome achievement was not 
entirely under the control of an agency, the likelihood for bad news to gain prominence 
was higher than that for achievements that were more controllable, such as the case of 
achievements from output delivery. Thus, it was best for officials to under-promise. The 
best way to under-promise was, as far as possible, never to promise anything, or in the 
case of performance reporting, less reporting was deemed to be better because then 
there would be less need to promise to deliver.  One top level official explained the 
under-promise tendency as follows: 
The other thing is [with] a lot of public sector on the ground up 
measures, they measure the failures, they measure road deaths …And 
that is part of the function of media … Ministers do not want to hang 
their heads [in shame because of] achieving something [negative that] 
may not happen, and public servants are also very nervous about 
promising things that they cannot necessarily deliver, particularly with 
the linkages that get a little… tenuous …  I can probably deliver ten 
percent improvement but I will promise five because that way I can be 
sure of meeting it … by the way that is going to give me something [in 
the back pocket] … for the following year …. (Respondent from Agency 
A) 
 
This asymmetrical value of information also discouraged agencies from 
experimenting with alternative activities to find better ways to achieve certain 
objectives or outcomes. Riskier strategies were pulled back from as soon as some short-
term indicators showed unfavourable results, not because the intervention failed, but 
because the data was not calibrated properly to measure the intervention. One 
interviewee described his experience in this situation: 
But because of this [unfavourable] event, you do get a lot of negative 
attention …. And, that then has a deleterious effect on you as an 
organisation because everyone starts pulling things back and so the 
original strategy like getting people out [to] work or whatever was 
compromised because of the risks. It is sometimes not because [the risk 
has] increased but [because] the risk could be increased. (Respondent 
from Agency C) 
 
 The tendency to limit performance information also occurred in politically 
sensitive areas. Some agencies did not even disclose their biggest achievements because 
they were considered to be very sensitive in the New Zealand setting. For example, 
some public agencies competed internationally with similar public agencies in other 
countries. They did not want to disclose some performance measures in case that would 
in some way reveal the organisation‟s strategy. In another situation that is politically 
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sensitive, one respondent stated that his agency did not disclose one of their biggest 
achievements because it was politically controversial with the New Zealand public. 
9. Major Obstacles, Constraints and Difficulties 
Some obstacles or constraints were raised by respondents, regarding the process 
of providing better performance information. There were two types of performance 
information that in their opinion were difficult to report; the first was outcome 
information and the second was measures for policy advice output. Most of the 
difficulties in reporting outcomes were centred on the complexity of the information. 
On the other hand, difficulties in reporting policy advice related to the selection of 
proper measures that could be consistently applied to a variety of policy advice outputs 
which may vary from a simple one-paragraph opinion to a thick analytical report. 
In developing performance information, respondents from six agencies argued 
that outcomes were too complex to be reported. The relationship between outputs and 
outcomes was more complicated than the relationship of inputs and outputs, where the 
relationship was seen as linear. One interviewee said: 
The linking [of] those to outcomes … proved to be difficult ... we went 
through a phase in the public service where people … [were] drawing nice 
little middle alliances between output classes and appropriations. …, I just 
think that is meaningless. I think that it is a problem but it is also strength 
in that there is not [a] one to one relationship. (Respondent from Agency 
A) 
 
This complexity was also related to the respondent‟s view that so many factors outside 
their control contributed to outcome achievement. There was a story for every 
eventuality. The challenge was how to understand these factors, measure them and 
incorporate them into the report. But, since agencies were not responsible for outcomes 
and the principal‟s pressure to deliver this information was low, there was a lack of 
initiative to overcome the challenge. One top-level official commented: 
We did appreciate they [outcomes] were important tools and an 
important way of communicating to the public and to ministers and other 
stakeholders of what we [were] about, what we have, so we have always 
made our best [efforts] to try and make [the information] as meaningful 
and useful as we [could] but it has been very difficult. And, perhaps … 
maybe we could've done more. (Respondent from Agency B)  
 
This situation led to the tendency not to allocate enough resources to performance 
monitoring systems, as acknowledged by one of the executives of an agency 
interviewed, who stated: 
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Yes, the challenge for us as a ministry, [is] we have not had any resource 
allocated [to] monitoring performance. It was just [a] deliberate choice 
of the chief executive and minister of the day… We spent a large amount 
of our vote doing [service delivery], but system monitoring we do not do 
and outcome monitoring we do not do. (Respondent from Agency D) 
  
Another difficulty related to the problem of measurement. This problem was 
more apparent when measuring the outcomes of policy advice output, with a dilemma 
evident when deciding between using short-term measures or long-term measures. 
When measures that cover a long-term horizon were selected, they did not change 
much, so it wasn‟t possible to tell whether something had actually happened and in 
which area improvement had happened or whether the outcomes had contributed to any 
improvement. In addition, these long-term measures were very costly to produce if they 
were not available as part of national statistics data. The measures chosen should show 
the impact of any changes in society or in the environment. One example was seen in 
the case of the Ministry of Fisheries. To produce annual data on fish stocks was not 
feasible under the current level of the ministry‟s funding. If short-term outcome 
measures were selected, these could better explain any achievements and the agency‟s 
contribution, but the measures tended to fluctuate, as the outputs varied from period to 
period. Consequently, consistency of reporting was quite difficult to adhere to in this 
environment. As one interviewee put it: 
So, [Agency G] is a little bit [more] dynamic than a lot of agencies 
because we sit at the top …, we are [an] economic development agency, 
we are the environmental agency, we are a people-centred [helping] 
agency as well, ... …we [have] got all [these] interfaces, so the 
environment is quite dynamic, …therefore your output set is changing as 
much as your outcome set is changing. So that is one of the things that I 
have been struggling with. (Respondent from Agency G) 
 
One respondent further explained that they faced a dilemma in respect of their 
role in selecting the appropriate horizon for the outcome measurement of policy advice 
outputs. On the one hand, ethically they had to serve the public by giving independent, 
honest and fair advice to the minister. In their business, there was a trade-off between 
selecting outputs that would provide immediate benefits but would not improve long-
term outcomes, or of selecting outputs that might not provide benefits in the short run 
but which had a greater probability of producing better long-term results. Therefore, if 
they acted ethically, they would select a longer time horizon for outcomes and also 
select one set of outputs. On the other hand, they also needed to meet the minister‟s 
requirements by providing the kind of advice that he/she favoured. In this case, the 
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selection of the outcome horizon tended to be shorter, following the election cycle of a 
three-year term. This in turn resulted in selecting a different set of outputs. Furthermore, 
in some cases in which outcomes did not change much during an election cycle period, 
the minister preferred a strategy (set of outputs) that was visible to the public in the 
short run even it might not be as effective in achieving better long-term outcomes. For 
example, one interviewee explained that based on his work experience, increasing the 
number of enforcement officers was the least effective intervention in the long run to 
reduce regulation violations. However, it was always the preferred intervention for the 
minister, as it would be easier for him to show that he had done something during his 
administration. Thus, agency officials were sometimes forced to provide interventions 
that they knew would not work to change outcomes in the long run. Furthermore, they 
were criticised by auditors for selecting inconsistent measures of outcome in order to 
comply with their ministers‟ interests.  
 Measurement difficulty also arose in cases where the performance of policy 
advice delivery was measured. There was a sense of ambiguity from some interviewees 
on the appropriateness of reporting policy advice as an output. Respondents from three 
agencies argued that policy advice was just an intervention or an activity that was a part 
of what was actually a real output. In these cases, policy advice was an input into the 
bigger activity of policy delivery. One interviewee stated that there should be a 
distinction between a set of extensive actions that resembled a policy development (Big 
P) and a simple activity that provided mere comments to the minister (Small P). He 
further argued that the Big P was the real output, while the Small P was not. However, 
another interviewee argued that in some cases the impact (outcome) of a one-page 
comment letter was bigger than a one-hundred page report of an extensive piece of 
policy research, so the obvious size difference between Big P and Small P could be 
misleading, in light of their differing impacts. This debate highlighted one important 
characteristic of policy advice that showed how it was difficult to develop performance 
measures for output delivery. One interviewee commented on this difficulty: 
If you write a ministerial [report] in response to a particular letter that 
might raise four or five different things … so is [this] a single output or 
is [it] a response… to a particular project that might [be] referenced to 
that ministerial [report] …These are [some of the] debates about what 
[is] the best unit of measurement. (Respondent from Agency A) 
 
Policy advice outputs varied widely from one output to another in terms of inputs, 
activities and impacts. Reporting them in standardised measures was meaningless, since 
the measures were not those that drove the agency‟s business to deliver policy advice 
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outputs. One respondent stated that what drove them to manage policy advice delivery 
was how well the policy advice influenced decision-makers or people, but measuring 
this influence was not an easy task. 
 The early review of the MfO initiative by the Economics and Strategy Group 
(2003) also showed the difficulty of specifying performance measures for policy advice 
agencies. There was an ambiguity evident in choosing between long-term and short-
term measures. The review quoted a Treasury official who proposed measuring the 
impact of policies as outcome measures for policy advice, but concern was raised about 
the complexity of the link between intervention and impact. 
 Another challenge was being able to come up with cost information at an 
individual output level. Currently, cost information was available at output class level, 
since it was developed as a part of the budget process. One interviewee, who did data 
analysis for unit performance reporting, agreed that cost information was not adequate 
to allow his agency‟s ministers or stakeholders to assess efficiency at output level. 
Management demand for a costing system was not strong enough to justify a substantial 
investment in the system. This challenge was described by this interviewee as follows: 
But at output level, one of the [difficulties is that], we have our outputs 
trying to match up [with] our financial [information. To] be able to cost 
our outputs is quite … challenging in our organisation. And the reason 
for that is that … our staff on the front line … do not have a time 
recording system. …, [This] is one [issue] that I am getting [on to], and 
we [will] do it based on time estimates. (Respondent from Agency B) 
 
 Agencies also had to manage some degree of disagreement in the process of 
developing an outcome framework and measures. The process involved people across 
an organisation, each of whom would have different interests and priorities, and 
therefore it was common to have some disagreements along the way. The disagreements 
seemed lower in agencies that focussed on policy advice delivery. These agencies used 
a top-bottom approach in developing outcome frameworks and measures, so everybody 
was forced to follow what was demanded from top management. There was strong 
leadership from top management for the development of an outcome framework for 
policy delivery. On the other hand, for agencies with a service delivery focus, the 
disagreement was stronger, since they used more of a bottom-up approach during the 
development process. An interviewee representing one such agency commented: 
It is … very difficult because we are talking to different people across 
the organisation that do totally different things and they all think that 
what they do is the most important thing.. (Respondent from Agency H) 
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Strong leadership in top management positions was cited as the way to resolve this 
disagreement. Interestingly, one interview revealed that a service delivery agency that 
used a combination of top-bottom and bottom-up approaches during the process had a 
low level of disagreement when developing an outcome framework. 
 Another impediment was a lack of top management‟s interest in outcome-
focused management. In these agencies, the progress in adopting outcome reporting was 
slow. Respondents from four agencies that had this kind of top management for some 
time periods during the MfO initiative argued that the auditors‟ pressure via a 
management letter had led to a gradual increase in resources to implement a rolling 
review of their management system to improve the quality of outcome information. 
When an agency had a chief executive that had already bought into outcome-focused 
management, progress was faster. As has been discussed before in relation to the role of 
reputation, the early adopters were the ones that had been known in the New Zealand 
public sector environment as high reputation career bureaucrats. Two respondents who 
had previously worked with one of them argued that his chief executive officer already 
had an outcome focus in mind, and therefore was willing to put more resources into his 
agency to produce outcome information, even before the MfO initiative was rolled out. 
His agency was among the top scorers on outcome information reported during the 
period of observation studied in this thesis.  
 Some of the factors mentioned by interviewees that contributed to the slow 
progress in outcome reporting were related to the role of central agencies and auditors in 
the development of performance information. The first factor was the view that the 
system was being forced into an implementation phase without considering appropriate 
incentives and support.  As one interviewee put it: 
They put the requirements [from] PFA to report and … become audited 
[into place] but they have been … slow … [in] providing the guidance, 
forcing every public agency to invent the wheel… I think [it was] an 
outrageous imposition of … cost ultimately when as central agencies, 
they should work [on] far more robust methodology, rather than just do 
it by ramming it through and making it auditable. (Respondent from 
Agency D) 
 
In terms of support, the main thing that was provided was reporting guidance, but it was 
not adequate to help agencies produce reports to a level that was satisfactory to auditors. 
All respondents stated that the available guidance did not help when developing 
outcome information. The guidance was very simple, so it only fitted the purpose of 
getting a basic idea of the information structure required. The respondents wanted 
 130 
specific examples that were applicable to their own agencies to enable them to develop 
a specific framework and measures. One interviewee described this situation as follows: 
We constantly asked them [for] the best practice examples, but they do 
not actually have it … what I like is [for] them [to]… provide a case 
study on „this is how you do it.‟ Because we do involve them early and 
we involve Treasury and audit and lots of our staff early [on] but we 
[found] that …. that they do not [have] that information [available]. 
(Respondent from Agency F) 
 
The second factor was the agencies‟ frustration regarding disagreement about 
the acceptable level of performance information. Respondents from six agencies 
described their frustration with the different views held by central agencies and auditors 
on how to report some information, since the reporting guidance was very general and 
broad. The focus of the disagreement was in the area of outcome and cost-effectiveness 
measures. One interviewee described this situation: 
The other thing was of course we have had problems over the last couple 
[of] years because Treasury and Audit have different views of what 
should go on the SOI. Treasury have one view and Audit have another, 
which …, from a departmental point of view, [made it] very difficult to 
work out what you put in… Nothing in the guidance from … Treasury 
would lead [you] to produce [what was needed] … we actually still do 
some much more effective [ways] of telling [the] story of what [we] are 
wanting to achieve. It is pretty high level and the audit stuff is pretty low 
level. Somewhere in the middle is actually what we have to produce. 
(Respondent from Agency F) 
 
 The third factor, which stemmed from the absence of any specific reporting 
guidance, was the lack of useful feedback for agencies to be able to improve the quality 
of their performance information. Periodically, agencies received comments and 
criticism on the reported information, but the comments were general, and in the words 
of one respondent, were “very theoretical”. A comment from an interview described this 
situation as follows: 
During the audit process, it becomes a matter of judgment. They say we 
are not satisfied with this [but] they generally do not tell you why they 
are not satisfied with [it] and how you can improve it. What we want 
from them is a way in which we can improve. (Respondent from Agency 
D) 
 
Auditors argued that their statutory responsibility was to assess the information. It was 
the responsibility of the individual agency to find out how to report it properly. 
Unfortunately, agencies did not know how to report properly and the central agencies 
that provided soft regulation on this issue were not helping them either. The reporting 
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system for non-financial performance was not as sophisticated as the system for 
financial information where a detailed standard were available for reporting, so 
obviously a greater level of disagreement existed among preparers, regulators and 
auditors on how to report non-financial information. This situation created a high degree 
of frustration for preparers, as they were frequently criticised but were unable to address 
the criticisms properly. 
10. Performance-Based Compensation 
 Respondents generally expressed a favourable attitude toward output-based 
compensation, but the level of support was not high for a compensation system that was 
based on outcome performance. Three agencies based some of their employee 
compensation on the achievement of output and short-term outcome measures. One 
agency tried this compensation scheme for its employees, but the minister did not like it 
and so it was abandoned. Almost all respondents argued that if performance-based 
compensation was to be applied, it should include some consideration of the 
effectiveness of the interventions. One respondent stated that quality measures could be 
a proxy for effectiveness, since they exhibit some aspects of effectiveness, especially in 
service delivery outputs. Others supported the use of short- or medium-term outcome 
measures in policy advice areas, but with some degree of judgment being needed. 
Respondents from only two policy advice departments had misgivings about 
performance-based compensation, because of controllability concerns. One of them 
stated that:  
I would only tie performance to something which I thought the person had 
control over. [If] they do not have control over it then that [outcome] is 
nonsense. (Respondent from Agency F) 
 
He further argued that performance-based compensation would further encourage 
agency behaviour of producing policy that the minister liked, rather than giving him or 
her fair and frank advice. 
C. Discussion 
 Discussion of the findings from disclosure analysis and the interviews is 
presented in five interrelated topics. The discussion starts with two sections of general 
analysis, using the theoretical framework selected and developed. This analysis 
provides an overview of the environment in which reporting practice takes place. The 
first section of the discussion deals with the analysis of public choice problems in the 
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New Zealand public sector system, by critically examining the Westminster system. The 
second section presents the analysis of the principal-agent relationship in the New 
Zealand central government setting. The third section focuses on an evaluation of 
Managing for Outcomes, using the perspective of public choice theory and agency 
theory. The fourth section discusses is the issue of incentives for agencies to improve 
the quality of their performance information in the New Zealand setting. The last 
section deals with challenges in the reporting of performance information. 
1. Public Choice Problems in the New Zealand Public Sector: An Analysis of 
the Political Constitution of the Westminster System  
 The political system in New Zealand is modelled on a form of parliamentary 
democracy developed in the United Kingdom, which is known as the Westminster 
system. Rhodes (2005) described four characteristics of this system of politics. First, 
parliament, with its unity of the executive and the legislature, is sovereign. This 
characteristic is also called the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. Second, political 
power is concentrated in a collective and responsible cabinet as the executive 
component. The third characteristic is that ministers are accountable to the parliament. 
This characteristic is the complement of the second characteristic. Together, they are 
known as the doctrine of ministerial responsibility. The last characteristic is that a 
constitutional bureaucracy should be non-partisan and employ expert civil servants. 
This last characteristic is also known as the doctrine of political neutrality of 
bureaucracy. 
 Cowen et al. (1992) added some more characteristics to the above description of 
a typical Westminster system of politics. They note that there is no written constitution 
in this system. What acts as a constitution is a combination of statutes, procedural rules 
and conventions. They argue that party discipline is fundamental in the conduct of 
parliament. Political parties will use their “constitution” and “punishment” to facilitate 
party unity in parliamentary voting on legislation. The last characteristic is the presence 
of a plurality rule or winner-takes-all rule, in which a member of parliament is elected 
from single-member districts, based on the highest number of votes in the district. In the 
New Zealand political setting, this characteristic was abandoned with the adoption of 
the mixed member proportional voting system (MMP system). 
 It is important to consider some of these characteristics when analysing the 
public choice problems found in the New Zealand public sector, because they serve as 
the rules of the game for the behaviour of political actors and bureaucrats. In addition, 
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the change in the voting system to MMP should also be integrated into the analysis, to 
show whether the problems are mitigated or magnified by the new system. The extent to 
which public choice problems are found in the political market is likely to be shaped by 
a combination of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, the doctrine of ministerial 
responsibility, party discipline characteristics and the election voting system. On the 
other hand, the extent to which public choice problems are found in the bureaucratic 
hierarchy is likely to be influenced by the doctrine of ministerial responsibility and 
bureaucratic neutrality. 
Public Choice Problems in the New Zealand Political Market 
 Somers (2008) argued that the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty can be 
defined through two perspectives: the legal perspective and the political perspective. In 
the legal perspective, the sovereignty of parliament means that only parliament has the 
right to make or unmake any law and no other person or body is able to override any 
law. In the political perspective, sovereignty means that only parliament is the source of 
authority for government, since it is the only institution of the central state whose 
members are chosen by the people. The majority party or coalition in the parliament 
forms a government by constructing a cabinet which consists of its elected members. 
Cabinet members, who have the authority to control bureaucratic organisations, are 
collectively and individually responsible to parliament. Therefore, parliament represents 
the people who have the authority to subject executive and bureaucratic organisations to 
be accountable to them. In other words, parliament has the authority to scrutinise 
government policies and operations, using either its legislative and financial control 
mechanisms or through other available opportunities, such as select committee systems 
or employment of parliamentary officers to help them perform such scrutiny
3
. 
 In public choice theory, this sovereignty is the source of rents in the political 
market. Any parliamentary legislation or parliamentary-controlled bureaucratic actions 
may involve involuntary transfer of wealth from one group of people to another group 
in society. Political decision-making is the means of allocating rents in the political 
market. The types of public choice problems that may occur depend on the likelihood 
that politicians are influenced by interest groups or their local constituents and the 
nature of the mechanism used by the party/coalition to ensure that its members vote 
support for the party‟s/coalition‟s preferred policies (party discipline). 
                                                 
3
For example, parliament employs the auditor general to assist parliament in scrutinising financial matters 
of government and employs ombudsmen to assist parliament in the investigation of complaints against 
government departments. 
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 The change in the voting system to MMP to elect parliamentary members in 
New Zealand has changed the pattern and the degree of special interests‟ influence. In 
their analysis of the proposal to change voting from the first-past-the-post (FPP) method 
to the MMP method in New Zealand, Cowen et al (1992) argued that the change would 
affect the influence of interest groups and their local constituents. The proportional 
representation method weakens the influence of the local constituency on politicians, 
since some of them can be elected even though they do not win in their district. 
Furthermore, they rely to a greater extent on their parties to gain seats during an 
election. Consequently, their parties are able to exercise stronger party discipline. 
However, the effect of the voting change on the influence of interest groups is not clear. 
Interest groups have to channel their pressure through multi-party coalitions, instead of 
through the majority party as was the case under the previous voting method. With 
MMP, the tyranny of the majority, in which the majority imposes their preference on 
the minority, may be weakened. In a coalition, the majority party has to give 
concessions to minority members to secure their confidence vote. 
 There should be mechanisms by which the discretionary power of a politician is 
limited with regard to increasing the amount of rents, minimising log-rolling and pork-
barrel projects in the budget allocation. Politicians need only consider voters when 
making their decisions if there is no constitutional mechanism to control their 
legislation or actions. Uninformed voters may not be able to provide adequate 
disciplining of the behaviour of politicians. This means that parliament itself controls 
the behaviour of politicians in relation to political decision-making. This self-control 
and the re-election motive may not be strong enough measures to mitigate political 
capture when opportunities exist.  
 The current discretion limit in political decision-making may not be enough to 
mitigate public choice problems in the New Zealand political market. Currently, there is 
only one discretion limit required to be met in the financial decision-making carried out 
by parliament; that is, there is a requirement for cabinet to apply principles of 
responsible fiscal management in pursuing its policies. The government‟s financial 
information requirements help parliament and the public to assess a politician‟s 
behaviour in the cabinet as to whether this financial discretion limitation is followed. 
This limit may control the total amount of rents that can be allocated by stopping the 
trend of excessive budget increases, but it may not be able to reduce the rents that are 
available to be allocated from the existing/current budget. There should be a similar 
parliamentary and public scrutiny for this budget. One way to do this is by requiring 
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politicians in the cabinet to state their objectives (outcomes) in the budget allocation and 
later requiring that outcome information be produced, so that progress towards 
achievement of outcomes can be assessed. The MfO provides the latter component, but 
unfortunately there is no effort to address the lack of the first component. 
 The necessary complement of parliamentary sovereignty is the doctrine of 
ministerial responsibility. Ministers in the cabinet act as a bridge between parliament 
and the Crown on one side and its bureaucratic organisations on the other side. 
Therefore, they are collectively and individually responsible for the conduct of the 
government through these organisations. Ministers are responsible for securing and 
providing information to the cabinet and parliament, so that parliamentary scrutiny can 
be implemented. In addition, ministers should also take responsibility for the actions of 
the bureaucracy, since these actions involve the political/power dimension, which 
means they are subject to ministerial control for the political legitimacy of these actions 
(Somers, 2008). From this doctrinal perspective, since the parliament‟s power to control 
the bureaucracy has been delegated to ministers, they must bear ultimate responsibility 
for the actions of the bureaucracy, even though they may not have direct control over 
them. 
 The ministerial responsibility doctrine is implemented in a number of ways, but 
these are less clear than what is laid down by legal requirements. At a minimum, 
ministers should be answerable for personal and departmental actions. This is the first 
thing they will do, because it does not cost them much compared with the possibility of 
allowing an adverse public perception of them to develop. For bigger problems, 
addressing them in front of parliament may not enough. Ministers may be forced by 
their colleagues or the public to show that they are taking all necessary steps to rectify 
any mistakes. Lastly, ministers may be pressured to resign by their colleagues in 
parliament and/or face dismissal by the public at the ballot box. This last step also 
depends on their colleagues‟ pressure on them to resign or to stay and the public 
satisfaction with the minister‟s explanation or corrective actions. 
 The most important feature of this doctrine is that its operation is all political. 
When ministers are designated to be responsible for outcomes in a reformed public 
management system in New Zealand, this responsibility can only be carried out 
politically. Attempts to put such responsibility into a statutory requirement, for example 
by requiring ministers to report outcome information, will not happen. Clarifying 
ministerial responsibility may provide more certainty with the assessment of outcomes, 
but as Somers (2008) argued, such clarification may restrict the scope of responsibility 
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held because there should be a causal notion of responsibility. It may also be difficult to 
hold ministers responsible for lesser offences, because the bar of assessment is higher 
now as a result of clarification. In the case of the New Zealand public sector, the PFA 
states that ministers are responsible for outcomes and chief executives of public 
agencies are responsible for outputs. Can parliament and/or the public forgo the claim 
for ministers to be responsible if their departments cannot deliver outputs that have been 
promised? It is highly unlikely. Ultimately, ministers will be responsible for any 
bureaucrat‟s action, because this responsibility is political.  
 However, there should be a mechanism by which the bureaucracy is directed to 
pursue certain outcomes and ensure that outcome information is available, so that the 
achievement of progress toward outcomes can be assessed. Even though the minister‟s 
responsibility will always be political, ultimately ministers are responsible for the 
outcomes of the bureaucracy. Parliament and voters in the political market need 
information in order to assess this ministerial responsibility. The MfO initiative went in 
the right direction in requiring such information, but the pressure was wrongly directed 
toward public agencies to provide it as a part of their accountability documents, instead 
of pressuring ministers to declare that the outcomes reported are their responsibility. 
The information requirement prescribed under the MfO initiative does not address the 
real accountability requirement for outcomes. 
Public Choice Problems in the Bureaucratic Hierarchy 
 The interplay between the doctrine of ministerial responsibility and the doctrine 
of political neutrality influences public choice problems in the bureaucratic hierarchy. 
The latter doctrine is also part of the established New Zealand political system. The 
origin of this doctrine in the New Zealand setting can be traced back to the enactment of 
the Public Service Act 1912. There are several components of this doctrine. First, 
political interests should not influence employment decisions. Second, public servants 
should serve the government of the day professionally and impartially. Third, public 
servants should work equally well with all governments and ministers that come into 
power, no matter what their political persuasion is (State Services Commission, 2004). 
 Somers (2008) argued that this doctrine is about political control of parliament 
over bureaucracy.  This convention makes possible parliament‟s control, via any 
government of the day, over the bureaucracy in order to pursue their preferred policies 
in the delivery of public services. Bureaucracy has to be non-partisan because it has a 
political and moral duty to respect democratically elected institutions of democracy, 
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including any government in power. However, this doctrine does not imply that 
bureaucracy should be neutral towards the government and the opposition. In Somers 
(2008)‟s words, bureaucrats should be political chameleons, who surrender political 
power to elected politicians, instead of political animals, that exercise political power 
independently. Public officials should be politicised in a way that is consistent with 
political decisions made in parliament, which are legitimised through the democratic 
process, rather than by exercising their own private morality, ethics or partisan values. 
 The imperfect functioning of the political neutrality doctrine is the essence of the 
public policy problem. By pursuing their own interests when they differ from the 
interests of the political principals, bureaucrats essentially violate this doctrine. 
Ministers, in following the doctrine of ministerial responsibility, should be able to 
control the actions of supposedly politically neutral bureaucrats. Therefore, public 
sector reform was initiated to put the bureaucrats under the control of their political 
principals so that they would be politically neutral when serving any politicians in 
power. 
 This control was asserted in the reform process by specifying the relationship 
between ministers and chief executives and ensuring that there was a clear responsibility 
laid on each of them. The New Zealand model is quite clear about these responsibilities 
conceptually. Unfortunately, the model seems to ignore the fact that the ultimate 
responsibility for the conduct of public officials is in the hands of ministers. Thus, the 
accountability of chief executives cannot be easily separated from the accountability of 
ministers in managing their portfolio of public agencies. The prescription that 
government agencies should report performance information to fulfil their own 
accountability requirements is not what is operating in the New Zealand political realm. 
Ministers are more concerned that the reported information does not show anything that 
is unfavourable and, in the extreme, makes them answerable or under pressure to resign. 
A respondent from central agencies described this interlinking of ministers and chief 
executives in an interview as follows: 
The trouble with the ministers is they are accountable for the actions of 
their department ultimately anyway, even at output level. .. All of their 
peers start looking at them for solutions and if they fail to provide 
solutions, their status within the Cabinet is diminished. Ultimately, 
portfolios become at risk, or conversely the only way a minister can 
ascend is to be… seen to be squeaky clean and [a] high performer within 
the political context. So, … actually they behave very much like the 
most senior executives in practice. (Respondent 1) 
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 Since the accountability of chief executives cannot be easily separated from the 
responsibility of ministers, it is difficult to require chief executives to report their 
performance separately without considering that ministers are also ultimately 
responsible for this performance. The MfO prescription for reporting outcomes will not 
produce meaningful information unless there is pressure on ministers (government) to 
acknowledge that the reported outcomes are also the outcomes for which they are 
responsible. Ministers should own the outcomes, together with their agencies. There 
should be a formal mechanism in the budget process for the government (ministers) to 
state the impacts (outcomes) of government expenditure managed by their portfolio of 
public agencies and how those impacts are measured. Unless the political principals are 
pressured to specify their responsibility in the delivery of public services, there is no 
inducement to provide a proper set of performance information on those services. 
2. Mapping of the Principal-Agent Relationship in the Central Government 
Setting 
 The principal-agent relationship in the NZ Central Government setting can be 
simplified as shown in Figure 2 below, based on the accountability arrangement 
depicted in Figure 1 on page 21. There are four cascading principal-agent relationships. 
At the bottom of this scheme, the chief executive of an agency is the agent of ministers 
who have twin interests as owner and purchaser. The chief executive may have two 
types of political principal: the first one has these twin interests and is usually referred 
to as the responsible minister, and the other has only a purchase interest and is usually 
referred to as the vote minister. The responsible minister is the dominant purchaser of 
the agency‟s services. In the next hierarchy, ministers can be considered as an agent of 
the coalition government in power. Then, the coalition government in power is an agent 
of the ultimate principals, who are the NZ citizens and residents that elect them and give 
them the task of managing the state.  
In this scheme of principal-agent relationships, the opposition coalition can be 
viewed as the potential agent of the public (potential principal to the chief executives) 
that is in competition with the elected agent to become the political principal at the next 
election. The incentive for the current principal (government) and the potential principal 
(opposition) is the same, how to get (re-)elected. In order for them to compete fairly, 
public information is provided to both of them, even though the current political 
principal is highly likely to have an upper hand when it comes to access to unpublished 
information, due to their power to allocate resources (budget), especially in their interest 
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relationship as purchaser, and in their leverage in employing the chief executives. Both 
parties rely on the OAG to verify the public information provided by executive agencies 
and to advise them on matters related to the information verified. In addition, the current 
political principal employs three agencies, usually referred to as central agencies, to 
help them in managing the relationships with the chief executives: Treasury for resource 
allocation, the State Services Commission for chief executive employment and 
performance assessment, and the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet for chief 
executive coordination (not included in  Figure 2 due to their limited involvement in 
performance information). The potential political principal has information access to 
these central agencies, but the current principal still retains control of these agencies due 
to their ability to allocate resources. Since some relationship management activities are 
performed by these central agencies, they can be viewed in a narrow sense as the 
pseudo-principals of the executive agencies in relation to these central agencies‟ 
functions. 
Ultimate Principal
(Public)
Parliament
Potential Principal
(Opposition)
Current Principal
(Government in Power)
Major Principal
(Responsible 
Minister)
Minor Principal
(Vote Minister)
Agent
(Chief Executives)
Resource (Budget) 
Allocation
(The Treasury)
Employment and 
Assessment (SSC)
Information Quality 
Control (OAG)
Reelection
Finance 
Minister
Reward/sanction
BudgetBudget
Decision rights
Information rights
 
Figure 2  Principal-agent relationships and accountability arrangements in the New Zealand Public 
Sector (Adapted from Anderson & Dovey, 2003). 
 
Information plays a central role in the functioning of the incentive mechanism of 
the political principals in relation to the ultimate principal. Political principals are 
interested in the kind of information that might help them to become the elected 
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principals in the next election. The current political principals will tend to maximise the 
possibility of good news and minimise the possibility of bad news. The potential 
political principals have the opposite tendency. Information asymmetry exists between 
political principals and their agents, so that political principals have to rely on executive 
agents to provide information. Some information should be provided by executive 
agencies as mandated by regulations, such as accountability documents. As long as no 
bad news is reported in these documents, the current political principal will be likely to 
pay minimal attention to them. Other information is only provided if it is asked for by 
the current and potential political principals in select committee meetings. The potential 
political principals may use this access to extract more bad news from the executive 
agency only if they know what to ask and where to find such bad news. Since agents are 
controlled by the current political principals, it is safe to assume that they will try to 
minimise the possibility of bad news occurring and to maximise the possibility of good 
news. This behaviour will satisfy their most dominant principal. So, even though the 
executive agencies and the current political principals are at opposite ends of the 
principal-agent relationship, in terms of information incentives, they are very much 
aligned. 
The findings from the interviews reveal that ministers have become involved in 
agencies‟ performance reporting if there was an indication that bad news would be 
reported. In that situation, ministers‟ interests aligned with chief executives‟ interests so 
that the prescription for information disclosure based on the principal-agent relationship 
did not work. Internally, in the minister-chief executive relationship, ministers are 
highly likely to act in their capacity as principals to straighten things out, but externally 
they have the same interest in mitigating against bad news. Only if bad news cannot be 
mitigated, such as in the case of public scandal, do ministers externally hold chief 
executives responsible. Ultimately, internal pressure from their peers in the cabinet and 
the external pressure of the opposition and the public will make ministers responsible 
for a bad performance by their chief executives. Therefore, both ministers and chief 
executives are agents of their prime minister internally in the cabinet, or agents of the 
public externally, in terms of outcome-focused management and reporting. 
The executive agency faces tension between providing information for 
managerial accountability to the minister and for accountability purposes to parliament. 
Information for managerial accountability is different from that for parliamentary 
accountability. The former type of information is produced to enable ministers to 
manage their portfolios properly. Information is a part of a feedback loop that enables 
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ministers to learn from past experience in order to manage better in future. Taking risks 
in reporting is important in this environment, because ministers and their chief 
executives need information that is operationally useful. The reported information 
should be able to be used to drive a learning process, in which ministers and their chief 
executives gain knowledge of what works and what does not work, and enables them to 
incorporate this knowledge in order to perform better in the next cycle of the policy 
delivery process. Progression toward better interventions requires trial and error. More 
information can be provided as long as the benefit of that information is more than its 
cost. 
The latter type of information is intended to fulfil agencies‟ accountability to the 
parliament in performing the duties delegated to them, including delivering public 
services and managing the organisation‟s resources. Performance information is 
provided and reported because it is a statutory requirement to measure results achieved 
against publicised intentions. The purpose is to enable parliamentary oversight. In this 
setting, the use of information is used to judge agencies‟ performance. Potentially, there 
will be some disincentives to providing more information than is required by statute, 
such as an aversion to incurring media and political reaction to bad news, or uncertainty 
about the use of extra information by other parties. Providing less information is the 
preferred choice in this setting. 
Ministers need time to understand how to manage their relationships with 
agencies. There is a bounded rationality problem evident in relation to principals. It is 
not easy for them to get an idea of what is or should be the outcomes produced by the 
public agency for which they are responsible. If they know the outcomes to be pursued, 
they still have to learn what the relationship is between the agency‟s efforts and other 
factors that might affect the outcomes. The fact that there is not much involvement of 
ministers in the development of outcome frameworks, and no meaningful discussion in 
the Select Committee during budget discussions or hearings, may indicate this situation 
of bounded rationality.  
Furthermore, ministers may have to rely on agencies to a large degree to provide 
information to them while they are learning how to relate to their agencies. In most 
cases, agents in the public sector possess an information advantage, similar to the case 
of the principal-agent relationship in which the agent is an expert or professional. In this 
type of relationship, knowledgeable agents serve less-informed principals. The 
information asymmetry can be particularly severe, since principals do not possess the 
technical knowledge to evaluate the agents‟ efforts or the outcomes accomplished. 
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Ministers may have to rely on their own uninformed judgment (Sharma, 1997) in 
making decisions related to their relationship with their chief executives, such as 
agreeing on an output plan or supporting an increase in the agency‟s funding. 
Boston (1992) argued that the problem of asymmetric information may not lead 
to excessive opportunistic behaviour and bureaucratic capture. The budget process 
provides additional pressure on the disclosure of performance information. This process 
ensures that performance information is available in the budget, which is also in a 
department‟s corporate plan. A performance agreement is developed based on this 
corporate plan. There is extensive external scrutiny undertaken during the budget 
process by central agencies, cabinet committees and select committees. This process 
shows that the specification of performance information is a collective process, in which 
the minister is but one of the participants. It is likely that chief executives are asked to 
perform demanding tasks in delivering outputs. 
The above argument is valid for output information, but unfortunately the same 
rigorous process is not available for outcome information. The score results show that 
the comprehensiveness of output information is much better than that of outcome 
information. The inclusion of output information in the budget process facilitates a 
collective effort that helps improve the quality of this information. Nobody in the early 
periods of the MfO initiative reviewed the SOIs and the outcome information reported 
in departmental annual reports. Later, the Audit Office provided a review of outcome 
information, but the review did not have sufficient influence to pressure chief 
executives to provide more comprehensive outcome information. 
Boston (1992) also argued that ministers have an array of supports so they are 
not wholly dependent on chief executives for information about agencies‟ 
performances. This support comes from their own staff, parliamentary colleagues, 
central agencies, external experts, the audit office and members of the public (interest 
groups). Thus, ministers may have enough collective skills to understand aspects of 
their departments‟/ministries‟ business. 
However, there is not much incentive for ministers to employ others to help 
them in dealing with their agents. If they employ experts, the benefits may not 
materialise in the short run, but the costs are visible in the short term. It is unlikely that 
experts are able to learn quickly the complexity of the task. In the short run, they are 
exposed to public and opposition criticism if they spend a large amount of public funds 
on such advice. The use of purchase advisors for budget scrutiny, by the Minister of 
Finance in 2009, was subject to public debate on the costs and benefits of such an 
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approach. If they employ auditors or officials from central agencies, these officials may 
not have enough expertise to help ministers with their learning process. These people do 
not have a level of knowledge and experience that is comparable to that of the public 
officials who run the day-to-day business of agencies.  
The only available option is the ability to apply the revelation principle. Agents 
should be induced to give a full and truthful disclosure of their private information. 
However, communication restrictions may inhibit the ability to apply this principle. In 
many cases, the information needing to be disclosed may be too complex, so that it is 
not easily communicated to or comprehended by political principals. In addition, the 
adversarial situation found in the political setting may deter public officials from 
providing more information. Political scrutiny creates an environment in which a long 
run of good performance can be destroyed overnight by one instance of bad 
performance. The strategy resulting in this environment is risk aversion. A large amount 
of time is spent in managing risk so that ministers will not get a „surprise‟. 
 Political scrutiny also influences the behaviour of ministers and departments/ 
ministries. Chief executives will only report formally on what they have real confidence 
in being able to measure and prove to auditors. This information may not be that which 
is used by internal management to tell how well the organisation is doing. The selection 
of performance measures to be disclosed is more focused on form, with less emphasis 
on substance. Effort will be spent more on ex-ante accountability, such as preparing 
budgets and performance indicators, rather than on monitoring of results. The real 
substance of accountability of agencies to their ministers is exercised through periodic 
and informal exchanges between them. The formal system of accountability is 
safeguarded so that no problems will emerge.  
3. Managing for Outcomes Evaluation 
 What the MfO initiative tried to correct is the missing focus on outcomes. The 
original model was deemed to be flawed because there was no apparent mechanism to 
ensure that public services were delivered so as to achieve certain outcomes. The first 
attempt to revise it by incorporating a strategic management framework failed, due to 
incompatibility of the framework with output-based planning and the unsuitability of 
applying private sector strategic management concepts in the public sector. The last 
attempt, the MfO initiative, forces executive agencies to provide outcome information 
as evidence that they are managing their operations in order to deliver certain outcomes. 
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 There should be accountability for outcomes in the public sector. The elected 
government constitutionally determines the objectives of bureaucracy. It can be argued 
that these objectives represent what politicians have promised to their constituents 
during their election campaign. They have a mandate to fulfil these promises through 
the achievement of desired policy outcomes. Therefore, it is appropriate to put the 
accountability for outcomes into the hands of the elected government (and its ministers), 
which then asks the bureaucracy to deliver the most suitable mix of outputs to achieve 
the intended outcomes. It is necessary that executive agencies help ministers, since they 
exist to serve them (Bale & Dale, 1998; Boston, 1992). The MfO initiative has put this 
obligation on agencies to help their ministers, in its proper place. The missing piece of 
the puzzle in the initiative is that there is no attempt to make ministers claim or take 
ownership of the outcomes developed and pursued by their agencies. This may relate to 
the fact that the MfO initiative is a bottom-up process, so the leadership is just not there. 
The Tension between Controlling Bureaucrats versus Management Inefficiency of 
Ministers’ Interventions 
 The main reason for public sector reform in New Zealand was to mitigate 
institutional capture. There was a strong conviction that bureaucrats and state-employed 
professionals, such as teachers, doctors and social workers, had undue control over the 
general policy that was supposed to be the prerogative of the elected government 
(Treasury, 1987). The public sector is not responsive enough to the changing 
preferences of elected politicians, because the incentives are low-powered in a system in 
which much of the policy process is under the direction of the bureaucratic process. 
When incentives are not strong enough, the logical step is to move the process into the 
environment of high-powered incentives. The public sector should be reformed so that 
institutional responsibility for the direction of policies can be separated from their 
implementation and administration. The former should be under the full control of the 
elected government and its minister. 
 The move to politicise policy direction was taken cautiously. There is a concern 
that the intervention of ministers in operational details, in response to political pressure 
on them, may compromise managerial efficiency. The reformers had an ambivalent 
attitude towards political control and accountability (Mulgan, 2008). On the one hand, 
there is a desire for politicians to take over political control of policy. However, on the 
other hand, too much political control will lead to a capture problem in the political 
market that may diminish the efficiency of policy delivery. This ambiguity led to the 
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decision to separate responsibility for outputs and outcomes, which may not easily work 
in practice. Ministers and chief executives must work together to achieve outcomes. The 
main objective of a government is not delivering outputs, it is about achieving 
outcomes. What the reform has created is an artificial separation of responsibilities 
between ministers and departments/agencies and blurred the roles of both.  
 In an interview, one respondent from a central agency argued that the MfO is not 
progressive enough to acknowledge this blurriness of roles. He said: 
… I have to say that the roles for principal and agent have always been 
blurred. It did not change with MfO. In some respects, you can actually 
agree that the principal is now being given the information [needed] 
which they can [use to] … perform their role as a principal better. The 
only better [result] which the blurring might [have caused] is really in 
making the most senior managers in the institutions equally responsible 
for pursuit of outcomes. But, in some respect it is a bizarre [situation.] 
(Respondent 1). 
 
The Confusion between Accountability for Outcomes and Accountability for 
Managing for Outcomes 
 There are three difficulties in framing the accountability requirements related to 
outcomes in the MfO initiative. First, it is not easy to separate accountability for 
outcomes from accountability for managing for outcomes. Second, there is a difficulty 
in reporting performance information that can differentiate between these two 
accountabilities. Third, outcome-related accountability has its inherent difficulties, such 
as the determination of an appropriate level of outcomes, the complexity found in 
intervention logic and measurability of outcomes for assessment purposes. 
 The Economics and Strategy Group (2003) argued that in the original reform, as 
formulated in the PFA 1989, there was already a requirement that agencies should be 
“managing for outcomes”. Chief executives were required under the act to give advice 
and deliver outputs that best supported the government‟s desired outcomes. The proper 
interpretation of giving advice as indicated in this requirement is to effectively 
determine which outputs best support outcomes. The MfO initiative merely added the 
requirement to make the outcomes more explicit by pressuring agencies to be actively 
involved in the selection of outcomes and in determining how to achieve them.  
 This additional requirement of the MfO initiative has expanded the boundary of 
the chief executives‟ accountability and brought it closer to the degree of accountability 
required for outcomes. If chief executives are accountable for managing their 
departments‟/ministries‟ operations to achieve certain outcomes, there should be a set of 
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outcome targets available first. When this is not available, and there is no attempt on the 
part of the government or their ministers to provide it, chief executives are pressured to 
develop such targets. Ministers‟ limited involvement in the process of outcome 
development may indicate that they have distanced themselves from the outcomes 
reported by chief executives. The outcomes essentially belong to the ministers. 
However, all respondents interviewed argued that they own the outcomes, not their 
ministers. Furthermore, most of the departments/ministers referred to these outcomes as 
„Departmental Outcomes‟. If they own the outcomes, then logically they are responsible 
for the outcomes, not their ministers. However, the MfO initiative is not intended to 
take responsibility for outcomes from ministers. Nevertheless, in practice, there is 
confusion about how to draw the line between accountability for managing for 
outcomes and accountability for outcomes. 
 The reporting requirement increases the confusion. Public agencies are required 
to report outcome information in their accountability documents. If these documents are 
intended to fulfil accountability requirements, all information disclosed in the 
documents is seen as information for accountability purposes. The inclusion of outcome 
information is intended to show that departments/ministers have implemented an 
outcome-focused operation. However, this convention may not work in practice, since 
the public may view it as an indication of the departments‟/ministries‟ accountability for 
outcomes. Consequently, chief executives are seen to be concerned more with the 
ability to report the information required under the MfO initiative, rather than 
implementing the real operation of outcome-focused management. A respondent from a 
central agency argued that: 
“… the statements of accountability became the driving force and were 
not translated into month-to-month management information and 
approach to running an organisation that reflected a long-term 
approach. (Respondent 1)  
 
 Lastly, when the public sector focuses on outcomes, the inherent difficulties in 
assessing the achievement of outcomes come into play. The first difficulty relates to 
tension between the politicians‟ and the bureaucrats‟ horizons for their goals and 
objectives. In New Zealand, politicians face a three-year election cycle, while the 
leadership cycle in public agencies is longer than three years. Politicians‟ main concerns 
are to show short-term results, while the concern of chief executives is argued to be 
longer-term. Since outcomes can be specified at different levels of generality, it is not 
easy to decide on the appropriate level of outcomes to be set. If a shorter focus is 
selected, it may not produce better results in the longer term, and vice versa. The second 
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difficulty stems from the condition that a myriad of relationships exist between outputs 
and outcomes. It may take time and a lot of trial and error to find the most appropriate 
intervention for achieving every specific outcome. If the targeted outcomes are the same 
over time, eventually the right interventions can be identified and executed. However, 
the situation is always changing, resulting in a change in outcomes sought, especially if 
the outcomes are more short-term in their orientation. In this environment, it is highly 
unlikely that the best mix of interventions can be identified. The last difficulty is that 
outcomes may not be easily measured. It is difficult to specify performance indicators 
for impacts expected from the delivery of outputs in some areas of public service 
delivery. One respondent argued that her department‟s minister was concerned with the 
influence of the department‟s policy on a group of people in society, but it was difficult 
to find indicators that could show the level of influence of the policy on society. 
Leadership in the MfO Initiative  
 One factor that is cited in some reviews of the MfO initiative, such as the review 
of the OAG and some other unpublished reviews, is the leadership of the MfO initiative. 
The first is leadership in the implementation of the initiative. The political support was 
strong for the initial stage, but this support slowly diminished over time. The initiative 
was developed by a bottom-up approach, in which central agencies led the initiative and 
pushed it on to the public management system. There was no parliamentary regulatory 
umbrella for the initiative. The initiators claimed that the PFA 1989 itself already gave 
them the statutory reason for the MfO initiative, as stated earlier in the Economics and 
Strategy Group (2003)‟s review. So, there was no need to add another regulation or to 
modify the current regulation, even though later the PFA 1989 was revised to become 
the PFA 1989, as amended in 2004. The pressure from the government on agencies was 
minimal. The pressure from central agencies is not strong enough to compensate for the 
missing pressure from the government. Leadership was very weak in implementation of 
the initiative.  
 The other leadership issue is in the performance reporting area. As the Office of 
the Auditor General (2008) claims, there is no clear responsibility established for 
professional leadership and oversight of the preparation of non-financial performance 
information. There is no professional body that provides leadership for preparing 
performance information equivalent to that provided in the financial reporting area. 
There is no standard-setting initiative for performance reporting. No professional body 
is in place to ensure that there are technical standards laid down for the preparers of 
 148 
non-financial performance information. Leadership is currently assumed by central 
agencies and the OAG, but no coherent idea of proper performance reporting is agreed 
on by these agencies. The preparers are confused because they receive conflicting 
messages on the quality of, and the need for improvement in, their performance 
reporting. 
Declaration of Early Victory 
 There is an acknowledgment by the officials of central agencies that the failure 
of the MfO initiative to implement outcome-focused management and to improve the 
quality of performance information may be caused by the oversight process and the 
early declaration of the success of the initiative. Too much focus was on visible things, 
such as what the reports produced, when the initiative was evaluated formally and 
informally, once it began to be implemented. There was not much initiative for a 
comprehensive investigation of the actual management process itself. One respondent 
from a central agency stated: 
… I think in hindsight we put too much emphasis on the SOI and not 
enough emphasis on the change processes that would support strategic 
management better. (Respondent 1) 
 
 The presence of an outcome framework in most of the SOIs issued during the 
earlier periods of the MfO implementation has led officials in the central agencies to 
believe that agencies were able to implement outcome-focused management. Based on 
the results of early evaluations, they believed that the presence of an outcome 
framework showed that chief executives understood the outcomes they were trying to 
achieve and the way the outputs contribute to the outcomes. However, their belief was 
later to prove untrue. They declared victory too early. Another respondent from a 
central agency described this situation:  
Central agencies shifted their attention to other things too quickly. Once 
every agency had done at least one annual cycle, we considered that the 
knowledge was out there and chief executives and their senior team 
would run it on its merit. I think in hindsight we were wrong. We 
declared victory too soon. (Respondent 3) 
 
Once they declared victory, the attention of central agencies moved from the MfO 
initiative to other activities, until they realised that the adoption of outcome-focused 
management had failed. 
 149 
Level of Support  
 Another factor that led to the failure of the MfO initiative to produce the 
intended impacts was the low level of support from central agencies. There is a little bit 
of a “blame game” in the claims about this factor. The majority of respondents claimed 
that the level of support was not enough to help them to implement outcome-focused 
management. However, respondents from three agencies acknowledged that the level of 
support was adequate. Two of the three agencies were from the group of the top 9 
agencies, based on the results of the disclosure analysis; the other agency is from the 
group of the middle 9 agencies. Respondents from four agencies claimed that the level 
of support was not sufficient to enable them to produce good outcome information. The 
composition of this set of these agencies was: one agency from the top 9 group, one 
agency from the middle 9 group, and two agencies from the bottom 9 group. The 
respondents from two agencies, one from the middle 9 group and the other from the 
bottom 9 group, expressed frustration with the level of support from central agencies.  
 On the other hand, two respondents from central agencies argued that the 
support was available but agencies did not show initiative in seeking support. One of 
these respondents commented on this tendency: 
... How many of them even know where the Pathfinder project is? How 
many of them regularly attend CFO network meetings? How many of 
them seek out the people who are identified and are still around in the 
Treasury on financial management issues? Not very many. It is easy to 
criticise support, it is much harder to sustain that criticism if there is no 
evidence of any efforts to seek that support. (Respondent 3) 
 
 This blaming game may indicate two issues. First, there are different sets of 
incentives at play for agencies in implementing outcome-focused management. Some 
chief executives may see the merit of the initiative and seek diligently any available 
help and guidance to ensure that they can produce a good quality of outcome 
information. On the other hand, other chief executives may not see the same incentives 
and instead they may view the requirement for outcome reporting as another compliance 
exercise. These executives may pressure their staff to come up with something to fulfil 
the reporting requirement. The staff may not have good access to such support and help. 
Second, the initiative was not organised in a coordinated way: the support mechanisms 
were scattered over many places, so that it was not easy for agencies to obtain them. 
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Accountability Shifting 
 The last factor that may contribute to the failure of the MfO initiative to provide 
a good quality of performance information is the concern that most of the accountability 
required in the public sector has been shifted from ministers to chief executives. The 
doctrine of ministerial responsibility has been modified into a doctrine that calls for 
joint responsibility from ministers and bureaucrats. There is a convention that 
ministerial accountability for departmental action means that the minister should answer 
to the public for such action and leave the public servant anonymous, regardless of their 
personal responsibility (Mulgan, 2008). Internally within the government, the minister 
will take any necessary steps to impose remedies and sanctions. Ministers are the public 
face of the bureaucracy in the political realm. 
 Even though the overall structure of ministerial responsibility still remains, the 
MfO initiative has expanded the accountability of agencies into the area that previously 
may have been the responsibility of ministers. At least by implication, the 
accountability is shifted away from ministers. If there is public failure, the public may 
have the perception that chief executives are to blame. Chief executives are facing 
greater risk due to the increased accountability which MfO demands of them. 
4. Reporting Incentives in the New Zealand Public Sector Setting 
The incentive for reporting outcome information is different from the incentive 
for the established practice of output reporting. In output reporting, ministers were 
acting as the principal for chief executives in demanding performance information. The 
interviews revealed that ministers used more detailed performance information in the 
output agreement to discipline chief executives. There is external pressure, from the 
perspective of chief executives, to put resources into the information infrastructure. 
Chief executives used performance information in managing day-to-day operations to 
meet the expectations of ministers. In addition to this, people understand that output is 
the responsibility of chief executives. Where there is a concern about bad news from 
output information, it is highly likely that chief executives, rather than ministers, will be 
questioned about it. There is therefore an incentive for chief executives to hide this bad 
news as long as possible, but there is an opposite incentive, from the ministers‟ 
perspective, to reveal this information, at least internally between them, since it is in 
their interest to act on this bad news to ensure that their priorities are still going to be 
achieved. 
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The prescription of outcome information has a different incentive setting. 
Outcomes are still the responsibility of ministers. They give attention only to the 
outcomes set in their own interest, in terms of priorities that they can control. Similar to 
chief executives, they want to disclose information on aspects that they can control. The 
findings indicate that while ministers are concerned with the short- or medium-term 
impact of their priorities in the horizon of the election cycle, they do not involve 
themselves in the development of outcomes from service delivery that may not 
materialise in the short or medium term. Even for information on aspects that they can 
control, like any other agents, ministers have a preference for releasing good news 
sooner and withholding bad news as long as they can, because of the asymmetric value 
of information. As has been stated above, the incentives for ministers and chief 
executives are aligned in outcome reporting. 
Incentives in the Budget Allocation Process 
Budget allocation can be used as a strong reporting incentive. The findings 
reveal that chief executives and ministers will be likely to disclose more information if 
they are competing for more funding in a period with an increasing budget. Once the 
funding is given in one year, it will continue to be given in future years, as long as the 
government budget increases. For ministers, the disclosure of performance information 
is important in the public debate within the cabinet and select committees in order to get 
more resources that can be allocated to their area or priorities. In the New Zealand 
setting, chief executives have greater flexibility in allocating resources. For them, an 
increase in funding is always favourable in that it is able to produce good news or 
increase their perquisites. The interests of ministers and chief executives are thus 
aligned. 
On the other hand, these interests are not likely to align in the period of a budget 
cut. Some respondents stated that there is not much debate when reduced funding is 
sought. Chief executives will be likely to disclose the sort of information that supports 
avoiding a funding cut, but ministers want to get another type of information so that 
they can set how much funding they can cut. The situation is exacerbated, because input 
information is no longer available in the budget system after input control was 
transferred to chief executives following public sector reform. Ministers find it difficult 
to make informed decisions. In one case that occurred outside the period focused on in 
this study, the current government had to employ former bureaucrats with extensive 
knowledge of government department operations to find areas in which funding could 
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be cut, as a consequence of the economic crisis resulting in a decreased government 
budget. This case highlights an important factor: the problem of bounded rationality is 
quite marked in the public sector, in which principals do not have enough expertise even 
to ask for the right information that they need, to deal with their agents. 
The findings from the interviews revealed that performance information is not 
used in the management of the public budget. One interviewee who did a review of 
accountability documents argued that performance information is always ignored, 
because the main control on public spending still revolves around input control. He 
further stated that even though it is almost two decades since public sector reform 
changed the focus of public sector management from input control to output control, 
deep within the system people are still controlling inputs instead of outputs. The budget 
allocation and evaluation discussions in the select committees of parliament are more 
about inputs. In this setting, nobody in the budget system provides the incentive for 
output and outcome reporting, since at the top level (parliament) the concern is with 
inputs. 
Incentives in Evaluation and Performance Assessment 
Another underdeveloped area in the management process is the closing link in 
the process, which is performance assessment and evaluation. While so many efforts 
have been directed to develop better planning, such as the introduction of a strategic 
management framework and the MfO initiative, not much attention has been paid to the 
assessment or evaluation of what has been done and whether what has been planned has 
been achieved. A periodic comprehensive evaluation, such as an impact evaluation, is 
needed to assess whether what was planned has been delivered efficiently and 
effectively. In impact evaluation, there is an in-depth analysis of the causes and effects 
and a search for opportunities for greater value for money from agencies‟ service 
delivery. This type of evaluation is rarely performed in the New Zealand public sector. 
Where such an evaluation does occur, it is more likely that it was done on an ad hoc 
basis (Ussher & Kibblewhite, 2005).  
While some efforts are still needed to improve the planning process in outcome-
based management, the focus of the MfO initiative, if it continues, is to develop a 
culture of evaluation in the public sector. There is some degree of evaluation of new 
spending, because Treasury and ministers will engage in more scrutiny of this spending; 
however, there is limited attention to evaluating the existing level of spending. When 
new policies are proposed, Treasury asks agencies to provide indicators to measure the 
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impact of the policies. Unfortunately, the share of the budget for new policy funding is 
very small. A large amount of the budget is allocated to existing or current policies that, 
while they may still be important policies, may not be scrutinised rigorously by central 
agencies. If external evaluation of these policies is not feasible in the short term, it may 
be useful for the MfO initiative to make it a requirement that agencies show that they 
are evaluating their existing policies. The disclosure that they periodically make of the 
appropriateness of outputs to achieve outcomes is as important as the disclosure of 
outcomes. Alternatively, a formal external evaluation of the performance of public 
sector agencies can be set up. In other jurisdictions, an independent agency is 
established to assess the performance of other public sector agencies. If no mechanism 
can be established within the current central agencies, there should be a new agency 
established to perform this function. It seems that the recent establishment of the New 
Zealand Productivity Commission is intended to fill part of this void. 
 Performance assessment can be used to induce chief executives to disclose more 
performance information. Interviewees‟ attitudes towards performance assessment were 
quite favourable, especially if the assessments were based on output information. To 
some degree, there was some support for performance-based compensation. However, 
the current performance assessment system at chief executive level is quite complex, 
because there are so many factors included in assessments. Achieving performance, as 
reported in the accountability documents, is just one item in a list of many outlined in 
performance assessment forms.  Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the current 
assessment system has any impact on performance reporting practice. 
 In order to put stronger pressure on chief executives to improve the quality of 
their performance information, their performance assessments should provide a more 
balanced focus that includes an evaluation of non-financial performance targets. 
Norman (2002) argued that while there are severe consequences for failing to meet 
financial performance requirements, there is not an equal penalty for failing to deliver 
on quality and outputs. Chief executives will not give enough attention to providing a 
better specification of outputs unless they are held responsible on under-delivery for 
these areas in the same way as they are judged if they miss financial targets. Similarly, 
chief executives will be induced to produce better outcome information or implement 
outcome-based management if they are evaluated by their ability to specify and monitor 
their outcomes and to perform systematic evaluation of how well their outputs 
contribute to outcomes. 
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Incentives in the Information Control Process 
 The strongest incentive for improving the quality of information is the presence 
of information quality control. In the current arrangement, auditors are responsible for 
verifying the information reported. In the New Zealand setting, their position is 
independent and they work for parliament. Their role, which is mandated by the PFA, is 
limited to auditing financial information and output information. Auditors were 
consistently cited in the interviews as the only party concerned with performance 
information reported in the accountability documents. Auditors use their leverage in 
issuing the audit opinion, as well as recommendations in management letters, to 
pressure chief executives to improve the quality of information over time. Auditors are 
able to ensure the reliability of information, since they verify the information system 
that supports chief executives‟ audited assertions. It was found that longitudinal 
consistency is quite strong in output reporting. 
 Despite the strong role of auditors in controlling the quality of information, the 
current external quality control does not elevate information quality to a level that is 
satisfactory, even to the auditors themselves. A high degree of cross-sectional 
inconsistency is found in output information. Two factors contribute to this deficiency. 
First, there is a high degree of discretion seen in the reporting. Second, auditors had not 
yet focused their audit on the relevance of information. In terms of outcome 
information, since it is not audited, the auditors‟ pressure is viewed as not particularly 
effective in improving quality. The lack of authority in verifying the information, 
coupled with some degree of disagreement on how to report outcome information, has 
meant the quality of outcome information has improved very slowly, which is very 
disappointing. The Economic and Strategy Group (2003) has raised the need for a 
mandatory quality assurance process in the MfO initiative, including an external review 
of the content of the SOI, after performing an early review of the MfO initiative and the 
Pathfinder project. Unfortunately, this suggestion was not followed up by central 
agencies, resulting in the current situation of disappointing quality in performance 
reporting. 
5. Challenges in New Zealand Public Sector Performance Reporting 
 Several challenges are identified in this study in relation to performance 
reporting practice in the public sector, especially in the New Zealand setting. The first 
three challenges relate to the external factors affecting the reporting entity: the 
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principal‟s bounded rationality, information quality control and reporting policy advice 
outputs. The next three challenges are internal ones for the reporting entity: 
complexities in managing for outcomes, determination of the appropriate level of 
outcomes and the current state of information technology. 
Ministers’ Capacity and Capability 
 Quality of information will improve if the problem of the principal‟s bounded 
rationality can be mitigated. If the principal knows what kind of information to demand 
from the agent and the principal is able to understand the agent‟s information and use it 
for decision-making in his/her relationship with the agent, then better information will 
be reported. The need for this capability is not cogent in the case where the information 
incentive is the same for ministers and chief executives. Usually, during a period of 
prosperity, ministers largely ignore published performance information, so no pressure 
is directed toward chief executives to improve the quality of information. Only when 
the incentive is not aligned, such as in the case of a funding cut, is the principal‟s 
capability in relation to information acquisition and processing highly valued.  
 The capacity and capability of ministers has been considered a serious issue 
since the original New Zealand model was implemented. A review by the Steering 
Group (1991), as quoted by Boston (1992), described a concern as to whether ministers 
had adequate support, in the form of independent advice, when developing and 
negotiating performance agreements with their chief executives. In the review, ministers 
were portrayed as extremely busy and many of them did not possess technical 
qualifications in the policy area of their portfolio. Consequently, they also did not have 
time or the technical knowledge to actively participate in the specification of their 
department‟s performance, especially in framing the desired outcomes, selecting 
appropriate departmental outputs and setting proper performance standards. 
 This capacity and capability concern is becoming more complicated due to the 
severe asymmetric situation, as previously explained, in which agencies hold virtually 
all the information needed to assess current performance and future capacity. Ministers 
must be heavily dependent on the advice of chief executives and other senior officials to 
decide the specification of outputs that ministers (government) have to purchase from 
departments/ ministries. The interview results show that ministers rely on their chief 
executives to enable them to make decisions on output plans. The typical process for 
decision-making on outputs is that ministers give their directions at the outset and ask 
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their chief executives to translate them into a set of outputs which the ministers will 
consider later and decide whether to accept or revise.  
 The interview results also showed that while some ministers provide a sense of 
direction on what their departments have to do in the next year, they do not actively 
participate in the planning of the long-term strategic performance of their portfolio of 
agencies. The process is mostly one-way. There is no structured debate on strategic 
direction, capability and performance so that agencies can properly report their ability 
and performance to parliament. It depends on chief executives and agencies to come up 
with their own long-term strategic vision and the strategies to retain long-term 
capability. This tendency is quite marked in agencies that provide service delivery 
instead of policy advice. There seems to be a combination of factors leading to the lack 
of an incentive for ministers to come up with long-term strategic plans, partly due to the 
adversarial environment of politics in the Westminster system, or to the lack of 
capability on the part of ministers to provide more than a sense of direction to their 
chief executives.  
 There is a need to provide greater support for ministers so they are able to 
perform their roles as active and discriminating purchasers of departmental outputs. 
Such purchasers should demand that departments/ministers produce clear expectations 
about service delivery and innovatively propose several sets of outputs to meet these 
expectations. Ministers should be in an environment in which several choices are 
available, instead of the current process in which agencies come up with the set of 
outputs that they think is the most appropriate. Ministers should be able to select from 
several options (each with its consequences outlined) that are put on the table by their 
departments.  
 Several suggestions have been offered to mitigate the problem of the bounded 
rationality of ministers, as stated by Boston (1992). The first suggestion is that ministers 
should be given more resources, in the form of additional staff in their office who are 
specifically assigned to assist them with the development and negotiation of the output 
plan. This suggestion seems to be the most promising one, considering that it addresses 
the problem directly by the provision of support that gives ministers the ability to have 
more control. However, the possibility of employing staff with the appropriate level of 
expertise and experience may be small unless a considerable amount of funding is 
allocated to the ministry‟s office. If the amount is too high, it may attract public concern 
about the appropriateness of the spending.  
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 The second is that the SSC or another central agency is given a mandate to help 
ministers in dealing with their departments in matters related to the planning and 
evaluation of performance. Currently, the central agencies‟ responsibilities in this area 
are unclear and unspecified (Cook, 2004). If they are given a clear mandate for this role, 
more resources need to be allocated to central agencies to enable them to perform this 
role. The limitations in the first suggestion, which is the availability of suitably qualified 
officials assigned to perform the tasks and the funding, also apply to this second 
suggestion. 
 The third suggestion, which is the strategy that has been adopted in the past and 
is considered to be the right strategy for the future, is employing a number of high-
quality purchase advisers. The practice of employing advisers to ministers to provide a 
different source of policy advice has become more popular since the MMP voting 
system was implemented (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2007). To be able to provide meaningful 
assistance, these advisors should be senior managers from the private and public 
sectors. They should have a level of expertise and professionalism that matches the 
expertise and experience of the current bureaucrats. Scott (2001) claimed that ministers 
who employ purchase advisers tend to be able to perform as discriminating purchasers. 
There is a tendency for the quality of output specification to be higher in agencies 
whose ministers utilise purchase advisers. In the past, these advisors were employed ad 
hoc by the ministers of finance. Since they are not a part of the formal and regular 
system, there is concern about their accountability and their cost-effectiveness. 
Recently, the New Zealand government took a formal approach to providing advice to 
ministers related to the strategic planning, performance and capability of their agencies 
by establishing the Productivity Commission. 
Information Quality Control 
Some interviewees argued that a lack of meaningful performance information 
can be alleviated if there is an information quality control function located internally in 
the government itself, in addition to the role of the OAG in providing assurance 
externally. In other jurisdictions, there is a dedicated unit responsible for analysing 
performance information which can ask agencies for more information in relation to 
their functions. The employment of purchase advisors that was previously mentioned 
highlights the need for this internal quality control. One respondent argued that this role 
would be appropriately included in Treasury, while another respondent from a central 
agency argued that the establishment of the Productivity Commissions (outside the 
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observation period of this study) might fill this gap. These suggestions highlight the 
need for internal quality control of performance information if the improvement in 
information quality being sought is to be achieved.  
 A lack of reporting standards has contributed to a great deal of confusion and 
frustration among agencies in relation to the disclosure of their performance 
information. It also results in cross-sectional inconsistency in reporting. The findings 
show that the preparers of performance information felt they were unfairly treated. On 
one hand, they were criticised for not reporting properly, while on the other hand they 
did not know how to report properly. The availability of reporting standards would 
increase the likelihood of disclosing relevant performance information. A similar note 
was also raised by the Economics and Strategy Group (2003) in their evaluation. There 
should be improved guidance available and wider distribution of a good practice model, 
to support agencies in developing performance information. The relevance characteristic 
is still not properly addressed in the current arrangement, as auditors concentrate more 
on the reliability of information and nobody in the system checks the relevance of 
information, except the reporting entity itself. However, developing reporting standards 
is not an easy job. Currently, it sits with the accounting profession but their main focus 
has been on financial reporting. Improvement in this regard may take place with the 
establishment of the External Reporting Board in 2011 and if the Board elects to set 
separate standards for the public sector. 
Reporting Policy Advice Outputs 
 Interview results showed that the biggest challenge in output reporting is the 
development of a meaningful set of output measures on policy advice. The current 
practice of measuring performance areas of outputs as if they are just a document does 
not take into account any assessment of the achievement of delivering policy advice to 
ministers. On the other hand, an alternative practice of considering policy advice 
activities as part of a bigger output of policy creates a concern as to how to link advice 
or a series of pieces of advice to the successful application of a policy. Because the links 
are not so obvious that does not mean that the quality of the policy advice should not be 
assessed. However, a good policy may not be accepted because it is not the policy that 
is the preference of the political principals. Equally, a bad policy may be accepted 
because it meets the preference of political principals. 
 The right measures are the ones that drive public officials in managing the 
delivery. In the case of policy advice, the proper measures are the ones used by chief 
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executives in the delivery of policy advice to ministers. The key function of policy 
advice is to inform ministers about any problems identified and to propose interventions 
to tackle the problems.  This involves an identification of the impacts/outcomes needed 
to solve the problems, several choices of outputs that can be delivered to achieve the 
intended impacts, and a justification of the link between outputs and outcomes based on 
evidence and sound reasoning. What is essentially produced by policy advice activities 
is a complete set of outcomes framework and measures of an intervention or a series of 
interventions for the proposed policy. Policy advice outputs should be presented in a 
proper context, which is to provide justification for an intervention and to provide 
mechanisms to assess the performance of the intervention. When performance measures 
of policy advice outputs are developed in this way, they serve two purposes. First, the 
measures developed are consistent in the way they deliver policy advice outputs. 
Second, it makes the appropriate and comprehensive outcomes framework available for 
all of a department‟s/ministry‟s interventions. 
Complexities in Managing for Outcomes 
 The third challenge is inherently related to the architecture of the MfO initiative. 
This initiative tries to develop a system where chief executives are accountable for 
output delivery, responsible for providing outcome information to enable the ministers 
to select the appropriate outputs and at the same time effectively manage for outcomes. 
This initiative requires a clarification of the distinction between non-accountability for 
outcomes and managing for outcomes. It needs the type of information that can be used 
to evaluate and to assess whether chief executives effectively manage the outcomes. 
What is the difference between this information and that which is used in accountability 
for outcomes? It is not an easy task to differentiate between the two. The impetus to 
provide a clear distinction will be stronger when the audit of performance information 
and assessment of performance becomes more formal.  
 When there is no clear and fully articulated model of the relationship between 
outputs and outcomes, management will find it hard to defend their choice of outputs to 
achieve the targeted outcomes. In this situation, the most difficult aspect of 
implementing the MfO initiative is the requirement to develop credible intervention 
logic and an effective structure for performance measurement. The interview results 
showed that even though agencies could produce a skeletal form of outcomes 
framework, it was hard for them to fill the empty spaces with explanations to justify 
their framework and sets of integrated measures for all components in the framework. 
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What is needed is the provision of extensive guidance or a comprehensive expenditure 
management model of outcome-based management that can be used by all agencies to 
develop justification of the critical linkages.   
Managing effectively requires a system in which agencies have a chance to 
experiment and to learn from mistakes in identifying the appropriate mix of outputs to 
achieve the targeted outcomes. But, considering that there is an asymmetrical value of 
information in the political setting, there is not much room to make mistakes. Nobody 
can guarantee that the potential principal will not take advantage of an agency‟s mistake 
to score a point. Here, the challenge is to develop a performance evaluation and 
assessment system that can inform whether chief executives are held accountable for 
output delivery and are moving in the right direction in effectively managing for 
outcomes, while at the same time allowing them to experiment to find better ways of 
achieving outcomes without promoting negative incentives on behalf of the current 
principals. The likelihood of developing such a system is very small. 
Developing a system in which the ability to learn from mistakes is fostered is the 
greatest challenge faced by agencies. Nobody will experiment to learn from their 
mistakes when others punish them for making mistakes. It requires a change from a 
culture of quickly blaming someone for a problem to giving them a chance to show that 
they can do it better next time. The latter is certainly not the culture in New Zealand 
society and the political setting, regarding problems in the public sector. The 
Westminster system has made the political setting too adversarial to foster this culture. 
Determination of the Level of Outcomes 
The fourth challenge relates to selection of appropriate levels of outcomes that 
chief executives are going to operate. There is a strong tendency to select high-level or 
long-term and ambitious outcome targets because of the perception that these broader 
society outcomes are the appropriate ones for the public sector agency, to show that 
they reach out to society. This tendency is further driven by the public setting that they 
operate in, which requires them to broaden their reach instead of focusing it.  It is easy 
for them to get an agreement on the outcomes targeted when they are broad; besides, it 
does not invite unnecessary public debate about the chief executives‟ performance. 
Auditors will not criticise them in the management letter, as has been asserted by some 
interviewees. A high-level outcome framework may inhibit the development of 
effective and realistic interventions and plans, and therefore it results in the difficulty of 
linking the outputs produced to the outcomes sought. The shorter term focus in the 
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outcomes framework increases the controllability or influence of the agency on 
outcomes, and thus makes it easier to understand the intervention logic used and 
develop effective plans. However, the incentive for a shorter focus is much smaller than 
that for a longer focus. 
Another advantage of focusing outcome measures on short-to-medium term 
outcomes, such as a 2-5 year window, is that they will be aligned with the political 
cycle of the ministers. A typical minister in a new government has a three-year span in 
his/her term. The most time that this minister is able to manage his/her portfolio is 
probably only two years, because of having to spend the first year gaining an 
understanding of it. In the first term, the minister will probably focus on a two-year 
window of results, but with a small amount of attention on the five-year window. If 
his/her coalition gets re-elected to govern for another term, he/she can concentrate on 
the previous five-year window and update the outcomes for the next five-year window. 
However, this short-to-medium outcome focus requires a more explicit arrangement to 
be made when establishing the responsibility of ministers for achieving those outcomes. 
Reporting should go hand-in-hand with accountability. The accountability function of 
ministers is missing in this area. Together, reporting and accountability can provide a 
strong incentive to ministers to choose more realistic and quantitative outcome targets. 
 The challenge of selecting and maintaining an appropriate level of outcomes is 
not unique to the New Zealand setting. Most countries that have developed an outcome-
based framework in their public management system also face a similar challenge. 
Webber (2004) found that these countries confront challenges in maintaining a 
consistent level of outcome definition. In most cases, policies do not produce the 
intended impacts and there are pressures for the policy design to respond quickly and 
appropriately to the changing situation. Ministries/departments may be reluctant to 
change their outcome statements in a system with a strong emphasis on outcomes. As a 
result, policy design is not responsive enough to provide different directions and 
consequently different policies. Countries that implement outcome-based management 
also confront challenges in maintaining the feasibility and practicality of outcome 
targets. Usually, politicians aim for higher but impractical targets; others, including the 
bureaucracy, may want something that is applicable and feasible. The challenge is to 
identify and maintain the appropriate horizon for outcome targets, so that policy impacts 
can be measured and policy assessment can occur meaningfully. If the horizon is too 
short, the policies are not stable enough to produce the intended impacts. On the other 
hand, if the horizon is too long, it may be too late to change a failed policy. 
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The Information System Issue 
 The last challenge to be faced is the current capability of the agency to produce 
performance information, especially outcome information. An early review of the MfO 
initiative revealed that the task of developing a proper performance report, in order for 
chief executives to be able to manage for outcomes, required skills and resources that 
the agencies did not have (Economics and Strategy Group, 2003). If they are pressured 
to produce such information without proper support from central agencies, the agencies‟ 
workload may be distorted. Agencies will not be likely to pursue this direction. A 
majority of the respondents in this study stated that the priority of agencies is for service 
delivery, rather than for system information supporting the accountability documents.  
 The state of the information system in public sector agencies is not as advanced 
as comparable entities, in terms of size, that are operating in the private sector. One of 
the examples that was frequently cited by a respondent in this study, in discussing the 
current state of the public sector information system, is the inability of the system to 
generate cost information at an individual output level. As service providers, where a 
considerable number of production costs are in terms of labour costs and overheads, 
government agencies do not have cost accounting systems to allocate these costs to their 
outputs. Accessing information that in theory is supposed to be able to be collected from 
inside the organisations is still very difficult for most government agencies to provide. 
Pressure to invest in a cost accounting system may come from two sources. First, 
central agencies, working together with professionals in the accounting field, may 
develop output pricing methodologies that are suitable for the public sector situation. 
These will serve as standards on how to price and eventually to cost, since most public 
services are not contestable, so that proper pricing methods would be some variant of 
cost-based pricing. Second, audit should direct greater attention to output costing. This 
strategy will provide a strong inducement for agencies to invest more in their 
information systems in order to satisfy audit requirements. 
 Another issue that is worth discussing is where the ability to produce some 
outcome information is extremely difficult, especially on high-level outcomes. For 
example, one interviewee discussed the need for fish stock information, since his 
agency decided that the level of fish stocks was the measure to use for their outcomes. 
To get this information is costly and requires them to employ fisheries scientists that are 
in limited supply worldwide. It takes around one-third of the budget spent by a typical 
fisheries agency in OECD countries to gather information at the current level needed for 
managing their business. Gathering more information to successfully manage for 
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outcomes is not viable for such agencies at the present time. Other research also 
highlighted the same issue. Ussher and Kibblewhite (2005) found that while some 
departments have developed a comprehensive set of world indicators, they still cannot 
produce effectiveness indicators and risk indicators
4
.  
 
 
                                                 
4
 Ussher and Kibblewhite (2005) define each of these indicators as follows: 
 World indicators provide a measure of the targeted world or aspect of it. For example, the 
indicator for a children‟s education service is the percentage of children sitting and achieving 
School  Certificate in 5 subjects 
 Effectiveness indicators show the measure of the success of particular interventions, such as the 
reoffending rate of a certain group of offenders that receive a particular intervention, compared 
with a control group. 
 Risk indicators provide information on the area to which the intervention should be targeted, for 
example the risk of imprisonment within 5 years. 
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VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION & 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This chapter presents the conclusions and recommendations of this research 
study. A brief summary of the study is presented first, before the conclusions are 
discussed. The chapter concludes with recommendations for future research. 
Summary of the Purpose of the Study and the Research Problem 
 The aim of the study was to fill the void in public sector research relating to 
performance reporting practice in New Zealand. First, as the output-based New Zealand 
model has morphed into a balanced focus of output and outcome model of the public 
management system, there is limited research directed to address the impact of the new 
focus on reported performance information. In addition, with just a few exceptions, 
most of the research and reviews have concentrated on the early process of change. This 
study was intended to provide a picture of the long-term change in performance 
reporting practice of the newly modified New Zealand model. Second, academic review 
of the MfO initiative to incorporate outcome information into the accountability 
documents has been limited. The few reviews that have taken place have used official 
documentation as the source of data. This study aimed to provide more evidence, by 
securing comprehensive inputs from various actors in the public sector regarding the 
issues found in public sector reporting. Third, some results from external assessment of 
the quality of performance information were available, but they were not in a detailed 
format in which the results of individual assessment of each agency were presented. In 
addition, there was no discussion on how the assessment was conducted, including the 
benchmark and methodology used. Studies focusing on non-financial performance 
information have mostly measured the quality of information using a simple 
methodology of indicator counting and categorisation. This study aimed to provide a 
more sophisticated methodology to measure the quality of non-financial performance 
information disclosed in the accountability documents of public agencies. 
 With these objectives in mind, the study focused on measuring the quality or 
comprehensiveness of output and outcome information and on identifying the incentives 
and challenges in the practice of reporting this information. Specifically, the study 
aimed to address a series of questions related to this focus. First, was there any 
justification for the assertions made by the OAG about the poor quality of performance 
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information? Second, how was the quality of performance information measured? 
Third, what was the impact of the MfO initiative on performance reporting practice? 
Fourth, has there been any improvement in the reporting practice of outcome 
information? Fifth, how useful was the reporting guidance or benchmarks? Sixth, what 
were the factors that affected reporting practice? And last, how did various actors 
interact in performance reporting practice? 
Summary of the Research Background 
 The current New Zealand public management system is an evolution of the new 
model introduced in the late 1980s. The model included a clear distinction being made 
between the responsibilities carried by ministers and those handled by chief executives 
in the operation of the government and its bureaucracy. The model was based on the 
implementation of some specific economic theories, particularly public choice theory 
and principal agent theory. The aim of the model was to enable the public sector system 
in New Zealand to be more efficient and effective in delivering its services. 
 In the model, a specific principal-agent relationship was established between 
ministers and their chief executives. Ministers were designated as the principal who had 
the ownership and purchase interest in the department. In performing their role as 
purchasers, ministers were responsible for outcomes. Chief executives were the agents 
employed to manage the ministers‟ ownership and deliver on their purchase of public 
services. A contract, in the form of an output plan (purchase agreement), was agreed to 
by ministers and their chief executives in the planning stages. The contract served as a 
basis for chief executives to deliver public service. At the end of the period an 
assessment was made, requiring chief executives to provide information on the 
performance of their delivery in the form of a Statement of Service Performance that 
contained detailed information on outputs planned and delivered.  
 While the focus on output was established, there was no visible mechanism put 
in place to ensure that the New Zealand public management system had an equal focus 
on outcomes. There was a concern that the selection of outputs did not include 
outcomes for consideration. To mitigate this concern, two attempts were made to 
include an outcome focus in the system. The first attempt was based on the strategic 
management framework used in the private sector. The second attempt, initiated after 
the failure of the first one, was intended to develop a more suitable approach to 
outcome-based management in the public sector. 
 166 
 The first attempt failed mainly due to the incompatibility of the framework with 
the public sector setting it was adopted into. The strategic management framework was 
a combination of two unrelated initiatives aimed at modifying the original New Zealand 
model that was considered to be flawed. The first initiative was a top-down approach, in 
which the government of the day provided a set of directions for bureaucrats in the form 
of the SRAs framework. At the same time, the bottom-up process of identifying the best 
indicators to assess the performance of chief executives was initiated within central 
agencies. To bridge these two initiatives, a set of indicators called KRAs was 
introduced. The KRAs were later deemed to be incompatible with the existing output 
performance reported on in the Statement of Service Performance. A change of 
government spelled the end of this initiative, and it later largely abandoned. 
 The second attempt, called the MfO initiative, is currently being implemented. 
The new system puts additional responsibility on chief executives to show that they are 
managing their output delivery to achieve certain targeted outcomes, even though they 
are still not responsible for outcomes. This initiative has resulted in the disclosure of a 
new set of information on outcomes, to complement the existing reported information 
on outputs. This study has been done in this new setting, and has focused on reporting 
practice of these two types of information.  
Summary of Theoretical Framework of the Study 
 The study used public choice theory and agency theory as the framework for 
analysis. The rationale for selection of these theories was that they are the theoretical 
framework used as the foundation for the reforms. 
 A public choice theory framework was used to identify public choice problems 
and their causes. The problems included policy capture by interest groups or specific 
constituents and bureaucratic capture. Policy capture happened because a politician‟s 
authority over allocating rents in the public sector was not controlled. On the other 
hand, bureaucratic capture was mainly the political principal‟s problem of controlling 
their executive agents, which are agency problems in a typical principal and agent 
relationship. 
 Public choice theory offered some strategies to help mitigate public choice 
problems. These strategies were based on the idea that the intervention of government 
should be minimal and instead closer attention should be given to how individuals 
interact with each other. Three of these strategies were considered within the theoretical 
framework. First, there should be an effort to limit a politician‟s authority, so that the 
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total allocated rents can be reduced. Second, there should be a separation between 
policy-making and policy delivery activities, so that bureaucratic capture could be 
minimised. The policy-making agencies should be induced to become a proxy for the 
consumers‟ voice in the public sector, to inform the policy delivery agencies of the mix 
of outputs desired by the consumers. Third, proper incentives should be installed in the 
public management system so that public agencies would deliver socially desirable 
outputs and outcomes. With these incentives, the self-interest of public officials could 
be aligned with the interests of society regarding public service delivery. 
 Information disclosure played an important role when consideration was given 
to each of these three strategies. Disclosure of output and outcome information enables 
voters to assess the adherence of politicians to the limitations imposed on them. This 
information would also be useful for consumers of public sector services to assess 
whether government agencies have addressed their concerns. Lastly, output information 
could be used to assess whether public officials delivered socially desired outputs. 
 Agency theory was used to identify factors that might support or inhibit 
performance reporting practice. Specific aspects of the theory were selected, those that 
were mainly present in the public sector setting. These particular aspects were: 
verifiability or measurability of outcome/performance, ex-ante causal ambiguity, the 
presence of multiple principals, severe bounded-rationality on the part of principals, a 
high degree of risk-averse behaviour on the part of agents and the level of goal conflict 
in the relationship. Two additional mechanisms were also included, which were the role 
of reputation in the agency relationship and the presence of severe asymmetric 
information. 
Summary of the Research Methodology 
 Two research methods were used in this research. The first method was the 
disclosure index, used to address concerns relating to the disclosure and quality of 
performance information. The second was the case study, which was used to address 
research questions relating to issues concerning performance reporting practice. 
 The disclosure index was used after considering some alternative ways of 
measuring information quality. This decision was also an attempt to answer the research 
question of how to measure information quality. There was no direct measure of quality 
of information available, since quality itself is hard to define. Most external proxies 
assume that perception of quality is the measure of quality, while internal proxies 
assume that the extent or comprehensiveness of information is the measure of 
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information quality. Since external proxies were not available, the most appropriate 
approach to use was the disclosure index technique, which is the most popular and most 
advanced technique for measuring narratives in a report. It is flexible enough to 
incorporate qualitative and quantitative aspects of the information. The process of 
development, and later the application, of the disclosure index was carefully 
implemented to ensure that the methodology had a high degree of reliability and 
validity. The validity of the index was strengthened by ensuring that the index was 
validated by experts and experienced practitioners in the New Zealand public sector 
management system. The reliability of the index was tested by ensuring that the 
difference between scores in the test-retest procedure, as well as the inter-coder 
reliability test procedure, was less than 1%.  
 Multiple case studies were selected, due to the need to gain richer data to enable 
the identification of various concepts and aspects discussed in the theoretical 
framework. Nine agencies with the role of preparers were selected for the study. These 
agencies were randomly selected, based on the result of the disclosure analysis. In 
addition, two institutions in the central agencies – the Treasury and SSC – and the OAG 
were also selected, to provide corroboration and possibly different perspectives on the 
same issues. Interviews were the main method of data collection. A document study was 
used as a secondary method, to complement the results gathered from interviews. The 
results from interviews and the document study were coded and analysed based on the 
theoretical framework used. 
Conclusion and Impacts 
 The results of the disclosure analysis show that the quality of performance 
information is still low. This is consistent with the assertions made by the OAG on the 
same matter. In terms of output information, the level of information provided was, as 
predicted, stable over the period of analysis, as the practice of disclosing this 
information had been established for more than a decade before the period of analysis. 
The disclosed information for the whole period of analysis was around 69% of a 
complete set of information, as an average rate. The only measure of output information 
that was disclosed comprehensively was the quantity measure. The quality, timeliness, 
location and cost of outputs were only partially disclosed. In terms of outcome 
information, there was a large and noticeable initial jump in the level of outcome 
information provided, but a very small increase of information over time. On average, 
only around a third of a complete set of outcome information was reported by agencies 
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six years after the roll out of the MfO initiative. The quality of disclosure is good in 
only two areas: the outcome definition and the outcome framework. Other aspects, such 
as outcome measures, intervention logic (attribution from output to outcome) and risk 
identification, were only in part disclosed or just poorly disclosed. 
 There is no indication that output information has improved because of the MfO 
initiative. There is also no indication that agencies made adjustments to their outputs in 
order to align them with the outcomes selected. There is considerable evidence that 
agencies tried to give information in the accountability documents that showed they 
identified their outcomes and the link between their outputs to various levels of 
outcomes. However, there is no indication that these agencies are continuously 
monitoring outcomes, since they were not able to provide targeted indicators for their 
outcomes. The only indicators that some of these agencies could provide were actual 
indicators of outcomes, but there is no evidence that links the achievement of outcomes 
with the outputs that they delivered. 
 While it must be acceptable for the quality of outcome information to have been 
very low in the earlier years of the MfO initiative, it is disappointing to see that the 
quality, as measured by comprehensiveness of information, did not increase rapidly in 
the later years. There was only gradual increase in the comprehensiveness of 
information supplied over time. There were some noticeable jumps in the 
comprehensiveness of information provided in the second year for three agencies, 
indicating that they had learnt from their experience in the first year. One agency 
showed a decreasing level in the quality of outcome information being provided over 
time. Overall, it seems to be quite a difficult challenge for agencies to come up with 
credible performance information. 
 The score results may indicate that compliance is the main motive for agencies 
for performance reporting. Professional guidance (TPA-9), which is not authoritative, 
was largely ignored, resulting in some mandatory information not being disclosed in the 
accountability documents. This information, such as an explanation for output class 
changes, variance disclosure and cost allocation disclosure, is either barely reported or 
not reported at all. Consequently, some recommended and voluntary information is also 
barely disclosed. Most of the respondents claimed that they followed Treasury guidance 
in the preparation of the SOI and the annual report. The disclosure analysis results 
support this claim for some components of information. It seems that agencies followed 
the guidance given to the minimum level required. The first thing that they did was to 
use the same format. Then, they filled it in with information that they could produce. 
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The indication is that some targeted and actual measures of output were not reported in 
accountability documents. Furthermore, most indicators included in outcome 
information were not presented in quantitative terms. Some of the information required 
by Treasury guidance was also not reported, such as measures of and an explanation for 
cost-effectiveness and organisational health and capability. 
Three factors act to promote improvement in the quality of information provided 
by public sector agencies in the New Zealand setting. The first, and most important 
factor, is audit pressure on agencies. The OAG consistently and periodically pressured 
chief executives to provide better information over time. Another strong factor is the 
reputation of senior officials in the agencies. The concern about reputation is seen as the 
motivation for ministries/departments to provide more information, rather than just meet 
compliance requirements. Those chief executives who were also known as pioneers in 
applying outcome-based management to the New Zealand setting were able to produce 
more comprehensive outcome information in the earlier years of the MfO initiative. The 
third factor that promotes more disclosure of performance information is the presence of 
a possible funding increase. To compete and eventually secure an increase, agencies 
were willing to provide more information. 
The analysis of data gathered from the case studies identified several factors that 
contributed to the lack of meaningful progress seen in New Zealand performance 
reporting practice. First, the MfO initiative has changed the reporting incentives of 
ministers and agencies from the one that existed under the pure output reporting regime. 
In an output-based system, ministers may have an incentive to demand more 
information on outputs, but for outcome information, ministers seem to be less 
interested. They are responsible for outcomes, so they are less inclined to make this 
information available. Second, no incentives were in place to induce agencies to 
disclose more performance information. Performance information was not used at all in 
budget allocation mechanisms and only in a very limited way in the performance 
assessment of the agency chief executives. In addition, the lack of authoritative 
reporting standards in performance disclosure has limited the role of auditors in 
increasing the quality of information.  
The main actors in outcome-based management are ministers and chief 
executives. They should work together to set outcomes and later decide the most 
appropriate mix of outputs to be able to implement outcome-focused management. 
However, the only actor that is the focus of the MfO initiative is the chief executive. 
The other supporting actors, the central agencies and the OAG, cannot come up with the 
 171 
leadership necessary to ensure that the quality of information produced by public 
agencies improves over time. All the actors, in following their own interests, 
contributed to the current disappointing level of information being provided. Ministers 
are concerned with their own priorities and that no bad news emerges from their 
agencies. The chief executives‟ main motive is to comply minimally with the 
requirements. Central agencies have claimed that they had already done their job of 
introducing outcome-based management and requiring the disclosure of performance 
information. The Audit Office stated that their priority was to perform their mandated 
role of auditing financial information and output information. Nobody was concerned 
with whether outcome-based management was in operation or whether the outcome 
information really reflected a public sector operation focused on outcomes.  
Lastly, there are several challenges that need to be addressed if outcome-based 
performance management and accountability is to be progressed. First, there is a need to 
address ministers‟ capacity and capability to understand their departments‟ business, 
performance and capability. Second, there is a need to develop a culture of evaluation in 
the public sector, so that periodic reviews can be conducted to assess the impact of 
policies and the realignment of outputs to better achieve intended impacts. Third, 
meaningful reporting of policy advice is the most difficult task in performance 
reporting. Unless the measures employed are ones that drive the delivery of such 
outputs, the benefits of reporting performance on policy advice will never outweigh the 
costs. Fourth, managing for outcomes requires an environment of trial and error. In the 
current adversarial system of politics, it is hard to convince chief executives to 
experiment to find better ways of achieving outcomes. Fifth, when all actors cannot 
agree on what level of outcomes should be in operation, outcome-based management 
will never happen. There is always a tension between selecting a more volatile but 
visible short-term set of outcomes and a more stable but less visible long-term set of 
outcomes. Sixth, there is not much investment in the public sector information system. 
The skills and capability required to implement outcome-focused management is very 
limited in all public agencies. The information system in the public sector is not 
sophisticated enough to perform even the simple task of producing information on 
output costs. It may take a lot of investment to enable the system to monitor outcomes. 
If the principals desire implementation of outcome-based management, then they should 
allocate or increase funding to upgrade the information system. In the current setting, in 
which a strong desire for implementation is not present, there is limited for support 
spending money on such a system. Lastly, there is a possibility that outcome-based 
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performance management is just too difficult to be implemented and it is doomed to 
fail, as some respondents have stated. The disappointed level of the comprehensiveness 
of outcome information and the difficulty raised by some respondents in their effort to 
set the target on outcomes or to come up with outcome measures may show that the 
links between output-based agency performance and complex outcomes is very 
complicated. In this environment, an outcome-focused performance management is just 
impossible to be implemented in a structured system. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
 The issue explored in this research is the quality of disclosure. Quality is 
determined by the purpose of disclosure and for whom disclosure is intended. While 
measuring quality in relation to the fitness for purpose may be able to be achieved 
satisfactorily, an attempt to measure quality from the perspective of the readers of any 
disclosure is very challenging. It requires an assessment of the characteristics of readers. 
Different readers have different characteristics, making it difficult to determine what is 
considered to be the level quality that most readers would agree on as being good 
quality. A lesser challenge, but still a difficult one, is determining quality based on 
fitness for purpose, which is the challenge addressed in this study. One question 
regarding this challenge is what should be the content of disclosures on performance 
that represents fulfilment of the accountability requirement? There is no easy answer to 
this question. 
 Several proxies have been offered as measures of information quality in the 
academic studies but no dominant method has emerged from these studies. The only 
increasing trend seen was that more and more research on accounting disclosure has 
used some form of disclosure index methodology. This methodology is increasingly 
used because it is more flexible and it can be applied to any kind of complex disclosure 
on specific and general issues. 
 The present study is the first attempt to develop a disclosure index for non-
financial performance information. Therefore, the index is considered an experimental 
index, in which there is a possibility that the index cannot capture what is intended, 
which is to measure the quality of output and outcome reporting for accountability 
purposes. The items used were based on the requirements indicated and suggestions 
arising from official documents and literature. The required and suggested items of 
information used may be appropriate in a small and narrow context, in this case the 
context of New Zealand central government agencies during the implementation of the 
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Managing for Outcome initiative; but they may not be appropriate when the context 
changes. 
 A similar study could be undertaken on a large scale. One way to do that is by 
developing the index in the context of other types of government institutions, such as 
Crown entities or local government agencies. This may lend more credence to the index 
methodology used. A larger context may result in a broader application of the measure, 
resulting in the development of a more general index able to be used in assessing the 
quality of performance information produced. A more general index could have a 
broader appeal when it is being used in other studies investigating the quality of 
performance information in the broader New Zealand public sector. 
 Similar studies could also be undertaken in other jurisdictions. The limitation of 
the current index is that it is based on the setting of the New Zealand public 
management system. A more robust index could be developed if some comparative 
studies were done of countries adopting a similar focus of output and outcome in their 
public management system. The index developed in these studies could then have a 
much broader appeal and would become a universal index for measuring non-financial 
performance information. As more research uses the index, the construct validity of this 
measure will improve.  
 This study is also exploratory in nature, in its effort to investigate performance 
reporting practice using multiple case studies. The findings are preliminary and require 
further investigation of many of their aspects and dimensions before generalisations can 
be drawn. The depth of the study is compromised by the constraints encountered. Case 
studies that are more comprehensive are needed to further clarify details of the findings 
in this study. Furthermore, this present study targeted preparers and external quality 
controls on performance information reporting. A study that targets more actors in the 
public sector arena, such as the inclusion of ministers and members of select 
committees, may provide additional depth to the findings,  
 Finally, this study investigated the long-term process involved in the adoption of 
the MfO initiative. The findings are constrained by the theoretical framework used. If 
the findings were analysed within the context of a series of historical events they might 
provide a different but complementary view of the adoption of the initiative. A 
historical study of the MfO development and its adoption, targeting the main events and 
actors in the initiative, could usefully place the findings reported in a study of this kind 
in a proper historical context. 
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APPENDIX A 
Selected Research on Public Sector Performance Information 
 
Study by Document 
analysed 
Item of 
analysis 
Methodology Findings 
Boyne and 
Law (1991) 
Welsh District 
(UK) 
Council‟s SSP 
1981/1982 – 
1988/1999 
Performance 
information 
in 9 
categories 
Simple scoring 
method 
Poor quality, some 
measures of output 
and efficiency 
Boyne & 
Law (2005) 
Local 
authorities 
(UK) 
Performance 
indicators  
Categorization 
of performance 
indicator into 
12 dimensions 
Modest use of 
outcome indicators 
(49%) 
Ho & Ni 
(2005) 
21 cities in 
the US 
Performance 
indicators 
Indicator 
counting and 
categorisation 
Significant progress 
in performance 
measurement and 
reporting. Few 
services remain 
primarily output-
focused 
Poister & 
Streib 
(1999) 
US cities Performance 
indicators 
Indicator 
counting and 
survey 
Substantial use  of 
performance 
measures with some 
area exceptions. 
More use of 
workload and 
effectiveness 
measures, less use of 
unit cost and 
efficiency measures 
Robbins & 
Austin 
(1986) 
US cities Annual 
reports 
Disclosure 
quality index 
Coalition of voters, 
administrative power 
and management 
incentives are 
influencing the 
quality of disclosure. 
No material impact 
on the use of 
compound disclosure 
index 
Ryan et. al. 
(2002) 
Queensland 
local 
government 
councils 
Annual 
reports 
Local 
Government 
Accountability 
index 
The quality of 
reporting increased 
over time. Financial 
disclosure is more 
complete. 
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Study by Document 
analysed 
Item of 
analysis 
Methodology Findings 
Smith & 
Coy (2000) 
NZ local 
authorities 
Annual 
reports 
Accountability 
index 
The quality of 
reporting only fulfils 
the statutory 
requirements 
Thompson 
(1995) 
NZ Public art 
galleries 
Performance 
indicators 
Indicator 
counting and 
categorisation 
The essential 
requirements of a 
service performance 
report are not 
achieved 
Tooley & 
Guthrie 
(2007) 
NZ secondary 
schools 
Annual 
reports 
School 
Performance 
Accountability 
Disclosure 
Index 
Many schools 
presented limited 
performance 
information. 
Collier 
(2006) 
Police 
agencies in 
England and 
Wales 
Performance 
indicators 
Indicator 
counting and 
categorisation 
Changes in indicators 
from one initiative to 
another has not been 
incremental, 
unidirectional, and 
unambiguous. 
Carter 
(1991) 
Government 
departments, 
public 
agencies and 
private 
businesses 
Performance 
indicator 
Case studies: 
information 
characteristic 
related to 
organisational 
dimension 
Cross-cutting 
organisational 
characteristics are 
most helpful in 
explaining variation 
in the nature and use 
of PIs. 
Hyndman 
& 
Anderson 
(1995) 
UK Executive 
Agencies 
Performance 
indicators 
Indicator 
counting and 
categorisation 
Significant 
proportions of 
agencies reporting 
little or no 
information of 
efficiency and 
effectiveness 
Hyndman 
& Eden 
(2002) 
UK executive 
agencies 
Performance 
targets and 
indicators 
Target and 
measures 
counting 
There is a high 
degree of 
quantification and 
coordination in the 
performance 
measurement and 
performance 
reporting systems 
Hyndman 
& 
Anderson 
(1998) 
UK executive 
agencies 
Performance 
indicators 
Indicator 
counting and 
categorisation 
of measures 
into several  
characteristics  
Significant 
proportions of 
agencies reporting 
little or no 
information of 
efficiency and 
effectiveness 
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Study by Document 
analysed 
Item of 
analysis 
Methodology Findings 
Pendlebury 
et al. 
(1994) 
UK executive 
agencies 
Performance 
indicators 
Indicator 
counting and 
categorisation 
Less accountability to 
Parliament and the 
public more 
accountability to the 
customers of goods 
and services 
Rutherford 
(2000) 
UK executive 
agencies 
Performance 
indicators 
Data counting 
based on 
several 
information 
characteristics 
More emphasis on 
measures of 
efficiency and 
effectiveness 
A variety of different 
methods of 
presentation 
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APPENDIX B 
Selected Accounting Research using a Disclosure Index 
 
 
No. Object of 
Analysis 
Author(s) Focus Disclosure index or rating 
1. Annual reports Brennan (2001) The association between the difference of 
book to market value and the extent of 
intellectual capital asset disclosure 
A framework developed by Guthrie et. al. (1999) for 
intellectual disclosure framework involves 24 variables 
across three intellectual capital categories. 
2. Annual reports 
(public sector) 
Robbins & Austin 
(1986) 
The determinants of disclosure quality in 
municipal annual reports 
An index is developed by sending questionnaire to 
municipal bond analysts resulting 27 information items in 
the order of importance. Weighted scores are used. 
3. Annual reports Belkaoui & Karpik 
(1989) 
The relationship between the extent of 
social disclosure and some characteristics 
(social performance, economic 
performance, political visibility and 
contracting and monitoring costs) 
An index derived from Ernst and Ernst surveys of social 
responsibility disclosure (Ernst and Ernst, 1973) 
transformed into a scale, varies from 0 to 13, to represent the 
number of social responsibility programs. 
4. Annual reports Cowen et al. 
(1987) 
The relationship between a number of 
corporate characteristics and specific types 
of social responsibility disclosures 
An index derived from Ernst and Whinney 1978 survey of 
corporate social responsibility disclosure. The index has 
seven categories: environment, energy, fair business 
practices, human resources, community involvement, 
product safety and other disclosures). 
5. Annual reports, 
stand-alone 
reports and 
special website 
reports 
Ho & Taylor 
(2007) 
The determinants of triple bottom-line 
disclosures. 
Sixty disclosure items are selected to determine the extent of 
economic, social, and environmental reporting. The sources: 
2002 GRI Reporting Guidelines, Deloitte and Touche 
(2002), KPMG (2002) and Pacific Sustainability Index (PSI) 
Scoring Sheet and some literatures. 
6. IPO prospectuses Bukh et al. (2005) The relationship between the extent of 
intellectual capital disclosure and the firm‟s 
characteristics 
A disclosure index is developed based on a thorough 
inspection of the literature on corporate disclosure and 
intellectual capital reporting. There are 78 items in the 
index. 
 190 
No. Object of 
Analysis 
Author(s) Focus Disclosure index or rating 
7. Annual reports Leventis & 
Weetman (2004) 
The impact of dual reporting on the extent 
of voluntary disclosures 
A checklist based on the structure by Gray et. al. (1995) and 
Meek et. al. (1995). Some items are added based on 
theoretical and empirical supports. The list contains three 
disclosure categories: corporate environment (26 items), 
social responsibility (19 items) and financial (27 items). 
8. Management 
Discussion and 
Analysis 
(MDAs) 
Bryan (1997) The association between MD&A variables 
and future financial variables, the 
association between MD&A and Value-
Line Sales Forecast Revision, and the 
association between MD&A and stock 
returns. 
An index is developed based on the disclosures required for 
the MD&A. Each disclosure is classified by its direction 
(unfavourable, neutral, favourable or missing) 
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APPENDIX C: List of Items in the Disclosure Index 
Output Information 
1. Output Description 
a. Description of output class 
b. A list of detailed outputs 
c. Description of detailed outputs 
d. Explanation of output class change 
 
2. Cost disclosure 
a. Total actual cost for each output class 
b. Total planned cost for each output class 
c. Cost allocation method disclosure 
d. Variance disclosure 
 
3. Presentation of quantity measures 
a. Actual quantity (list of actual deliverables for binary-type output) 
b. Planned quantity (list of planned deliverables for binary-type output) 
c. Variance disclosure 
 
4. Quality description 
a. List of relevant quality dimensions 
b. Descriptions of relevant quality dimensions 
 
5. Quality benchmark used 
a. Subjective (internal) benchmark 
b. External benchmark 
c. External assessment of external benchmark 
 
6. Presentation of quality measures 
a. Actual quality measures 
b. Planned quality measures 
c. Variance disclosure 
 
7. Presentation of timeliness measures 
a. Actual timeliness measure 
b. Planned timeliness measure 
c. Variance disclosure 
 
8. Presentation of cost measures 
a. Actual cost measure 
b. Planned cost measure 
c. Variance disclosure 
 
9. Presentation of location measures 
a. Actual location measure 
b. Planned location measure 
c. Variance disclosure 
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Outcome Information 
1. Goals/objectives identification 
a. Description of goals/objectives 
b. Link between goals/objectives and outcomes in graphical/tabular form  
c. Elaborate explanation of the links between goals/objectives and 
outcomes 
 
2. Outcome description 
a. Title or short description of outcomes 
b. Explanation of each outcomes 
c. Outcome framework outlining high-level and low-level outcomes 
d. Explanation of the links between high-level and low-level outcomes 
 
3. Outcome target 
a. Broad statement of targets 
b. Quantitative targets 
c. Multi-dimension targets 
 
4. Outcome-output link discussion 
a. Simple linking statement 
b. Explanations to justify the links (intervention logic) 
c. Discussion of output alternative 
 
5. Discussion of other factors influencing outcomes 
a. Identification of the factors 
b. Explanation of the factors 
c. Management assessment of projections of the factors 
 
6. Presentation of outcome measures 
a. Planned outcomes 
b. Variance discussion 
c. Past outcomes (measures from previous periods) 
d. Current outcomes (measures from current periods) 
e. Comparative outcome data from other organisations and/or countries 
 
7. Cost effectiveness of the interventions 
a. Descriptions of cost effectiveness 
b. Explanation of measures of cost effectiveness 
c. Actual measures 
d. Planned measures 
 
8. Organisation health and capability to deliver outcomes 
a. Descriptions of organisation health and capability 
b. Explanation of measures of organisation health and capability 
c. Actual measures 
d. Planned measures 
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APPENDIX D: 
List of departments selected for disclosure analysis 
1. Archives New Zealand (Te Whare Tohu Tuhituhinga O Aotearoa) 
2. Crown Law Office 
3. Department of Building and Housing (Te Tari Kaupapa Whare) 
4. Department of Corrections (Ara Poutama Aotearoa) 
5. Department of Internal Affairs (Te Tari Taiwhenua) 
6. Department of Labour (Te Tari Mahi) 
7. Inland Revenue Department (Te Tari Taake) 
8. Land Information New Zealand (Toitu te whenua) 
9. Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (Te Manatū Ahuwhenua Ngāherehere) 
10. Ministry of Defence (Manatu Kaupapa Waonga) 
11. Ministry of Economic Development (Manatū Ōhanga) 
12. Ministry for the Environment (Manatū Mō Te Taiao) 
13. Ministry of Fisheries (Te Tautiaki i nga tini a Tangaroa) 
14. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Te Manatū Aorere) 
15. Ministry of Health (Manatū Hauora) 
16. Ministry of Justice (Tāhū o te Ture) 
17. Ministry of Research, Science and Technology (MoRST) (Te Manatū Pūtaiao) 
18. Ministry of Social Development (Te Manatu Whakahiato Ora) 
19. Ministry of Women's Affairs (Minitatanga mō ngā Wāhine) 
20. New Zealand Customs Service (Te Mana Arai o Aotearoa) 
21. State Services Commission (Te Komihana O Ngā Tari Kāwanatanga) 
22. Statistics New Zealand (Te Tari Tatau) 
23. Te Puni Kōkiri (Ministry of Māori Development) 
24. The Treasury (Kaitohutohu Kaupapa Rawa) 
25. New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) (Te Ope Kaatua O Aotearoa) 
26. Parliamentary Counsel Office (New Zealand) (Te Tari Tohutohu Paremata) 
27. New Zealand Police (Ngā Pirihimana O Aotearoa) 
List of departments that are excluded due to unavailability of 
accountability documents for the period of observation 
1. Department of Conservation (Te Papa Atawhai) 
2. Education Review Office (Te Tari Arotake Matauranga) 
3. Government Communications Security Bureau 
4. Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 
5. Ministry of Education (Te Tāhuhu o te Mātauranga) 
6. Ministry of Pacific Island Affairs 
7. Ministry of Transport (Te Manatū Waka) 
8. National Library of New Zealand (Te Puna Mātauranga o Aotearoa) 
9. Serious Fraud Office (Te Tari Hara Taware) 
10. New Zealand Security Intelligence Service 
11. Office of the Clerk of the House of Representatives 
12. Parliamentary Service Commission 
13. New Zealand Food Safety Authority (Te Pou Oranga Kai O Aotearoa) (New 
Department) 
14. Ministry for Culture and Heritage (Te Manatū Taonga) (New Department 
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APPENDIX E 
TABLE 1 Relative scores for output information 
 
 
AGENCY
2003/2004 2004/2005 2005/2006 2006/2007 2007/2008
1 New Zealand Defence Force 0.81 0.83 0.82 0.83 0.87
2 Ministry of Economic Development 0.78 0.84 0.83 0.82 0.81
3 Ministry of Health 0.79 0.80 0.81 0.81 0.78
4 Ministry of Research, Science and Technology 0.79 0.78 0.80 0.78 0.80
5 The Treasury 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.76
6 Department of Internal Affairs 0.75 0.79 0.80 0.78 0.77
7 Ministry of Defence 0.76 0.77 0.79 0.79 0.74
8 Land Information New Zealand 0.79 0.77 0.73 0.76 0.72
9 Inland Revenue Department 0.77 0.77 0.72 0.80 0.71
10 Ministry of Fisheries 0.74 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.73
11 Ministry of Social Development 0.79 0.71 0.71 0.74 0.72
12 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 0.71 0.72 0.72 0.76 0.74
13 New Zealand Customs Service 0.74 0.74 0.69 0.74 0.68
14 Parliamentary Counsel Office 0.68 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.85
15 Crown Law Office 0.73 0.72 0.70 0.69 0.67
16 Ministry of Justice 0.69 0.65 0.69 0.72 0.68
17 Department of Correction 0.70 0.70 0.68 0.69 0.62
18 Statistics New Zealand 0.65 0.63 0.67 0.68 0.68
19 State Services Commission 0.61 0.63 0.64 0.66 0.71
20 New Zealand Police 0.64 0.69 0.64 0.65 0.61
21 Archive New Zealand 0.66 0.60 0.65 0.62 0.62
22 Te Puni Kokiri 0.48 0.66 0.69 0.67 0.51
23 Ministry of Housing 0.58 0.48 0.50 0.71 0.70
24 Ministry of Women's Affair 0.62 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.54
25 Department of Labour 0.53 0.58 0.54 0.51 0.50
26 Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 0.63 0.38 0.45 0.42 0.44
27 Ministry for the Environment 0.42 0.31 0.27 0.34 0.38
Mean 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.70 0.68
Median 0.71 0.71 0.69 0.72 0.71
Maximum 0.81 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.87
Minimum 0.42 0.31 0.27 0.34 0.38
Standard deviation 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12
OUTPUT INFORMATION SCORE
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TABLE 2 Average score for each disclosure item – output information 
 
DISCLOSURE ITEMS 03/04 04/05 05/06 06/07 07/08
A Output Description
1 Description of output class 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
2 A list of detailed outputs 0.96 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
3 Description of detailed outputs 0.96 0.93 0.89 0.93 0.93
4 Explanation of output class change 0.00 0.60 0.40 0.25 0.38
B Cost disclosure
5 Total actual cost for each output class 0.96 0.96 0.99 0.99 0.96
6 Total planned cost for each output class 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98
7 Cost allocation method disclosure 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00
8 Variance disclosure 0.19 0.37 0.34 0.42 0.35
C Presentation of quantity measures
9 Actual quantity (list of actual deliverables for binary-type output) 0.93 0.91 0.92 0.91 0.90
10 Planned quantity (list of planned deliverables for binary-type output) 0.73 0.71 0.69 0.70 0.71
11 Variance disclosure 0.53 0.48 0.52 0.54 0.54
D Quality description
12 List of relevant quality dimensions 0.90 0.87 0.87 0.92 0.92
13 Descriptions of relevant quality dimensions 0.74 0.71 0.71 0.73 0.75
E Quality benchmark used
14 Subjective (internal) benchmark 0.74 0.73 0.74 0.75 0.77
15 External benchmark 0.61 0.59 0.61 0.63 0.61
16 External assessment of external benchmark 0.60 0.58 0.60 0.62 0.60
F Presentation of quality measures
17 Actual quality measures 0.77 0.78 0.81 0.86 0.86
18 Planned quality measures 0.78 0.76 0.77 0.82 0.78
19 Variance disclosure 0.87 0.81 0.83 0.84 0.68
G Presentation of timeliness measures
20 Actual timeliness measure 0.73 0.69 0.70 0.70 0.71
21 Planned timeliness measure 0.65 0.64 0.63 0.63 0.64
22 Variance disclosure 0.78 0.63 0.67 0.71 0.76
H Presentation of cost measures
23 Actual cost measure 0.16 0.17 0.13 0.17 0.13
24 Planned cost measure 0.21 0.19 0.15 0.19 0.11
25 Variance disclosure 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.21 0.20
OUTPUT INFORMATION - TOTAL SCORE 14.88 14.71 14.60 15.03 14.89
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TABLE 3 Relative scores for outcome information 
 
AGENCY
2003/2004 2004/2005 2005/2006 2006/2007 2007/2008
1 Department of Correction 0.41 0.45 0.41 0.55 0.51
2 Ministry of Health 0.34 0.52 0.50 0.45 0.41
3 Inland Revenue Department 0.45 0.52 0.33 0.47 0.47
4 The Treasury 0.38 0.45 0.45 0.42 0.47
5 Ministry of Housing 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.45 0.41
6 Archive New Zealand 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.39 0.62
7 New Zealand Customs Service 0.34 0.34 0.28 0.34 0.38
8 Department of Labour 0.38 0.38 0.31 0.31 0.31
9 Department of Internal Affairs 0.28 0.28 0.34 0.38 0.38
10 Ministry of Justice 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.34 0.38
11 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 0.21 0.24 0.34 0.41 0.41
12 Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 0.24 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.44
13 New Zealand Defence Force 0.21 0.28 0.34 0.38 0.38
14 Statistics New Zealand 0.17 0.28 0.34 0.34 0.45
15 Ministry of Social Development 0.17 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35
16 New Zealand Police 0.30 0.29 0.30 0.32 0.33
17 Parliamentary Counsel Office 0.24 0.24 0.28 0.31 0.31
18 Ministry of Research, Science and Technology 0.17 0.43 0.43 0.17 0.17
19 Ministry of Economic Development 0.24 0.24 0.28 0.28 0.28
20 Ministry of Fisheries 0.17 0.21 0.24 0.34 0.34
21 State Services Commission 0.34 0.34 0.17 0.17 0.21
22 Land Information New Zealand 0.21 0.21 0.24 0.28 0.28
23 Te Puni Kokiri 0.07 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.28
24 Ministry for the Environment 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.18
25 Ministry of Defence 0.10 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.17
26 Ministry of Women's Affair 0.00 0.07 0.17 0.24 0.14
27 Crown Law Office 0.14 0.10 0.07 0.14 0.14
Mean 0.25 0.29 0.29 0.32 0.34
Median 0.24 0.29 0.31 0.34 0.35
Maximum 0.45 0.52 0.50 0.55 0.62
Minimum 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.14 0.14
Standard deviation 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.12
OUTCOME INFORMATION SCORE
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TABLE 4 Average score for each disclosure item – output information 
 
DISCLOSURE ITEMS 03/04 04/05 05/06 06/07 07/08
A Goals/objectives identification
1 Description of goals/objectives 0.78 0.81 0.70 0.74 0.74
2 Link between goals/objectives and outcomes in graphical/tabular form 0.59 0.56 0.59 0.63 0.67
3 Elaborate explanation of the links between goals/objectives and outcomes 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
B Outcome description
4 Title or short description of outcomes 0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
5 Explanation of each outcomes 0.74 0.85 0.89 0.96 0.96
6 Outcome framework outlining high-level and low-level outcomes 0.59 0.78 0.81 0.81 0.78
7 Explanation of the links between high-level and low-level outcomes 0.07 0.11 0.04 0.00 0.00
C Outcome target
8 Broad statement of targets 0.48 0.56 0.70 0.74 0.82
9 Quantitative targets 0.09 0.21 0.14 0.14 0.20
10 Multi-dimension targets 0.36 0.54 0.54 0.59 0.74
D Outcome-output link discussion
11 Simple linking statement (tabular or graphical form) 0.88 0.89 0.85 0.89 0.89
12 Explanations to justify the links (intervention logic) 0.04 0.15 0.19 0.15 0.15
13 Discussion of output alternative 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
E Discussion of other factors influencing outcomes
14 Identification of the factors 0.26 0.26 0.33 0.34 0.37
15 Explanation of the factors 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.15 0.07
16 Management assessment of projections of the factors 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F Presentation of outcome measures
17 Planned outcomes 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.04
18 Variance discussion n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
19 Past outcomes (measures from previous periods) 0.14 0.21 0.20 0.16 0.17
20 Current outcomes (measures from current periods) 0.18 0.24 0.18 0.12 0.15
21 Comparative outcome data from other organisations and/or countries 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00
G Cost effectiveness of the interventions
22 Descriptions of cost effectiveness 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.26 0.42
23 Explanation of measures of cost effectiveness 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.11 0.16
24 Actual measures 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.11
25 Planned measures 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
H Organisation health and capability to deliver outcomes
26 Descriptions of organisation health and capability 0.67 0.78 0.81 0.93 0.89
27 Explanation of measures of organisation health and capability 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.22
28 Actual measures 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04
29 Planned measures 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
OUTCOME INFORMATION - TOTAL SCORE 7.24 8.38 8.35 9.24 9.80
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APPENDIX F 
Disclosure Index Research Instrument - Scoring Instruction 
SCORING INSTRUCTION FOR INFORMATION AT OUTPUT CLASS LEVEL 
 
The scoring is applied to the Statement of Intent and the corresponding Annual Report. 
The coder should check both documents in following the instructions below. 
 
Items Instruction Control 
Description 
of output 
classes 
Identify the output classes and list them horizontally in the 
scoring sheet for output class level. This information is 
usually presented in the Statement of Intent and/or Annual 
Report. 
 
For each output class identify, put a score of 1 in the 
appropriate cell if there is a description of output class. This 
description should be more than the name or title of output 
class. This information is usually presented in the Statement 
of Intent and/or Annual Report. 
 
A list of 
detailed 
outputs 
For each output class, put a score of 1 in the appropriate cell 
if there is a list of names/titles for detailed outputs. The 
names/titles may be presented in a table. This information is 
usually presented in the Statement of Intent and/or Annual 
Report. 
 
Description 
of detailed 
outputs 
For each output class, put a score of 1 in the appropriate cell 
if there are descriptions of detailed outputs. These 
descriptions should be more than the name/title of output. 
This information is usually presented in the Statement of 
Intent and/or Annual Report. 
 
Explanation 
of output 
class 
changes 
Compare this year‟s SOI with last year‟s SOI. Check if 
there is/are an output class change(s). If an output class 
change is detected, identify if there is an explanation for the 
change. If yes, put a score of one in the cell that 
corresponding with the column of the changed output class. 
The change can be a modification or an addition to the 
output class. This information is usually presented in the 
Statement of Intent and/or Annual Report. 
 
Total actual 
cost for 
each output 
class 
For each output class, put a score of 1 in the appropriate cell 
if the information on actual cost is presented. These 
descriptions should be more than the name/title of output. 
This information is usually presented in the Annual Report. 
 
Total 
planned 
cost for 
each output 
class 
For each output class, put a score of 1 in the appropriate cell 
if the information on planned/budgeted cost is presented. 
These descriptions should be more than the name/title of 
output. This information is usually presented in the 
Statement of Intent and/or Annual Report. 
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Items Instruction Control 
Cost 
allocation 
method 
disclosure 
Put a score of 1 in the appropriate cell on average column if 
there is a disclosure on cost allocation method. This 
information is usually presented in the Annual Report. 
 
Variance 
disclosure 
For each output class, calculate if the variance between 
actual cost and planned/budgeted cost is 10% or more of the 
planned/budgeted cost. If no, put n/a (not applicable) in the 
proper cell. If yes, identify whether there is an explanation 
for the variance. If there is an explanation, put a score of 
one in the appropriate cell. This information is usually 
presented in the Annual Report. 
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SCORING INSTRUCTION FOR INFORMATION AT OUTPUT LEVEL 
 
The scoring is applied to the Statement of Intent and the corresponding Annual Report. 
The coder should check both documents in following the instructions below. 
 
Items Instructions Control 
 Identify the output and list them horizontally in the 
scoring sheet for output level. This information is usually 
presented in the Statement of Intent and/or Annual 
Report. 
 
Actual quantity 
for each output 
For each output, put a score of 1 in the appropriate cell if 
the information on actual quantity is presented. This 
information is usually presented in the Annual Report. 
 For binary-type output (output with a quantity of 
one), the actual quantity is deemed to be presented if 
there are a list of milestones/targets achieved or 
activities conducted. 
 
Planned 
quantity for 
each output 
For each output, put a score of 1 in the appropriate cell if 
the information on planned/budgeted quantity is 
presented. This information is usually presented in the 
Statement of Intent and/or Annual Report. 
 For binary-type output (output with a quantity of 
one), the actual quantity is deemed to be presented if 
there are a list of planned milestones/targets or 
activities. 
 
Quantity 
variance 
disclosure for 
each output 
For each output, calculate if the variance between actual 
quantity and planned/budgeted quantity is 10% or more 
of the planned/budgeted quantity. If no, put n/a (not 
applicable) in the proper cell. If yes, identify whether 
there is an explanation for the variance. If there is an 
explanation, put a score of 1 in the appropriate cell. This 
information is usually presented in the Annual Report. 
 For binary-type output (output with a quantity of 
one), the variance is determined if the planned 
milestones/targets are not achieved or planned 
activities are not completed. 
 
List of relevant 
quality 
dimensions 
For each output, identify if there is a list of quality 
dimension is disclosed. If yes, put a score of 1 in the 
appropriate cell. 
 The quality dimensions for policy advice outputs 
may be disclosed separately as a generic set of 
quality dimension. If is the case, then all policy 
advice outputs should get a score of 1. 
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Description of 
quality 
dimensions 
For each output, identify if there is a description on the 
list of quality dimension is disclosed. If yes, put a score 
of 1 in the appropriate cell. A description means a 
presentation of quality dimension of more than the 
name/title of the quality dimension. 
 The description of quality dimensions for policy 
advice outputs may be disclosed separately as a 
generic set of quality dimension. If is the case, then 
all policy advice outputs should get a score of 1. 
 
Subjective 
(internal) 
benchmark 
For each output, identify in the list of quality dimension 
that is applicable to this output whether internal 
benchmarks are used. If yes, put a score of 1 in the 
appropriate cell. Internal benchmark is benchmark 
established by the entity being assessed.  
 
External 
benchmark 
For each output, identify in the list of quality dimension 
that is applicable to this output whether internal 
benchmarks are used. If yes, put a score of 1 in the 
appropriate cell. Internal benchmark is benchmark 
established by entities/persons external to the 
organisation, including ministers, customers, etc. 
 
External 
assessment of 
benchmark 
For each output, identify whether the quality dimensions 
are assessed by entities/persons external to organisation, 
including ministers, customers, etc. If yes, put a score of 
1 in the appropriate cell. In the case there is no 
information regarding who made the assessment, it is 
assumed that the dimensions are assessed internally, so 
no score is given. 
 
Actual quality 
measures for 
each output 
For each output, put a score of 1 in the appropriate cell if 
the information on actual quality is presented. This 
information is usually presented in the Annual Report. 
 For binary-type output (output with a quantity of 
one), the actual quality is deemed to be presented if at 
least there is a general statement on the result of 
quality assessment applicable for this type of outputs. 
 
Planned quality 
measures for 
each output 
For each output, put a score of 1 in the appropriate cell if 
the information on planned/budgeted quality is presented. 
This information is usually presented in the Statement of 
Intent and/or Annual Report. 
 For binary-type output (output with a quantity of 
one), the planned quality is deemed to be presented if 
at least there is a general statement the expectation of 
the quality assessment for this type of outputs. 
 
Quality 
variance 
disclosure for 
each output 
For each output, calculate if the variance between actual 
quality measures and planned/budgeted quality measures 
is 10% or more of the planned/budgeted quality 
measures. If no, put n/a (not applicable) in the proper 
cell. If yes, identify whether there is an explanation for 
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Items Instructions Control 
the variance. If there is an explanation, put a score of 1 in 
the appropriate cell. This information is usually 
presented in the Annual Report. 
 For binary-type output (output with a quantity of 
one), the variance is determined if the expectation of 
the quality assessment differs from the result of the 
assessment. 
Actual 
timeliness 
measures for 
each output 
For each output, put a score of 1 in the appropriate cell if 
the information on timeliness measure is presented. This 
information is usually presented in the Annual Report. 
 For binary-type output (output with a quantity of 
one), the actual timeliness measure is deemed to be 
presented if at least there is information about dates 
or deadlines of activities in the output. 
 
Planned 
timeliness 
measures for 
each output 
For each output, put a score of 1 in the appropriate cell if 
the information on planned/budgeted timeliness measure 
is presented. This information is usually presented in the 
Statement of Intent and/or Annual Report. 
 For binary-type output (output with a quantity of 
one), the planned quality is deemed to be presented if 
at least there is information about planned dates or 
deadlines of activities in the output. 
 
Timeliness 
variance 
disclosure for 
each output 
For each output, calculate if the variance between actual 
timeliness measures and planned/budgeted timeliness 
measures is 10% or more of the planned/budgeted 
timeliness measures. If no, put n/a (not applicable) in the 
proper cell. If yes, identify whether there is an 
explanation for the variance. If there is an explanation, 
put a score of 1 in the appropriate cell. This information 
is usually presented in the Annual Report. 
 For binary-type output (output with a quantity of 
one), the variance is determined if there is 
information about planned dates are not similar the 
actual dates of activities in the output or if there is 
information that deadlines are not met. 
 
Actual cost 
measures for 
each output 
For each output, put a score of 1 in the appropriate cell if 
the information on actual costs is presented. This 
information is usually presented in the Annual Report. 
 
Planned cost 
measures for 
each output 
For each output, put a score of 1 in the appropriate cell if 
the information on planned/budgeted costs is presented. 
This information is usually presented in the Statement of 
Intent and/or Annual Report. 
 
Cost variance 
disclosure for 
each output 
For each output, calculate if the variance between actual 
cost and planned/budgeted cost is 10% or more of the 
planned/budgeted cost. If no, put n/a (not applicable) in 
the proper cell. If yes, identify whether there is an 
explanation for the variance. If there is an explanation, 
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Items Instructions Control 
put a score of 1 in the appropriate cell. This information 
is usually presented in the Annual Report. 
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SCORING INSTRUCTION FOR GENERAL OUTCOME INFORMATION  
 
The scoring is applied to the Statement of Intent and the corresponding Annual Report. 
The coder should check both documents in following the instructions below. 
 
Items Instruction Control 
Description of goals 
and objective 
If there is a section that discusses goals/objectives 
put a score of 1 in the appropriate cell. 
 
Link between goals 
or objectives and 
outcomes 
If there is an assertion of the link between 
goals/objectives and outcomes, put a score of 1 in 
the appropriate cell. 
 
Elaborate 
explanation on the 
link between goals 
and objectives 
If the above assertion is further explained, put a 
score of 1 in the appropriate cell. The elaborate 
explanation is deemed to be properly disclosed if at 
least a paragraph of discussion is presented, with a 
minimum of five sentences. 
 
Description of cost 
effectiveness 
If there is a short description on cost effectiveness 
of the interventions, put a score of 1 in the 
appropriate cell. The description is deemed to be 
presented if there is at least information on 
names/titles of cost effectiveness, a paragraph of 
discussion on cost effectiveness, and names/titles of 
measures used. 
 
Explanation on 
measures 
If each measure is further explained, put a score of 
1 in the appropriate cell. The explanation is deemed 
properly disclosed if at least a paragraph of 
discussion is presented, with a minimum of five 
sentences. 
 
Actual measures of 
cost effectiveness 
If actual result(s) on measures of cost effectiveness 
is/are presented, put a score of 1 in the appropriate 
cell. 
 
Planned measures of 
cost effectiveness 
If planned/targeted result(s) on measures of cost 
effectiveness is/are presented, put a score of 1 in 
the appropriate cell. 
 
Description of 
organisational health 
and capability 
If there is a short description on organisational 
health and capability, put a score of 1 in the 
appropriate cell. The description is deemed to be 
presented if there is at least information on 
names/titles of organisational health and capability, 
a paragraph of discussion on organisational health 
and capability, and names/titles of measures used. 
 
Explanation on 
measures 
If each measure is further explained, put a score of 
1 in the appropriate cell. The explanation is deemed 
properly disclosed if at least a paragraph of 
discussion is presented, with a minimum of five 
sentences. 
 
Actual measures of 
organisational health 
If actual result(s) on measures of organisational 
health and capability is/are presented, put a score of 
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and capability 1 in the appropriate cell. 
Planned measures of 
organisational health 
and capability 
If planned/targeted result(s) on measures of 
organisational health and capability is/are 
presented, put a score of 1 in the appropriate cell. 
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SCORING INSTRUCTION FOR INDIVIDUAL OUTCOME INFORMATION  
 
The scoring is applied to the Statement of Intent and the corresponding Annual Report. 
The coder should check both documents in following the instructions below. 
 
Items Instruction Control 
Identification of 
outcomes 
Identify the outcomes and list them horizontally in 
the scoring sheet for output level. The outcomes 
identified are the highest-level ones. 
 
Title or short 
description of 
outcomes 
For each outcome identified, if there is a short 
description on outcomes targeted, put a score of 1 
in the appropriate cell. The description is deemed to 
be presented if there is at least information on 
names/titles of outcomes, a paragraph of discussion 
on outcomes, and names/titles of measures used. 
 
Explanation of 
outcomes 
For each outcome identified, if each measure is 
further explained, put a score of 1 in the appropriate 
cell. The explanation is deemed properly disclosed 
if at least a paragraph of discussion is presented, 
with a minimum of five sentences. 
 
Outcome framework 
outlining hierarchies 
of outcomes 
For each outcome identified, if there is an outcome 
framework that outlines the relationship/link 
between different levels of outcomes, put a sore of 
1 in the appropriate cell. The outcome framework 
for all outcomes may be presented in one tabular or 
graphical format. If this is the case, then the 
information is deemed to be disclosed. 
 
Explanation of the 
links in the outcome 
framework 
For each outcome identified, if the links in the 
outcome framework is further explained, put a 
score of 1 in the appropriate cell. The explanation is 
deemed properly disclosed if at least a paragraph of 
discussion is presented, with a minimum of five 
sentences. 
 
Broad statement of 
outcome targets 
(qualitative targets) 
For each outcome identified, if there is a statement 
on the outcomes targeted, put a score of 1 in the 
appropriate cell. If a description of quantitative 
outcome target is presented, then the information is 
deemed presented.  
 
Quantitative 
outcome targets 
For each outcome identified, if there is/are 
quantitative outcome target(s), put a score of one in 
the appropriate cell. 
 
More than one 
outcome targets are 
presented 
For each outcome identified, if there is more than 
one indicator for outcomes targeted, put a score of 
one in the appropriate cell. 
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A simple assertion of 
the link between 
outputs and 
outcomes 
For each outcome identified, if there is an assertion 
of which outputs contribute to the outcome 
(intervention logic), put a sore of 1 in the 
appropriate cell. The assertion may be presented in 
one tabular or graphical format. If this is the case, 
then the information is deemed to be disclosed. 
 
An elaborate 
explanation of the 
intervention logic 
For each outcome identified, if the link between 
outputs and outcome (intervention logic) is further 
explained, put a score of 1 in the appropriate cell. 
The explanation is deemed properly disclosed if at 
least a paragraph of discussion is presented, with a 
minimum of five sentences. 
 
Discussion of output 
alternatives 
For each output, if the presentation on intervention 
logic contains discussion on output alternatives that 
have been considered in the planning process, put a 
score of 1 in the appropriate cell. The description is 
deemed to be presented if there is at least 
information on names/titles of alternative outputs 
and a paragraph of discussion on the outputs. 
 
Identification of 
other factors/risks 
influencing 
outcomes 
For each output, if the presentation on intervention 
logic contains discussion on factors/risks that are 
considered to influence the outcomes, put a score of 
1 in the appropriate cell. The description is deemed 
to be presented if there is at least information on 
names/titles of alternative outputs and a sentence of 
description on the outputs. 
 
Explanation of the 
factors/risks 
influencing 
outcomes 
For each outcome identified, if the factors/risks that 
influence outcome are elaborated, put a score of 1 
in the appropriate cell. The explanation is deemed 
properly disclosed if at least a paragraph of 
discussion is presented, with a minimum of five 
sentences. 
 
Management 
assessment or 
projection on the 
factors/risks 
For each outcome identified, if there is an 
assessment or projection on the factors/risks that 
influence outcome, put a score of 1 in the 
appropriate cell. The explanation is deemed 
properly disclosed if at least there is a discussion on 
the current state and the projection of future state of 
the factors/risks. 
 
Planned/targeted 
outcomes 
(quantitative 
indicators) 
For each outcome identified, if there is/are 
quantitative target(s) on outcome indicators 
presented, put a score of 1 in the appropriate cell. 
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Items Instruction Control 
Current results on 
outcome indicators 
(measures from the 
current period) 
For each outcome identified, if there is a disclosure 
of actual outcome indicator(s) measured in the 
current period of the Statement of Intent and 
Annual Report, put a score of 1 in the appropriate 
cell. 
 
Past results on 
outcome indicators 
(measures from past 
periods) 
For each outcome identified, if there is a disclosure 
of actual outcome indicator(s) measurement of 
previous periods, put a score of 1 in the appropriate 
cell. 
 
Discussion on 
outcome variance 
For each outcome identified, calculate if the 
variance between actual outcome indicator(s) and 
planned/budgeted outcome indicator(s) is 10% or 
more of the planned/budgeted cost. If no, put n/a 
(not applicable) in the proper cell. If yes, identify 
whether there is an explanation for the variance. If 
there is an explanation, put a score of 1 in the 
appropriate cell. If planned and/or actual outcome 
indicator(s) is/are not available, put n/a (not 
applicable) in the appropriate cell 
 
Comparative 
outcome data 
For each outcome identified, if there is a disclosure 
of similar outcome indicator(s) measurement from 
other entities and/or jurisdictions, put a score of 1 
in the appropriate cell. 
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APPENDIX G 
Scoring Example 
SCORING AT OUTPUT CLASS LEVEL FOR DEPARTMENT XYZ  
THE STATEMENT OF INTENT AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2003/2004 
 
 
 
Note: 
The average score is used to calculate the total score of disclosure items. It represents the comprehensiveness of item information. In this 
example, the total score of information at output class level is 5 from 6 applicable items.
DISCLOSURE ITEMS D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 avrg
A Output Description
1 Description of output class 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0.7
2 A list of detailed outputs 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.8
3 Description of detailed outputs 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.9
4 Explanation of output class change n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
B Cost disclosure
5 Total actual cost for each output class 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0.8
6 Total planned cost for each output class 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.8
7 Cost allocation method disclosure 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 Variance disclosure n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
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SCORING EXAMPLE 
SCORING AT OUTPUT LEVEL FOR DEPARTMENT XYZ 
THE STATEMENT OF INTENT AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2003/2004 
 
 
 
Note: 
Detailed outputs for output class D5-D7 are not skipped in the above table. The average score is used to calculate the total score of 
disclosure items. The average scores presented in the table are the scores for all detailed outputs for output class D1-D10. It represents the 
comprehensiveness of item information. In this example, the total score of information at output level is 10.45 from 17 applicable items. 
Thus, total score for output information is 15.45 out of 33 applicable items, resulting in 0.67 in terms of relative score.
DISCLOSURE ITEMS D1.01 D1.02 D1.03 D1.04 D1.05 D2.01 D2.02 D2.03 D2.04 D2.05 D3.01 D4.01 D4.02 D8.01 D9.01 D9.02 D9.03 D10.01 D10.02 D10.03 avrg
C Presentation of quantity measures
9 Actual quantity 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0.95
10 Planned quantity 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0.95
11 Variance disclosure n/a n/a n/a n/a 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 1 n/a n/a 1 n/a 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a 1
D Quality description
12 List of relevant quality dimensions 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.975
13 Descriptions of relevant quality dimensions 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0.375
E Quality benchmark used
14 Subjective (internal) benchmark 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.55
15 External benchmark 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.575
16 External assessment of external benchmark 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.575
F Presentation of quality measures
17 Actual quality measures 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.975
18 Planned quality measures 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.975
19 Variance disclosure 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a 1
G Presentation of timeliness measures
20 Actual timeliness measure 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.275
21 Planned timeliness measure 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.275
22 Variance disclosure n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 1 1 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a 1
H Presentation of cost measures
23 Actual cost measure 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
24 Planned cost measure 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
25 Variance disclosure n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
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SCORING EXAMPLE 
SCORING FOR OUTCOME INFORMATION FOR DEPARTMENT XYZ 
THE STATEMENT OF INTENT AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2003/2004 
 
 
 
Note: 
The average score is used to calculate the total score of disclosure items. It represents 
the comprehensiveness of item information. Thus, total score for outcome information 
is 9 out of 28 applicable items, resulting in 0.32 in terms of relative score. 
DISCLOSURE ITEMS Obj 1 Avg
A Goals/objectives identification
1 Description of goals/objectives 1 1
2 Link between goals/objectives and outcomes in graphical/tabular form 1 1
3 Elaborate explanation of the links between goals/objectives and outcomes 0 0
H Cost effectiveness of the interventions
22 Descriptions of cost effectiveness 0 0
23 Explanation of measures of cost effectiveness 0 0
24 Actual measures 0 0
25 Planned measures 0 0
I Organisation health and capability to deliver outcomes
26 Descriptions of organisation health and capability 1 0
27 Explanation of measures of organisation health and capability 0 0
28 Actual measures 0 0
29 Planned measures 0 0
DISCLOSURE ITEMS OC1 OC2 OC3 Avg
B Outcome description
4 Title or short description of outcomes 1 1 1 1
5 Explanation of each outcomes 1 1 1 1
6 Outcome framework outlining high-level and low-level outcomes 1 1 1 1
7 Explanation of the links between high-level and low-level outcomes 0 0 0 0
C Outcome target
8 Broad statement of targets 1 1 1 1
9 Quantitative targets 1 1 1 1
10 Multi-dimension targets 1 1 1 1
D Outcome-output link discussion
11 Simple linking statement (tabular or graphical form) 1 1 1 1
12 Explanations to justify the links (intervention logic) 0 0 0 0
13 Discussion of output alternative 0 0 0 0
E Discussion of other factors influencing outcomes
14 Identification of the factors 0 0 0 0
15 Explanation of the factors 0 0 0 0
16 Management assessment of projections of the factors 0 0 0 0
F Presentation of outcome measures
17 Planned outcomes 0 0 0 0
18 Variance discussion n/a n/a n/a n/a
19 Past outcomes (measures from previous periods) 1 1 1 1
20 Current outcomes (measures from current periods) 1 1 1 1
21 Comparative outcome data from other organisations and/or countries 0 0 0 0
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APPENDIX H 
Ethics Information Sheets 
 
ETHICS INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS FROM CENTRAL 
AGENCIES AND THE OFFICE OF AUDITOR GENERAL 
 
 
 
Interviewee Information Sheet for a Study of Performance Reporting by New 
Zealand Central Government Agencies 
 
Researcher: Rahmadi Murwanto: School of Accounting and Commercial Law, 
Victoria University of Wellington  
 
I am a PhD student in the School of Accounting and Commercial Law at Victoria 
University of Wellington. As part of this degree I am undertaking a research project 
leading to a thesis. The project I am undertaking is assessing longitudinally the increase 
in the quality of performance information as a result of the Managing for Outcome 
Initiative. I will also identify the internal and external factors to influence the increase in 
the quality of performance information over time. The University required that ethics 
approval be obtained for research involving human participants. The ethics approval has 
been obtained. 
  
I am inviting officials in the New Zealand Central Government Agencies to participate 
in this study. Participants will be interviewed on a set of open questions on their view of 
the development of Managing for Outcome Initiative and/or its impacts on the quality of 
their institution‟s performance information. Each interview will last around 60-90 
minutes. The interview will be at the place of your convenience. It will be recorded and 
transcribed. Once the interview is transcribed, you have the right to check the full 
interview transcript to clarify or to change your response if you wish to no later than 5 
April 2010. A follow-on interview may be conducted to further clarify the responses 
before 5 April 2010. 
 
Should any participants feel the need to withdraw from the project, they may do so 
without question at any time before 5 April 2010 when the data is analysed. Just let me 
know at any time before this date.  
 
Responses collected will form the basis of my research project and will be put into a 
written report on an anonymous basis and will thus not be associated with names of 
participants. However, it may be possible that your organisations to be identified when 
specific functions associated with your responses are discussed in the report. All 
material collected will be kept confidential. No other person besides me and my 
supervisors, Prof Tony van Zijl and Dr Bhagwan Khanna, will see the records and 
transcripts. The thesis will be submitted for marking to the School of Accounting and 
Commercial Law and deposited in the University Library. It is intended that one or 
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more articles will be submitted for publication in scholarly journals. The records and 
transcripts will be destroyed two years after the end of the project. 
  
If you have any questions or would like to receive further information about the project, 
please contact me at 021 264 7312 or my supervisor, Prof Tony van Zijl, at the School 
of Accounting and Commercial Law at Victoria University, P O Box 600, Wellington, 
phone 04 463 5329, and Dr Bhagwan Khanna at the School of Accounting and 
Commercial Law at Victoria University, P O Box 600, Wellington, phone 04 463 5843. 
 
Rahmadi Murwanto     Signed: 
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ETHICS INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS FROM 
MINISTRIES/DEPARTMENTS DESIGNATED AS PREPARERS 
 
 
 
 
 
Interviewee Information Sheet for a Study of Performance Reporting by New 
Zealand Central Government Agencies 
 
Researcher: Rahmadi Murwanto: School of Accounting and Commercial Law, 
Victoria University of Wellington  
 
I am a PhD student in the School of Accounting and Commercial Law at Victoria 
University of Wellington. As part of this degree I am undertaking a research project 
leading to a thesis. The project I am undertaking is assessing longitudinally the increase 
in the quality of performance information as a result of the Managing for Outcome 
Initiative. I will also identify the internal and external factors to influence the increase in 
the quality of performance information over time. The University required that ethics 
approval be obtained for research involving human participants. The ethics approval has 
been obtained. 
  
I am inviting officials in the New Zealand Central Government Agencies to participate 
in this study. Participants will be interviewed on a set of open questions on their view of 
the development of Managing for Outcome Initiative and/or its impacts on the quality of 
their institution‟s performance information. Each interview will last around 60-90 
minutes. The interview will be at the place of your convenience. It will be recorded and 
transcribed. Once the interview is transcribed, you have the right to check the full 
interview transcript to clarify or to change your response if you wish to no later than 5 
April 2010. A follow-on interview may be conducted to further clarify the responses 
before 5 April 2010. 
 
Should any participants feel the need to withdraw from the project, they may do so 
without question at any time before 5 April 2010 when the data is analysed. Just let me 
know at any time before this date.  
 
Responses collected will form the basis of my research project and will be put into a 
written report on an anonymous basis and will thus not be associated with names and 
organisations of participants. All material collected will be kept confidential. No other 
person besides me and my supervisors, Prof Tony van Zijl and Dr Bhagwan Khanna, 
will see the records and transcripts. The thesis will be submitted for marking to the 
School of Accounting and Commercial Law and deposited in the University Library. It 
is intended that one or more articles will be submitted for publication in scholarly 
journals. The records and transcripts will be destroyed two years after the end of the 
project. 
  
If you have any questions or would like to receive further information about the project, 
please contact me at 021 264 7312 or my supervisor, Prof Tony van Zijl, at the School 
of Accounting and Commercial Law at Victoria University, P O Box 600, Wellington, 
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phone 04 463 5329, and Dr Bhagwan Khanna at the School of Accounting and 
Commercial Law at Victoria University, P O Box 600, Wellington, phone 04 463 5843. 
 
Rahmadi Murwanto     Signed: 
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CONSENT TO PARTICIPATION IN RESEARCH  
 
Title of project: Performance Reporting by New Zealand Central Government 
Agencies 
 
 
Please tick the following statement to indicate your consent to participation in this 
research. 
 
 
I have been given and have understood an explanation of this research project. I have 
had an opportunity to ask questions and have them answered to my satisfaction.  
Y  N  
 
I wish to check the interview transcript before 5 April 2010 (before data collection and 
analysis is complete).        Y  N  
 
I understand that a follow on interview may be conducted to further clarify my 
responses before 5 April 2010 (before data collection and analysis is complete).  
Y  N  
 
I understand that I may withdraw myself (or any information I have provided) from this 
project and the tape recordings will be wiped no later than 5 April 2010 (before data 
collection and analysis is complete) without having to give reasons. Y  N  
 
I understand that any information I provide will be kept confidential to the researcher 
and the supervisor, the published results will not use my name, and that no opinions will 
be attributed to me in any way that will identify me.      
Y  N  
 
I understand that the tape recording of interviews will be electronically wiped on 31 
August 2012 (two years after the project ends) unless I indicate that I would like them 
returned to me.         
          Y  N  
 
 
 
Name:       Signed: 
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Interview Research Instrument 
 
INTERVIEW TARGETS AND THE LIST OF QUESTIONS 
 
Top management (CEO or CFO) of selected NZ central government agencies 
 
1. What are the expectations of the Minister, Parliament, and/or other parties (such 
as the Office of Auditor General, the Treasury and the State Services 
Commissions) on the level of the quality of performance information reported? 
2. Does the quality of non-financial performance information (output and outcome 
information) reflect your efforts in informing the stakeholders on your 
achievement in managing the agency? Why or Why not? 
3. Are there any incentives or benefits personally and organisation-wise that might 
be received or are received from reporting the performance information (output 
and outcome information) in your corporate report? If so, what are the 
incentives? 
4. Are there any impacts your reputation as a professional executive of a public 
agency by reporting the performance information in the corporate reports? If so, 
what are the impacts? 
5. Is there any concern for revealing more performance information? What are the 
concerns, if any? 
6. How do you create a boundary of the level of performance information to be 
disclosed to the public? 
7. Do you have any concern that any reported information might be used against 
you or your agency? What are the concerns, if any? 
8. Are there any constraints in reporting your performance? If so, what are the 
constraints that you identify? 
9. What is your opinion on the reporting standards or reporting requirement for 
output and outcome information? Are they helpful in prescribing you what to 
report? 
10. Do you consider that the agency‟s reported performance (its outputs and 
outcomes) is influenced by some factors beyond the agency‟s control? 
11. What is your opinion if some parts of your compensation (salary and/or bonus) 
are based on the reported figure of the organisation‟s output and/or outcome?  
 
Staff in charge of the SOI and Annual Report preparation of selected NZ central 
government agencies 
 
1. How output measures in the SOI and the Annual Report is developed? Does it 
involve these parties below for the development of output information? If so, 
what are their roles? 
a. The Ministers 
b. Members of Parliament 
c. Users of your products/services 
d. Auditors 
e. Others (please identify) 
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2. The TPA-9 recommends for 5 components of output information (quantity, 
quality, timeliness, location and cost). Why are some components not reported 
(such as quality, location and/or cost per output)? 
3. How outcome measures in the SOI and the Annual Report is developed? Does it 
involve these parties below for the development of output information? If so, 
what are their roles? 
a. The Ministers 
b. Members of Parliament 
c. Users of your products/services 
d. Auditors 
e. Others (such as the Treasury, the SSC and the Office of Auditor General) 
4. Are the outcomes of your agency easily identified, developed and agreed by the 
parties involved in the development of outcome measures? Are there any 
disagreements during the process? If so, how do you resolve the disagreement? 
5. Considering that your agency delivers multiple services, do you consider that 
there are some difficulties in developing a coherent outcome framework for your 
agency? 
6. What are the difficulties in developing the outcome framework? 
7. How the performance information is collected, summarised, and reported?  
8. Are there specific resources used in these processes? 
9. How the capability to provide performance information is developed? Is there 
any specific information system and/or dedicated staff for this? Is there any 
specific training for the staff responsible for the preparation of performance 
information reported? 
10. Do you get any supports from these agencies below in the process of the 
development of the capability and/or the development of performance measures? 
If so, what are the supports? 
a. The Ministers 
b. Member of Parliament 
c. The Treasury 
d. The SSC 
e. The Office of Auditor General 
f. Other institutions (please identify) 
 
The Treasury: officials involved in the MfO initiative. The list of the questions: 
 
1. How do you involve in the MfO Initiative? Describe your involvement 
historically in the initiative. 
2. What is Pathfinder Project? What is its relation with MfO Initiative? What is the 
Treasury role in the Pathfinder Project? 
3. What are the impacts of MfO Initiative in the performance reporting practice in 
NZ public sector? Are these impacts are expected? Does the current reporting 
practice meet the targeted impacts set in the MfO Initiative? 
4. What are the important roles delivered by the Treasury in the MfO initiative? 
5. How the guidance documents for performance reporting (guidance for MfO, 
guidance for SOI preparation and guidance for Annual Report preparation) are 
developed?  
6. Did the Treasury conduct any evaluation processes during the implementation of 
MfO initiative, especially related to the quality of performance information 
reported? If so, what are major issues identified from this process? 
7. Are there any roles adopted or other actions taken by the Treasury to improve 
the quality of performance information of performance information? 
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8. Is there any specific support from the Treasury to each government agency in its 
preparation of performance information? 
9. In the budget allocation decision, is performance information is used as an 
input? 
 
State Services Commission: officials involved in the MfO initiative. The list of the 
questions: 
 
1. How do you involve in the MfO Initiative? Describe your involvement 
historically in the initiative. 
2. What is Pathfinder Project? What is its relation with MfO Initiative? What is the 
SSC role in the Pathfinder Project? 
3. What are the impacts of MfO Initiative in the performance reporting practice in 
NZ public sector? Are these impacts are expected? Does the current reporting 
practice meet the targeted impacts set in the MfO Initiative? 
4. What are the important roles delivered by the SSC in the MfO initiative? 
5. Does the SSC involve in the development of guidance documents for 
performance reporting? If so, what are the SSC‟s roles? 
6. Did the SSC conduct any evaluation processes during the implementation of 
MfO initiative, especially related to the quality of performance information 
reported? If so, what are major issues identified from this process? 
7. Are there any roles adopted or other actions taken by the SSC to improve the 
quality of performance information of performance information? 
8. Is there any specific support from the Treasury to each government agency in its 
preparation of performance information? 
9. In the evaluation of CEO‟ performance and/or determination of their 
compensation, is performance information is used as an input? 
 
 
The Office of Auditor General: officials involved in the MfO initiative or 
performance reporting audit policy and the auditors. The list of the questions: 
 
For officials involved in the MfO initiative or performance reporting audit policy: 
1. How do you involve in the MfO Initiative? Describe your involvement 
historically in the initiative. 
2. What are the important roles delivered by the OAG in the MfO initiative? 
3. Are there any roles adopted or other actions taken by the OAG to improve the 
quality of performance information of performance information? 
4. Is there any specific support from the OAG to each government agency in its 
preparation of performance information? 
 
The auditors: 
1. Do you provide a review of outcome information reported in the SOI and the 
Annual Report of the Agency? How the review is done? 
2. How the audit is done for the Statement of Service Performance? 
3. What reporting standards/guidance do you use in the review of the SOI and the 
audit of the Statement of Service Performance? 
4. How much time and resources (in a percentage of total time and resources spent 
for the audit) do you spend for auditing/reviewing the Statement of Service 
Performance and the disclosure of outcome information? 
5. Do you provide any specific advices to improve the outcome information 
reported? The output information reported? 
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